

Introduction

Living in a safer and more peaceful world is the international community's old dream. This fact is particularly true for the situation arisen following the collapse of the European communist world order which had been established as a result of the WWII. However, this has resulted not only positive changes but also a number of safety risks. Especially the collapse of the Soviet Union has created such an international environment when people could worry about the possibility of getting nuclear technology and nuclear weapons into hands of such countries and organizations which could represent security challenge for the world. To prevent that, the fight against the spread of the weapons of mass destruction has become a key issue of our days. It is especially true for the period following the terror attack against the United States of America on 11 September 2001.

To prevent the further spread of the weapons of mass destruction the international coalition led by Washington has called a fight against the international terrorism. In this fight North Korea, which has been confessedly working on producing nuclear weapons for almost two decades, represents a significant element. Besides the Pyongyang administration's declaration that it possesses nuclear weapons the question whether it has reached its aim is not proved yet.

The processing of this issue provided an opportunity for reviewing the security situation in the North-East Asia region and for the rough introduction of the differences lying between North and South Korea.

In the course of the preparation for my work I received a lot of help from Korean researchers examining this topic, from diplomats, and from experts participating in negotiations between North and South Korea. I would like to highlight the Institute of Foreign Affairs and National Security (IFANS), the leaders of which and the colleagues of its library were always ready to help me in my work. Professor Kim Sung-Han, Director-General for American Studies in the Institute supported my work as an external consultant as well as Choi Jinwook, senior researcher at Korean National Union Institute (KINU). I also would like to express my acknowledgement to Mr. András Tóth, deputy head of the Security Politics and Non-Proliferation Main Department at the Hungarian Ministry of Foreign Affairs, to Dr. István Horváth, head of the International EU Legal Main Department, our formerly delegated ambassador to the International Atomic Energy Agency.

I. Historiography review

In the topic of hindering the widespread of weapons of mass destruction a wide selection of professional works and documents is available for a researcher. The international literature introducing the North Korean nuclear background, the so called first nuclear crisis, the 1990s, the Framework Agreement concluded between the United States of America and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea concluded in Geneva in 1994 is smaller but still significant. Considering that the second nuclear crisis and especially its solution are our days' tasks the available literature in the topic is mostly based on writings and analyses published in the daily newspapers and the professional magazines. As a consequence of these the documentation of the earlier events is mostly based on scientific works while the process of the latest events is rather built on those politicians' and diplomats' opinions, declarations and documents who participated in the talks.

Among the works processed I would like to highlight the following: Don Oberdorfer „The Two Koreas” and Kwang-Il Baek „Korea and The United States, A Study of the ROK-U.S. Security Relationship within the Conceptual Framework of Alliances between Great and Small Powers”, which process the period under review in details. Former US Secretary of the State, Henry Kissinger's book, „Diplomacy”, provides a comprehensive and extensive picture about the Asian politics of the great powers, about the background of the eruption of the Korean War and its effects on the United States' later point of view about the area.

It is important to mention David Cortright, David A. Hambrug and Cyrus R. Vance's book, „The Price of Peace, Incentives and International Conflict Prevention, Carnegie Commission on Preventing Deadly Conflict”, which explains via a row of historical examples how and by means of what kind of incentives managed to arrange a number of international conflicts and crises. The book details the North-Korean nuclear crisis, the way towards Framework Agreement signed in Geneva in 1994 and the agreement itself. Leon V. Sigal's „Disarming Strangers, Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea” is also an important document in the process of the history of the North-Korean nuclear problem.

The most comprehensive and most well known study and document volume in this subject was issued by Longman in 1992 with the title of *Nuclear non-proliferation: a reference handbook* with the edition of Darryl Howlett and John Simpson. The writers of the volume have piled up indispensable knowledge in the subject of the non-proliferation.

Other review books and articles about the methodology of the nuclear proliferation and about the NPT regime's theoretical and political connections also promoted my work, like: *Nuclear Non-Proliferation and Global Security*, edited by D.B. Dewitt (London: Croom Helm, 1987); D.A.V. Fischer, *Stopping the Spread of Nuclear Weapons: the Past and Prospects* (New York-London, Routledge, 1992); *Opaque Nuclear Proliferation: Methodological and Policy Implications*, edited by B. Frankel (London, Frank Cass&Co., 1991); John M. Deutsch's study: *The New Nuclear Threat*, which was published in 1992/4 issue of *Foreign Affairs* (pg. 120-134); Lewis A. Dunn's study: *Four Decades of Nuclear Proliferation: Some Lessons From Wins, Losses, and Draws* (In: *The Washington Quarterly* issue 1990/3 pg. 5-18); a book with the title of *Beyond 1995: The Future of the NPT Regime* edited by Joseph Pilat and Robert Pendley and published by Plenum Press in 1990; Leonard S. Spector, *A Historical*

and *Technical Introduction to the Proliferation of Nuclear Weapons* (Washington, DC, Carnegie Endowment for International Peace, 1992); Kenneth Waltz's study: *The Spread of Nuclear Weapons: More May Be Better* (Adelphi Papers, no. 71, 1981). The following documents also promoted my : *The Politics of Positive Incentives in Arms Control* edited by T. Bernauer and D. Ruloff published by the University of South Carolina Press in 1999 (with e.g. a A. Smithson study about North Korea: A Case in Progress in it); *The Price of Peace: Incentives and International Conflict Prevention* edited by D. Cortright (Lanham, MD, Rowman and Littlefield, 1997), with e.g. S. Snyder's study about North Korea's Nuclear Program: The Role of Incentives in Preventing Deadly Conflict in it; and *Honey and Vinegar: Incentives, Sanctions, and Foreign Policy* edited by R. Haass and M. O'Sullivan (Washington, DC, Brookings Institution Press, 2000) with such studies in it as e.g. L. Sigal's *The United States and North Korea: Cooperative Security on the Agreed Framework and Beyond*.

From the rich literature and source material about the North Korean crisis the materials listed below provide affluent information for the researchers: C. Martin's study: *The US-North Korean Agreed Framework: Incentives-based Diplomacy after the Cold War* (In: *Sanctions as Economic Statecraft: Theory and Practice*, edited by S. Chan and A.C. Drury. New York, St. Martin's, 2000, pg 86-109); R. James Woolsey's hearing in the senate: "Proliferation Threats of the 1990s." (in front of a Committee on Government Operations on 24 February 1993), W. Clinton's statement about the North Korean issue (U.S. Department of State Dispatch 1994. 5(44): pg 721) and R. Gallucci's statement (U.S. Department of State Dispatch 1994. 5(44): pg 721-722); document published in Government Printing Office in 2001 related to the 16 July hearings: *U.S. Congress, House Committee on International Relations, Subcommittee on East Asia and the Pacific, July 26. Hearing on US-North Korean Relations after the Policy Review*; Paul Bracken's study published in 1993: *Nuclear Weapons and State Survival in North Korea* (In: *Survival* 35: pg 121-136); Michael J. Mazarr's book: *North Korea and the Bomb: A Case Study in Nonproliferation* (New York: St. Martin's Press, 1995); Sigal, Leon V. *Disarming Strangers: Nuclear Diplomacy with North Korea* (Princeton, New Jersey, Princeton University Press, 1997); Y. Kihl and P. Hayes's book with the title of *Peace and Security in Northeast Asia: The Nuclear Issue and the Korean Peninsula* (Armonk, NY, M. E. Sharpe, 1997); *J. Laney and J. Shaplen's study published in Foreign Affairs volume 2003/2: Peace in Korea: A Roadmap for Talks* (82: pg 16-32); *J. Lee and C. Moon's study, The North Korean Nuclear Crisis* (In: *Security Dialogue* (2003) 34(2): pg 135-152);

Korean authors are providing a special approach: *Song Young Sun* [The Korean Nuclear Issue. In *Korea and World Affairs*, vol. 15, no. 3 (fall 1991): pg 471-493]; *Tae-Hwan Kwak and Seung-Ho Joo* [The Denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula: Problems and Prospects. In *Arms Control: Contemporary Security Policy* 2(1993): pg 65-95]; *V. Cha and D. Kang* (Nuclear North Korea: A Debate on Engagement Strategies. New York, Columbia University Press, 2003).

The studies published in professional magazines of the international politics supported the examination of the Korean issue significantly. These are: SIPRI Yearbook, United Nations Disarmament Yearbook, Verification Report; Arms Control Reporter, Arms Control Today, Bulletin of the Atomic Scientists, Bulletin of the Emerging Nuclear Suppliers Project, IAEA Bulletin, Nuclear Engineering International, Nuclear Fuel, Nucleonics Week, PPNN Newsbrief, Trust & Verify

II. The objective and the content of the study

1. Objective

WWII has resulted the division of the Korean Peninsula. It has created belligerent North and South Korea being in conflict with each other several times and being at war against each other between 1950 and 1953. However, in the course of the last decades the leaders of the two countries have attempted to establish the institutional system of the cooperation, substantive advance in the subject has not really happened. The first summit did not bring a breakthrough in the relations but opened the way for economic cooperation and for political and military dialogues. This, however, was not accompanied by the relief of the stress, the primary reason of which is the North Korean nuclear program, either on the Korean Peninsula or in its environment.

In the course of the past few years a number of documents, which were considered to be state secrets earlier have been opened for researchers even in the Hungarian National Archives. These documents disclose that the North Korean leadership has been aiming to own and produce nuclear equipment since the end of the Korean War. To realize their aim they frequently asked the Soviet Union and the former communist countries to help but they rejected to give the requested support. Therefore North Korea has developed its weapons of mass destruction by using its own resources and reached the level, which is not far from the level, which enables the missiles to reach the continental territories of the United States. Besides its missile development program North Korea is aiming to produce nuclear weapons as well. In the course of the realization of this objective North Korea is defying the international community, setting itself directly against the International Atomic Energy Agency, the United Nation's Security Council and resigns from the Non-Proliferation Treaty. And it does all of this while the economic situation of the country is catastrophic, millions of people are starving, and the only reason why it is not running into tragedy is that the world, with the United States of America in it, is providing catering for the inhabitants in the form of humanitarian aids.

Besides focusing on the North Korean nuclear program, the study is aiming to process the happenings in North Korea on basis of documents by providing a view to the country's aspirations to produce other weapons of mass destruction.

2. Content

2. 1. The security situation in North-East Asia at the end of the 20th century

However North-East Asia contains only a few countries, the region embodies a great security challenge. The two Koreas split by WWII, the nuclear great powers China and Russia can also be found here. In military alliance with the Republic of Korea and Japan the United States of America is also here with significant military power. There are no official relations between the United States and North Korea and North Korea and Japan. After all, North Korea ties up significant powers both in Washington and in Tokyo, which means serious danger for the security of the region with its nuclear and missile development program.

The North Korean nuclear program itself is a challenge for the non-proliferation system. However the real problem is that if it turns out to be impossible to stop Pyongyang's intention to produce weapons of mass destruction, the economically much more powerful and technically much better developed Japan, South Korea and Taiwan can decide that they also need to have nuclear weapons to guarantee their own security.

By the end of the 20th century it became obvious that the security challenges in Asia and especially in the North-East Asian region indicates more than a mere regional challenge. The economic and military interdependence required willingness for cooperation from the countries of the region as well, because it has become more and more clear that the strategy structure of the Asian region has moved from the bipolar order towards the direction of the multi-polar changes. After the disintegration of the Soviet Union Russia has stayed the leading nuclear power of the region. While the United States has decreased its military presence in the Asian and the Pacific Ocean regions, its strategic importance has not decreased. Japan has strengthened, but parallel with it China has also come to the front. In other words, unambiguous signs are indicating that serious economic and military interests are concentrated in the region in which the only superpower, the United States of America, is playing the main role, while the balance power is represented by Japan, Russia and China. On the other hand, there are more and more signs hinting that in the coming period the American dominancy can be questioned. China, which is speeding to attain the status of an economic great power, will put up for not only the role of the regional power but also for the recognition of its greater participation in the global politics than before.

It is obvious today that without Beijing's involvement it is impossible to make a decision in North-East Asian matters. Washington needs it both in its fight against international terrorism and in arranging the North Korean nuclear question. Tokyo, if it really aims to occupy a more serious role in the United Nations, has to arrange those disputes with Beijing and South Korea, which have been still burdening its relations with its neighbors since the time of the Japanese colonial period before WWII.

2. 2. Defense and military politics of great powers in the North-East Asian region

The United States of America is a significant factor in the respect of the security of North-East Asia. The Bush-administration handles the region as a highlighted one both in global and regional respects. It is aiming to strengthen the existing military alliance system with Japan and the Republic of Korea, and by so doing it is placing increasing pressure on North Korea persuading it to give its nuclear program up.

The primary objective of the American security strategy is an action against the terrorism as well as against the spread of the weapons of mass destruction (WMD). Furthermore, it is also aiming to manage the challenges, which China and Russia, risking the American positions represent.

Japan, the second greatest economic power in the world, a close ally of the US, which has been occupying greater and greater role in the field of its foreign and security politics in the last years, is working out common missile security cooperation with the United States.

The relation of Japan and China is also an important factor in the regional security. Japan does all it can to protect itself while - besides strengthening its defensive capacities - it is aiming to strengthen its own positions in North-East Asia in a way that follows the

triple principles for the denuclearization – policy of not possessing, not producing and not permitting the introduction of nuclear weapons into Japan.

The visible Chinese development is also influencing the security position of North-East Asia. In the White Book about defense approved in 2004 and in the interest of its territory and sovereignty, the country's peaceful development, the reforms, the open politics initiated by the Communist Party and the military modernization China decided to pursue defensive military politics. The army has to hinder the eruption of a local war based on modern weapons referring to the "one China" politics in connection with Taiwan.

In the new military doctrine approved in April 2000 Russia placed the main emphasis on the prevention of the military threat against the country. With preventive purposes and in the interest of the self-defense Russia and the countries belonging to the Commonwealth of Independent States do not exclude the usage of nuclear weapons and handle the security of the Russian Federation as a highlighted issue. The Russian administration is aiming to introduce a military reform in the country and to maintain the military superpower status.

2. 3. The Democratic People's Republic of Korea's nuclear and missile development program

The North Korean security politics question consists of two elements, the missile development and the nuclear problem.

The most neuralgic issue of the security of the Korean Peninsula and the whole North-East Asian region is the North Korean nuclear program. In North Korea the need for possessing nuclear weapons was arisen in the fifties. The reasons are obvious: the Korean War was just finished; the US settled nuclear weapons to South Korea. The question of the Chinese and Russian support became more and more insecure. At that time – primarily because the Soviet Union was not interested in the question – the Pyongyang administration did not get the requested support. The real development of North Korea's military type nuclear program got into its stride in the beginning of the nineties, which attracted the attention of the United States as well as of the International Atomic Energy Agency.

In order to realize the North Korean administration's nuclear program, following its session of the Central People's Committee in Pyongyang, on 12 March 1993 North Korea announces its intention to withdraw from the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT). The resign was explained by the International Atomic Energy Agency's intention to control the North Korean nuclear establishments and the annual American-South Korean Team Spirit military exercises.

The Clinton administration took the North Korean nuclear threat very seriously, considering it as a challenge against its own North-East Asian security aspirations, and thought that resigning from the NPT can threat the whole non-proliferation system. The Security Council of the UN was also engaged in the issue. With the abstention of China and Pakistan and with vote result of 13:0 the Security Council first, in the middle of March, called upon the Democratic People's Republic of Korea to let the International Atomic Energy Agency inspect its two nuclear objects. Then on 1 May 1993 also with 13:0 ratio – and with the abstention of China and Pakistan – it called upon the Pyongyang administration to let the inspectors of the International Atomic Energy Agency in and to withdraw its resign from the NPT. On 3 May

1993 North Korean Information Minister Kim Ki Yong announced that North Korea would rejoin the Nuclear Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT) if the following conditions are met: (1) the IAEA must remain neutral; (2) the IAEA must give assurances that military facilities will remain closed to foreign inspections; (3) the United States must guarantee that it would not use nuclear weapons against North Korea; and (4) the United States must withdraw all nuclear weapons and facilities from South Korea.

The American administration was ready to initiate talks with North Korea however they did not reach substantive results. At this time President Clinton did not exclude the possibility to arrange the question by military means. Thanking to former US President Carter it was evitable. President Carter arrived to North Korea on 15 June 1994 where he held successful meetings with Kim Il Sung. As a result of this the United States and the Democratic People's Republic of Korea started negotiations in Geneva on 9 July 1994, which were interrupted by the death of Kim Il Sung on the following day but which continued later. As a result of those parties signed an Agreed Framework on 21 October. In this framework a number of steps are clarified which cover the liquidation of the North Korean nuclear program and as a compensation for which the United States accepted to build two light water reactors. The agreement has not been fulfilled by either party. Both parties blame the other one for failing to fulfill the requirements.

The other group of the North Korean weapons of mass destruction is the missile development. On basis of the available data at the end of the '60s and at the beginning of the '70s North Korea armed itself with soviet Frog 3, 5 and 7 missiles. The 50-70 km range missiles could reach the South Korean capital, Seoul, situated app. 50 km in a straight line from the demarcation line from the northern territories. In the same time they represented no threat for territories situated farther. Therefore in 1976 the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, which felt threatened and lived in war psychosis all the time, hoped to get assistance from China to develop the 600 km range DF-61 ballistic missile. Before starting the cooperation with China North Korea acquired the production technology of the soviet Scud-B missile via Egypt. Later, thanking to Iran's and Egypt's help, North Korea successfully tested the Scud-B missile in 1984, the range of which was app. 320-340 km. With intensive work and with decreasing the missile's weight significantly from 985 kg to 500 kg, North Korea managed to increase to range of Scud-C missile to 500 km. It got tested successfully in June 1990 and the mass production started in 1991. North Korea, which was in economically difficult situation at that time, was keen on exporting weapons with Scud missiles among them, which represented almost the only convertible currency income opportunity for the country. It exported the missiles to a number of countries in the Near East – Libya, Syria, and Iran - but according to American sources they had customers in South America as well. However, Pyongyang is denying the news. In 1993 North Korea successfully tested the 1,300 km range Rodong-1 missile, which was able to reach Japan, and then in 1998 the 2,000 km range Taepodong-1 missile. According to data from the CIA the aim of the North Korean missile development program at that time was to develop such an intercontinental missile, which can reach the territory of the United States. Taepodong-2, which was able to send 1,000 kg weights at its target in the distance of 6,700 km, seemed to meet these conditions.

Continuing the missile development and the nuclear program raise such security questions for the countries of the North-East Asian territory and the great powers being present in the region like the United States, the arrange of which are essential.

2. 4. The second nuclear crisis

On 3-5 October 2002, as President George Bush's special envoy, Deputy Under-Secretary of the Department of Foreign Affairs in the United States, James A. Kelly, made an official visit in the Democratic People's Republic of Korea, where he pursued negotiations with his North Korean partners. Following the meeting – from American sources – such information came to light that first deputy minister of foreign affairs, Kang Sok Ju indirectly admitted that North Korea – despite those determined in the 1994 Agreed Framework – was continuing its nuclear program. The Korean party denied the allegations. Following this summit the processes sped up and within a short time the 1993-94 situation grew up again on the Korean Peninsula. Following the American declaration IAEA director Mohamed El Baradei expressed his deep sorrow for North Korea's continuing its nuclear program. In the same time he asked for urgent information from both North Korea and the United States in order that they could make a decision in the issue.

The United States – similarly to the situation in 1993 – faced the challenge resulted by the North Korean nuclear program again. The possibilities of the solution were similar to those ten years earlier:

- the international community acknowledges and accepts that the Democratic People's Republic of Korea is a country with nuclear weapons;
 - the question is arranged with military tools by destroying those objects where the weapons of mass destruction are presumably being produced;
 - in the way of negotiations they manage to convince the North Korean administration to give up its nuclear program and to destroy their existing nuclear weapons;
- but following September 2001 the United States' attitude towards the production of the weapons of mass destruction and towards the hinder of their spread and the whole international environment have significantly changed.

In the given situation it was unambiguous that the neighbors of North Korea as well as the whole international community are not ready to tolerate the fact that North Korea produces and possesses nuclear weapons. For the United States the nuclear weapon possessing North Korea is unacceptable because:

- Pyongyang can sell the plutonium applicable for producing nuclear weapons for third countries and for terrorist groups,
- in case the North Korean system collapses the nuclear weapons can get into the hands of military groups or political fractions and could get out of sight,
- in case the weapons stay under the central government North Korea can use them for forcing the United States to withdraw their troops from South Korea.

The most important aspect of all is that if the North Korean administration can resign from the NPT and can produce nuclear weapons without any consequences it can start a domino effect which can have serious impact primarily on the peace of the North-East Asian region but in a wider dimension on the peace of the whole world as well. It can easily happen that in a situation like this Japan, South Korea and Taiwan would consider it necessary and would feel authorized to produce own nuclear weapons which would shake NPT in its bases.

To put pressure on DPRK, the US was urging to address the issue to the Security Council of the UN. However, China and Russia hindered the Security Council to accept a declaration disapproving Pyongyang. On the other hand, it managed to achieve that the North Korean administration showed some intention to start the Beijing trilateral

negotiations involving the US, DPRK and China, which later continued in a six parties talks.

2. 5. The six party talks

The establishment of the forum of the six party talks had the basic aim to find a peaceful way to arrange the crisis caused by the North Korean nuclear program. The summoning of the talks was presumably been endorsed by North Korea's playing all its cards it could have improved its bargain position with. A substantial element was that instead of the five party talks initiated originally by the US the participants of the talks expanded to six and in this way a so called 3 + 3 circle was established. In other words, on one side there were the US, Japan and South Korea, while on the other side Russia, (Soviet Union), which had nurtured an allying relationship with North Korea, China and North Korea.

Compromises were needed not only on the part of Pyongyang but also on the part of Washington which was presumably promoted by the more and more pragmatic Chinese diplomacy. The American administration managed to accept that the guarantee ensuring the survival of the North regime should be the only way to solve the nuclear crisis in a peaceful way and North Korea's every step, which quite often seems to be illogical, is aiming to obtain this guarantee.

Following long conciliations the first round of the six party talks was held on 27-29 August 2003 in Beijing, however real results were reached only on the fourth round consisting of two negotiation sections and were held between 26 July and 7 August 2005 and 13 and 19 September 2005. On 19 September the participants of the six party talks accepted a Joint Declaration, which declares that in the interest of the peace and security of the Korean Peninsula and North-East Asia and on basis of common respect and equality the six countries held serious and practical talks with the aim of denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula and agreed in the following:

- 1) The six parties unanimously reaffirmed that the goal of the six-party talks is the verifiable denuclearization of the Korean Peninsula in a peaceful manner.
- 2) The six parties undertook in their relations to abide by the purposes and principles of the Charter of the United Nations and recognized norms of international relations.
- 3) The six parties undertook to promote economic cooperation in the fields of energy, trade and investment, bilaterally and/or multilaterally.
- 4) The six parties committed to joint efforts for lasting peace and stability in northeast Asia. The directly related parties will negotiate a permanent peace regime on the Korean peninsula at an appropriate separate forum.
- 5) The six parties agreed to take coordinated steps to implement the aforementioned consensus in a phased manner in line with the principle of "commitment for commitment, action for action."
- 6) The six parties agreed to hold the fifth round of the six party talks in Beijing in early November 2005 at a date to be determined through consultations.

The above agreement suggested hope that there would be real steps taken in the interest of the liquidation of the North Korean nuclear program and parallel with it of establishing the permanent security in the region.

III. The study's new scientific result and its application and research possibilities

The study is presenting the reasons of the North Korean nuclear program and the process as a result of which the North East Asian country presumably joined the group of countries possessing nuclear weapons in a special system.

Despite the fact that the number of the researchable documents has significantly increased, a number of related information is still handled as secret. However, even being aware of this, on basis of the study an easily reviewable picture can be drawn how a small country in every respect can be a factor basically influencing the security of the region which, in the interest of prolonging the ruling of an elite leading the country, does not boggle at blackmailing and at an immense exploitation of its own nation.

Since the recognition of the Joint Declaration on 19 September the six party talks has practically run into a dead end. At the moment we cannot see when and how it would be possible to realize those mentioned last year in the practice, as neither the US nor North Korea show any intention to yield from its point of view and by so doing to give way for continuing the substantive talks.

It can take long years while Washington and Pyongyang get to such minimum level of the common trust when the arrangement of the nuclear problem can really start. In the course of this the parties have to agree not only on the give up of the missile development and the nuclear program but also on the way how North Korea can claim the right – for which all the countries are entitled – for producing nuclear energy in its own country. Until the conditions of it are created, South Korea is ready to supply the necessary electric energy "buying out" the light water reactors the construction of which the United States currently does not approve.

A basic condition to arrange the North Korean nuclear program is that Pyongyang should rejoin the NPT system and place its nuclear program under the supervision of IAEA. These conditions have not been provided yet. The solution can only be imagined in a wider international context within the frames of which not only the North Korean but also the Iran nuclear problem can be solved.

IV. Summary

North Korea's nuclear program is a concurrent challenge within the Inter-Korean, the regional (North-East Asian) and the global security environment in the conflicts connected with the transition following the cold war. Due to the lack of the resolution in the North Korean nuclear issue the involvedness of the United States carrying a leading role in the establishment of a realizable new world order is deepening. Since September 2001 the United States of America, which has reached a hyper-power level, has had to undertake the handling a new borne asymmetric conflict as well (I. Newsweek Special Edition Issues, 2003, pg 30-32, Bush-doctrine).

The Korean politics of Washington Presidents and administrations following each other has always been complicated by the special context, in which, within the relations of the several decades' split North- and South Korea is continuously fighting for their own legitimacy. The acute conflict on the Korean Peninsula is paired with the proliferation turn following the cold war. The US realized only at the end of the 1980s that the DPRK's efforts had been ongoing since the 1950s aiming the development of the nuclear abilities (within the frames of its program North Korea is able to produce and recycle plutonium) stepped into a new, worrying part. So, the North Korean nuclear program has become one of the key questions in the world politics and urged the circle of the involved great powers, first of all, the United States to apply a counter strategy. The objective to reach was to place North Korea's nuclear program under international control.

The Bush- and Clinton administrations worked out its reaction between January 1989 and June 1995. It took until the fall of 1992 to determine the theoretical frames of the strategy (l. method known as "compensating and punishing" method), and the specific strategic elements collected with South Korea (the plans contained the withdrawal of strategic nuclear weapons had been deployed in South Korea, providing North Korea with restricted security guarantees, organization of a pressure expressing international diplomacy coalition, and a quick close of the future talks with North Korea). Considering the changes taken place in the global strategic environment in September 1991 the US announced the withdrawal of its land and naval strategic nuclear weapons. Year 1991 is considered to be a year of historical development in the North and South Korean relations: the "Agreement on Reconciliation, Nonaggression and Exchanges and Cooperation between the South and the North was concluded (December) and in reference to the nuclear disarmament in the peninsula the two parties issued a common declaration. A key element of the common undertaking was that they would not develop nuclear weapons including the recycle of plutonium.

The mutual trust building was endorsed by the US as well: it expressed its intention to let competent North Koreans check its bases, furthermore, in case the Pyongyang administration returns the allowances (they allow foreign experts to check the DPRK's nuclear abilities and they join the IAEA) it held out the prospect of the cancellation of the coming Team Spirit military exercises.

However the great power multilateral diplomatic movements were limited because the two Korean administrations could not agree on the work level talks and mainly due to the interior confrontations within South Korea about the politics towards North Korea the talks became suspended in the fall of 1992. (Typically, Washington responded with continuing the Team Spirit campaigns).

Among the lessons of the Korean politics of American administrations following each other we would like to highlight those below:

- The Bush-administration took the first steps towards North Korea in a way that it did not get into offensive in the region (l. withdrawal of the land and naval strategic nuclear weapons).

- As North Korea could not be prepared for the unilateral concessions requested by the USA they failed to lay stable bases for talks. In the time of the talks between North and South

Korea the US failed to connect this step with the high level talks continued with North Korea, however between 1988 and 1991 North Korea openly expressed its intention to improve its relations with the United States without receiving any answers for these before the Kanter-Kim summit.

- A key element in the failure is that the economic restrictions towards the DPRK and its opposite, the possibility for not being economically isolated, could put only a slight effect on the North Korean regime. The rational self-interest was embodied mostly in political and ideological considerations in the North Korean context.

- The “legacy” of the Korean War, which resulted the split of the peninsula, stayed as an obstacle in the period following the cold war as well. (This revolutionary change did not have its effect felt, despite its long running and insecure initiations aiming to improve its relations with the US the state party administration could not see any movements either. The Bush-administration also failed to evaluate this careful opening attempt correctly; however it enjoyed much more space for action from the part of Seoul than the Clinton-administration. This disadvantage was arisen in the Clinton era by the conception that the US-South Korea relations need to be handled as a part of the negotiation strategy with North Korea.

- By the time of the “operability” of the Clinton-administration the nature of the North Korean nuclear crisis had changed (North Korea provided forged data regularly, then at the beginning of 1993 it resigned from the Non-Proliferation Treaty (NPT)). The US had to pursue defensive strategy; it failed to urge all the related great powers, especially China, to come to a unified point of view and to reach that the UN Security Council draw a resolution containing sanctions as well. (See the content of the SC resolution dated 8 April 1993, which expresses proposals for the necessity for bilateral talks between the US and DPRK.)

- The fear intensified in the North Korean administration that the direct American North Korean talks could loosen the security federal ties maintained with them. The US tried to dissolve this suspicion with restricting its own moving space to nuclear issues prior to the talks.

- As a reaction to the bilateral negotiating techniques North Korea prepared with extraordinarily strict and rigid directions. There was only a slight chance to reach compromises as later became proved that the North regime managed to reach better position for itself. On the second Geneva turn in July 1993 the US theoretically supported the North Korean suggestion about providing North Korea with the so called proliferation resistant light-water reactor (LWR) technology.

Serious dispute has been arisen about the military, political and diplomatic answers given to the North Korean challenges. The North Korean nuclear issue has raised a strong dilemma not only in the US-administrations but also in the different players of the non-proliferation politics. It has not been known whether the separately and together applied steps of the different forms of “incentives” and “deterrence” managed to serve the objective in a satisfactory way: to keep DPRK under international institutional control and to reach that it gives up pursuing its nuclear abilities.

- The events have proved that the "loosening" of the North Korean regime and the realization of a regime changing similar to those happened in the countries of the Central-Eastern European sovietized block is a mere illusion. Such political opening, which can

destabilize the North Korean regime supposed such actions, which would entail foreign economic aids and/or direct involvement. For North Korea, which is a totally closed country, this type of incentives would mean even greater threat than those before.

The report published in February 1994 with the title of "North Korea's Nuclear Program: Challenge and Opportunity for the American politics" and prepared by the US Peace Institute for the Clinton administration is also presuming it in a paradox way.

The authors of the report suggested that the North Korean nuclear program is aiming the acceleration of the military crisis therefore it urged the Clinton-administration to make Pyongyang feel - on basis of its package plans - that it can choose between two ways. It is known that circumventing the partly renewed IAEA control the North Korean administration obtained plutonium surplus from the heating rods of the Yongbyon 5 megawatt experimental reactor and by so doing it committed a conscious provocation. (compare to Brent Scowcroft's, Arnold Kanter's and Henry Kissinger's opinion)

In order to cease North Korea's "reprocessing" ability from the part of the American analysts and advisors the necessity for a military action was arisen.

The only reacting nature of the initial Clinton-politics resulted that almost only North Korean actions determined the US's attitude. As a result of this realization by 1994 the intention indicating the restitution and reanimation of the interactions and negotiation mechanisms turned up. The governments of North and South Korea and the US considered that the solution of the crisis could be either the mutual retreat or the military confrontation.

The six party talks starting in the fall of 2003 opened a new section in the prolonging conflict arrangement in which the ability for a compromise was in focus. Considering the expansion of the newer and newer threats and risks emerging within the international relations in the other regions in the world including Middle- and Near East in the transformation of the Korean crisis an obvious mutual interest drove the parties including the responsibility bearing US as well.

In the first part of the transition to the post-bipolar period, which coincided with the Korean crisis, the reinterpretation of the security conception was undertaken. As an effect of the UN's Development Program (UNDP) in 1994 annual report Redefining Security: the Human Dimension was issued, which almost closed the theoretical disputes about the expansion of the security. The inclusion of the idea of the human security in the interpretation of the security has created such a universal security concept focusing not only on the state but also on the society as well as the individual. The extension of the concept is changing the cold war realistic security concept in its bases and places the emphasis from the power politics to the sustainable human development.

Sticking to our topic we have to state that the immediate vindication of the new theoretical principle, the multidimensional security concept could not be realized either generally or in special cases like the arrangement of the Korean conflict. Considering its origin, the DPRK crisis is a so called threaten with "artificial origin" (1. risk of the uncontrolled nuclear threat), while considering its size, it was handled as a local-regional problem for a long time, however it carries – due to the multidimensional effect - the possibility of a continental and global threat. Considering its direction, it can be related to separate factors of almost all the dimensions, to the international relations, and to acute conflictuality effecting the

establishment of the comprehensive world order. (See the UNDP report's global criteria!). In the today international life it is not an isolated danger source.

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