

Eötvös Loránd Tudományegyetem
Bölcsészettudományi Kar

DOKTORI DISSZERTÁCIÓ

Kiricsi Ágnes

**Semantic Rivalry of *Mod/Mood* and *Gemynd/Minde* in
Old and Middle English Literature**

Irodalomtudományi Doktori Iskola, Angol Reneszánsz és Barokk Program,
Középkori Angol Irodalom Alprogram

Témavezető: Dr. Halácsy Katalin

Budapest, 2005.

Contents

Acknowledgements	4
1. Introduction.....	6
2. Approaches to the Anglo-Saxon Mind	17
2.1. Introduction.....	17
2.2. A Germanic vs. Christian Approach.....	21
2.2.1. <i>The Mind as a Bird – The Flight of the Soul in a Germanic Reading</i>	22
2.2.2. <i>The Mind as a Bird – The Flight of the Soul in a (Partly) Christian Reading</i>	30
2.2.3. <i>Comments on the Two Approaches</i>	38
2.3. A Classical vs. Vernacular Approach.....	42
2.3.1. <i>The Consciousness in the Classical Tradition</i>	44
2.3.2. <i>The Consciousness in the Vernacular Tradition</i>	48
2.3.3. <i>The Locus of the Mind in European Medical – Philosophical Texts</i>	60
2.3.3.1. <i>The Antiquity</i>	64
2.3.3.2. <i>The Middle Ages</i>	73
2.3.4. <i>The Anglo-Saxon Locus of the Mind</i>	79
2.3.5. <i>Comments on the Different Approaches</i>	93
2.4. A Semantic – Literary Approach.....	94
3. The Corpus Research	107
3.1. Guiding Principles for Building the Corpus	107
3.1.1. <i>The Old English Part</i>	112
3.1.2. <i>The Middle English Part</i>	116
3.2. The “Meaning-Groups” of the Pilot Study	118
3.2.1. <i>mod/mood</i>	119
3.2.1.1. <i>The “basic meaning” EMOTIONAL MIND</i>	119
3.2.1.2. <i>The “basic meaning” RATIONAL MIND/SPIRITUAL SELF</i>	120
3.2.2. <i>gemynd/minde</i>	121
3.2.2.1. <i>The “basic meaning” MEMORY</i>	121
3.2.2.2. <i>The “basic meaning” MIND</i>	122
3.3. The “Meaning-Groups” of the Extended Corpus	123
3.3.1. <i>mod/mood</i>	124
3.3.1.1. <i>The “basic meaning” EMOTIONAL MIND</i>	124
3.3.1.2. <i>The “basic meaning” RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF</i>	129
3.3.2. <i>gemynd/minde</i>	132
3.3.2.1. <i>The “basic meaning” MENTION</i>	132
3.3.2.2. <i>The “basic meaning” MEMORY</i>	134
3.3.2.3. <i>The “basic meaning” MIND</i>	137
3.4. Mod/mood.....	141
3.4.1. <i>The Pilot Study</i>	141
3.4.2. <i>The Study of the Extended Corpus</i>	143
3.5. Gemynd/minde.....	148
3.5.1. <i>The Pilot Study</i>	148
3.5.2. <i>The Study of the Extended Corpus</i>	154

3.6. Memorie and Remembraunce	163
3.6.1. <i>The Pilot Study</i>	163
3.6.2. <i>The Study of the Extended Corpus</i>	166
3.7. The “Basic Meaning” MIND	168
4. The Possible Reasons of the Semantic Change	177
4.1. Linguistic Considerations	177
4.2. Literary Considerations.....	186
4.3. The Rationalisation of the Mind	188
4.3.1. <i>The Changes in the Functions of Memory</i>	190
4.3.2. <i>The Moderation of Passions</i>	196
5. Epilogue	199
Bibliography	201
Appendix.....	212

Acknowledgements

Writing a thesis on the Old and Middle English mind-vocabulary has been a great challenge and infused me with ardour from the beginning, the very first day when Dr. Matti Kilpiö at the University of Helsinki suggested the topic to me. I owe him thanks for the idea and the great help he gave me by his supervision, the countless hours he devoted to my topic, and for his wonderful personality.

I wish to express my gratitude to my teacher and supervisor Dr. Katalin Halácsy, as well, whose fascinating lessons on Medieval English Literature meant the beginning of a new era in my life. Without her captivating seminars, I would not have become a teacher of Medieval English Literature, myself. Her generous support, and guidance made it possible for me to write this thesis.

I also want to express my heartfelt thanks to my childhood and adulthood friend András Zubor, who devoted so many hours to this dissertation, helped me with the layout and the tables and diagrams that otherwise would have taken me ages to prepare. He has been a wonderful “editor” and a great encouragement.

I would also like to give my special thanks to my dear friend, Csaba Oppelt for his spiritual, emotional support, and the unfailing patience. The thought-provoking discussions with him, his questions at the right place and right time, his invaluable comments and constructive criticism added a new impetus to the thesis every time. His warm-heart has always given me strength, and his analysing-mind stimulus and inspiration to write.

My gratitude is also owed to all my other friends for the practical help and encouragement they gave me. The list would be long and incomplete, but I would especially like to thank Emő Nagy for the kindness and support in every minute. I am also grateful to Veronika Schandl whose progress in her PhD studies has stimulated me so much. My thanks are due to Attila Pechtöl, too, who with his constant remark “during this time I would have written three dissertations” made me work diligently and finish this thesis after so many years. Thanks to all of my friends for the patience and understanding that in the past few months I had to dedicate most of my time to my thesis and have not always been available and sociable.

Besides the personal supports, I am most thankful for the scholarships and grants that supported this work financially. First of all to the bilateral agreement between Eötvös Loránd University, Budapest and the University of Helsinki, which made my first stay in Helsinki, the autumn semester of 2001, possible. Special thanks to the CIMO (Centre for International Mobility) at the University of Helsinki for granting me another productive year at the VARIENG Research Unit, Department of English, University of Helsinki, in the academic year of 2003-2004. Besides Dr. Matti Kilpiö, I would also like to express my gratitude to Dr. Leena Kahlas-Tarkka, for her reading my chapters and encouraging me in my work, and my dear office-mate Dr. Alaric Hall for looking up books in the library for me from a distance of 1500 kilometres. My friends and colleagues in Finland provided me with a new insight into the field, they taught me a lot about how to work with electronic corpora, and most important of all, they gave me so many cheerful days even in the coldest and darkest periods of the Finnish winter. *Paljon kiitoksia* to everybody at the Research Unit! The ESSE (European Society for the Study of English) made it possible to spend a productive and fruitful summertime in 2002 at the University of Oxford, under the guidance and friendly company of Prof. Bruce Mitchell, whose helpful comments proved invaluable for the progress of this work. The challenging discussions there with Dr. Malcolm Godden and Dr. Terry Hoad, with their remarkable insight into the field, gave me fruits for thought. I gratefully acknowledge the Lynne Grundy Memorial Trust, whose generous award in the year 2005 also contributed to finishing this dissertation. Their kindness and supportiveness is outstanding, I am greatly indebted to them.

Finally, I would like to thank my family for supporting my ambition to continue my studies after the university and making it possible to write this thesis. I owe them for their love and encouragement at all times. They never let my enthusiasm fail and were my first and foremost support every day.

1. Introduction

[...] Eadem spectamus astra, commune caelum est, idem nos mundus involvit. Quid interest, qua quisque prudentia verum requirat? Uno itinere non potest perveniri ad tam grande secretum. [...]¹

Quintus Aurelius Symmachus

(We look on the same stars, the sky is common, the same world surrounds us. What difference does it make by what pains each seeks the truth? We cannot attain to so great a secret by one road.)

What is an “apple”? How can we define it? Is it possible that when someone utters this word, everyone pictures the same Platonic idea of the apple? Do we all imagine a round, red, edible and juicy fruit of the genus *Malus* in the *Rosaceae* family? Can it be stated that this is the “prototype” image in our minds? Still, we recognise an apple even if it is yellow or green, unripe, shapeless; or let us suppose: an artificial one made of plastic to decorate a somewhat tasteless kitchen-table. Moreover, the semantic inventory of a word is always loaded with expressions and idioms that at first sight seem only distantly or not at all related to our base word. What shall we do with an apple of discord, the apple of the eye, or to take it even further: the apple of one’s eye? And if one digs further, there are so many more “Apples” that we start feeling dizzy, not knowing if the computer company is meant, the British psychedelic rock band of the 1960s, or the short-lived American automobile? Let us not forget that the example of an apple is among the simplest ones, and yet we have to face several difficulties once we try to define its exact referent. If, however, we are to define a more complex notion, our task becomes even more demanding. Would anyone find it an easy challenge to explain and determine what “emotion” or “cognition” is? If one opens a dictionary at these headwords, one is likely to feel immediate puzzlement either by the circumstantial, intricate and often overcomplicated explanation of it, or by the abundance of categories and subcategories, the maze of meanings listed under points, subpoints and sub-subpoints. We must conclude that meaning itself is not a rigid category; it is flexible and unstable and it is impossible to force a word into one strict semantic model.

¹ From Bibliotheca Augustana.

http://www.fh-augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost04/Symmachus/sym_re03.html

Translation from: <http://www.acs.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/Courses/texts/sym-amb/symrel3.html>

Even when we are talking about the meaning of a word at one given period, or even when we mention it on one occasion, there is no guarantee that the same image appears before everyone's inner eye. Language, moreover, does not only exist in synchrony. Language changes through time; there is no doubt about that. This change can manifest itself on multiple levels, and semantic change is among the most intriguing of these processes. Although we can observe that the meaning of a word may be shifted, generalised, specialised through time, just to mention a few of the most common types of semantic change, the reasons for the change often remain obscure. Diachronic linguistics always considers the questions *how* and *why* language changes, and at times they seem to be unanswerable. When discussing semantic change, the only thing we notice is that words *do* alter their meaning, new words are born, old ones become obsolete.

It is generally accepted now that historical linguistics is not an autonomous science. When studying the diachronic processes of semantics, we cannot neglect extra-linguistic factors strongly influencing and determining the direction of change. The language-internal and language-external elements in the study of a word's "life" seem to walk hand in hand, as the workings of the human mind, the appearance of new philosophical trends, the existence of certain social and cultural factors are all interwoven into a complex system of causes and effects. Linguistic change, therefore, cannot be studied without relating it to the basic cultural development of a people, and the social evolution of a speech community. Intra-linguistic and extra-linguistic elements are thus entwined, and are of equally crucial significance. Studying the changes in a semantic field can only be complete by taking into consideration the cultural factors that may have facilitated or at least influenced the modification.

As I have already mentioned, solving the problems of *how* and *why* is a great challenge. It is an expedition to an unknown land, a *terra incognita*, a voyage of discovery to a mysterious labyrinth where traps and dead ends are awaiting the linguist and philologist, offering alluring false tracks. If this expedition ventures into the land of abstractions, the impediments seem to be even greater, the appearing questions more unbridgeable. An abstract idea is often a shapeless, amorphous entity that can only roughly be outlined, as the above mentioned examples of "emotion" and "cognition" suggest.

Defining “emotion” and “cognition” proves to be hazardous, but “mind” itself is an abstraction that incorporates both. How is it possible to circumscribe and delimit a word that signifies a notion embodying both of these complex abstract ideas, and having other properties like “reason”, “imagination” or “memory”, without feeling that we are lost? In my dissertation, I venture to take the word *mind* and put it under the microscope of cultural history and semantics. The basic question to be answered is why *mod*, the dominant word meaning “mind” in the Old English period, is gradually replaced by *minde* in the Middle English period. *Minde* itself has its roots in Old English, too. It is derived from *gemynd*, signifying “memory”, “remembrance”, “commemoration”, a meaning that is overtly preserved nowadays only in the adjective *mindful*. Here the use of the adverb *overtly* is very important, as we will later see, because expressions like *to keep in mind*, *bring something to mind* all retain the otherwise obsolete meaning “memory.” Parallel to this process, the word *mod* has developed into “mood”, which at first sight seems to lie at quite a distance from its original referent. If, however, we presuppose that the human mind has emotional properties, this development can be seen as a shift from the umbrella term of feelings to a specific state of feelings or mind at one given time, which becomes an example of specialisation in the group of semantic changes.

For millennia, philosophers have painstakingly been trying to give a proper definition of the human mind, and indeed this has been one of their most central concerns from Antiquity to the present day. It is not my aim, therefore, to invent a new “inventory” of the mind or to undertake the almost impossible task of determining its nature. It has been done before me several times and in several ways. My primary aim is to establish a picture of the development of this word on the basis of empirical evidence, from the linguistic data of the Old and Middle English periods that might serve as a mirror image or imprint of the underlying processes that influenced the semantic change of the words *gemynd/minde* and *mod/mood*. In order to find out how and why these lexemes changed their meanings in Middle English, a corpus of Old and Middle English texts has been compiled. This corpus embraces six hundred and fifty years, from 850 until 1500, at least in terms of the dates of the manuscripts that contain the material examined. This analysis will provide the backbone of the thesis, and this aims at casting a new light upon and providing a new approach for the study of the mental faculty, starting out from the grassroot-level, that of the lexemes.

Thus, the starting-point will be the medieval mind-vocabulary itself, but the approach and the purpose will be twofold. On the one hand, when the words are dealt with, I intend to highlight the cultural processes determining and escorting the changes. On the other hand, when the socio-cultural background is focused upon, my intention is to provide a deeper understanding of the development of the lexemes. Consequently, the present thesis will be rather interdisciplinary. When studying the Middle Ages, philology, cultural history, history, linguistics should not be, and cannot be studied individually. Causes and effects are manifested in all of these fields, social changes are reflected in the literary works produced in the era, and semantic changes might mirror many of the underlying processes in a given cultural community.

For the vastness of the field to be studied, I will have to limit the questions to be discussed. Some paths of the linguistic and cultural maze will stay unexplored, others only hinted at, providing ground for further studies that the limits of this thesis do not allow. The study presented here will cover these six centuries of manuscript heritage, and will go beyond this: it will look into an earlier period, into some Germanic ideas that came down to the Christian Old English times, and also some classical and antique influences manifest to a certain extent in Anglo-Saxon and later medieval English thinking. Besides this, the thesis will also look into these six centuries' relative future, that is, our modern understanding of the mind, to give a basis for comparison. However, as I have already noted, I am not going to create a new "History of the Mind in Western Civilization" volume, in order to enrich the already well-loaded bookshelves dedicated to the field. It will not be a complex philosophical study, what is more, not even a philosophical study. It will touch upon the field, though only to a degree which is necessary for the scope of the present material. Finally, it will not be a complete philological analysis of all the medieval English works dealing with the workings of the human mind, either. This corpus is so vast that entire volumes could be written about it, therefore it cannot serve as a starting point for a PhD thesis.

Thus, the study of the above mentioned "corporal" backbone will be supported and enriched by philosophico-medical and socio-cultural discussions, which in turn echo, or rather, provide a basis for an echo in the semantic change from *mod* to *minde*. As a consequence, although the dissertation will focus on this grassroot-level of the words, it will not become a linguistic study, but an attempt to give an insight into both

language and literature, history and culture. It will identify patterns in medieval thinking and place them into perspective, giving them a new approach.²

After the present introduction completed with a short discussion of what the mind means to most of us, some typical approaches to the question will be elaborated first, in chapter 2. The aim of this is going to be an orientational one, to place the Anglo-Saxon mind into a broader context, so as to allow for a better understanding of its nature and the later semantic change itself happening in the Middle English period. These approaches will attempt to provide an insight into the major discussions carried out so far about the Anglo-Saxon mind, varying in focus, but all contributing to a fuller understanding of it. At times it might seem that my own mind will roam about freely in this first part of the thesis between the different approaches and questions treated by various authors in the variety of discussions. Nevertheless, the purpose will always be to glimpse into the different directions taken up by scholars, and after the trip return with newer and newer pieces of the puzzle which, in the end, placed side-by-side, will provide an enriched understanding of the mind in general.

Chapter 3 will present the results of the corpus research. After the description of the methods and some guiding principles that I employed for compiling the corpus, the data gained will be presented. Compared to the earlier part of the dissertation, this chapter will seem more mathematical, given the unavoidable presence of numbers and percentages that aim at clarifying and demonstrating the process of the semantic change by showing how *mod* gradually lost its old meaning and how *gemynd* took up its new referent. The strict row of numbers and tables will be lightened and “tamed” by diagrams that will give a more palpable, easier-to-grasp reflection of the linguistic process from century to century and even from dialect to dialect.

Finally, in the third part of the thesis, chapter 4, probably the most fascinating aspect of the research is presented. While chapter 3 looks at the *hows*, tries to visualise the steps that the words *mod/mood* and *gemynd/minde* took, and maps the linguistic change from *mod* to *minde*, chapter 4 attempts to look at the *whys*. I will provide possible answers to the question posed at the beginning of the thesis, and discuss what

² Parts of this dissertation are based on an article and a book review of mine published recently. Kiricsi, Ágnes. Review of *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, by Antonina Harbus. *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 105. (2005): 504-507. Kiricsi, Ágnes. “From *Mod* to *Minde* – Report from a Semantic Battlefield.” In *What does it Mean*, edited by Kathleen E. Dubs, 217-239. Piliscsaba: Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 2003-2004.

possible reasons must have led to the loss of *mod*'s old meaning and the appearance of *gemynd*'s new one – if they can be called old and new, at all. Different cultural and linguistic influences will be discussed, all contributing to or at least mirroring the processes taking place in the English mind-vocabulary.

Before the study really begins, the introduction of the thesis must serve one more purpose, as it was promised some paragraphs ago. For a discussion of the Old and Middle English minds, some basis for comparison needs to be provided. In order to 'microscope' the development of the words, the concept itself has to be approached first, and given the fact that one of the most abstract nouns is concerned here – a pet-concept of philosophers – it is difficult to find a perfect angle for how the question of the mind should be dealt with. Obviously, the interpretation of words might change from time to time, and place to place, thus both in synchrony and diachrony, as it has already been hinted at. We cannot be certain that what we mean by the mind was the same centuries ago, or even that the Anglo-Saxons pictured it the same way as the speakers of Middle English. Indeed, if we have a closer look at the inventory of the mental processes and what *mod* or *gemynd* stood for centuries ago, in what lexical circumstances they were used, what meanings they had, we can discover that there must have been significant differences in the concept covered by this word (these words) then and now.

Therefore, to have some grounds for comparison, I decided to collect peoples' ideas about what the mind means to them today. The total number of people who answered the questions is 18, and their views provide a very good starting point for comparing the basic modern concepts we have and those of the Old and Middle English periods. Among the questions and ideas I was interested in, the first and most general one should stand here now, namely: "What is the mind?" The responses were really varied; some tried to give a scientific all-encompassing definition, others seemed to struggle with the problem and grasped it from the humorous end. Let me give a verbatim report here and provide a few quotations from my question sheets:

The mind is

- "For interpreting and misinterpreting everything that surrounds us."
- "Executor of our mental functions."
- "Through this we can "intuite" and conceptualise things. Makes us different from animals."

- “Seat of consciousness and thought. Processes information.”
- “Consciousness and subconsciousness of a person, her cognitive personality. It filters the sensory input, processes it and stores the most important content.”
- “Something like the psyche and active part of the brain. Sometimes a synonym for memory also. Primary source for intellectual activity.”
- “Processes (typically human) cognitive and emotional processes.”
- “An organ responsible for our thoughts.”
- “One’s own unique ability to function through introspection and via experiencing the world and people around us.”
- “An organ with what we think (those in the Big Brother lack it).”
- “The rational compartment of the soul responsible for organizing and interpreting the world around us.”
- “This is what you think with, a great part of a personality. Its functions are collecting, analysing, decision-making ... and so on.”
- “Controls feelings.”
- “Very very difficult question to define MIND, I just started to read Penrose ‘Shadow of mind’ to get a grasp. Penrose’ ideas involve Quantummechanics, odd enough.”
- “The human experience of neural processing – environmental inputs are processed by neural hardware, causing changes in neurotransmitters and this alters the human experience ... so in summary, I don’t know.”

“Very very difficult question” and “I don’t know.” Definitely, these answers prove how hard it is to describe the meaning of an abstract term. However, those who managed, seem to agree that the mind is a rational faculty, responsible for thinking and thought processes, and closely associated with consciousness. What they said is very close to the *OED* definition:

III. Mental or psychical being or faculty.

17. a. The seat of a person’s consciousness, thoughts, volitions, and feelings; the system of cognitive and emotional phenomena and powers that constitutes the subjective being of a person; also, the incorporeal subject of the psychical faculties, the spiritual part of a human being; the soul as distinguished from the body.³

One feature, however, is missing in most cases. While sixteen people immediately conceptualised the mind as the seat of thinking, it was only three persons who mentioned a connection with emotions, feelings right when trying to define the term. It indicates that to most of us the mind is rather rational in its functions, and being the seat

³ *Oxford English Dictionary* on CD-ROM (Second Edition) Version 1.13. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

of feelings – although it can be found in the *OED* definition – is only a secondary attribute.

After asking for a definition of the mind and its functions, three more questions were posed. First of all, knowing that the medieval idea behind its location was different from what most of us think now, I was interested in its seat, where it is located. The answers were as expected. The great majority of people placed it in the head or the brain, some realized the importance of the nervous system and the neurons. Only two people out of the 18 attributed some importance to the heart or the chest.

Seat of mind (18 answers):

Head / brain	9
Brain + something else	2
No seat (or perhaps brain)	2
Brain + nervous system + senses	1
Neurons	1
Neurons and brain	1
Head and heart	1
Chest	1

The next question of my questionnaire was: “What do we think with?” As the above quoted replies make it clear, people tend to endow the mind with cognitive and rational functions, among which thinking is the most significant one. Therefore, it comes as no surprise that almost everybody named the mind or the brain as the seat of thoughts. Two people, however, diverted from the average answer and named “our own existence” or “the heart and the mind.”

Seat of thoughts (18 answers):

Mind	6
Brain + mind	4
Brain	5
Brain + mind + intuitions	1
Heart and mind	1
Our own existence	1

The final question was: “Where do emotions come from?” This one proved to be more difficult, as only 17 people answered it. The results, on the other hand, are the most interesting. Even though, there were only three persons who included “feelings” in

the basic definition of mind and its functions, now 8 of them located feelings and emotions in the mind and three other people connected them to the brain or neurons. Comparing the results with those of the “seat of thoughts”, we can observe that the heart has higher priority in this case. Three people named it directly as the locus of emotions and two others thought that the heart shares this function with the mind or neurons.

Seat of feelings / emotions (17 answers):

Mind	6
Heart	3
Heart + mind	1
Heart + neurons	1
Mind + instincts	1
Intuitions	1
Brain	1
Some organs (e.g. hypothalamus) which give dope to the blood	1
Senses	1
Senses and soul	1

What is reflected in this small-scale, though still very telling “public opinion poll” exactly corresponds to what Anna Wierzbicka describes in her study of the picture of the mind.⁴ She calls the *mind* a “folk concept” and regards it as culture-specific. And actually, it is so. How shall we translate it to other languages so that the foreign word denotes exactly the same concept, same overtones, and calls to mind the very same associations? When we place any word into a cross-cultural perspective, we cannot be certain that it has exact translations, and it can be particularly difficult in this case. The same applies to the concept of the English mind now and hundreds of years ago. Cultural changes have affected the vocabulary, as well, and even *mod* and *gemynd* changed their referents through the centuries, and what we mean by them today was not equivalent to the ideas they covered in the Old English period.

When we think of the mental faculty, it has “a predominantly intellectual orientation [...] with thinking and knowing dominating any other non-bodily aspects of a person’s inner life,”⁵ as Wierzbicka notes and as it is reflected by the answers given to

⁴ Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations*.

⁵ Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations*, 45.

the small questionnaire shown above. Expressions like “malicious mind”, “humble mind”, “happy mind” or “tender mind” sound strange to our ears now, because an emotional or spiritual perspective is added to the word, it is placed into a psychological and moral reading. Even though it is still often noted, as made clear by the *OED* entry, that the mind is responsible not only for thinking and cognition, but emotions as well, the “folk concept” does not immediately realise it. Nowadays, when we want to describe the emotional dimension, we tend to add *heart* or *soul*; when the moral, spiritual then mostly *soul*. If, however, these attributes do appear with *mind*, the text sounds archaic or simply odd in nature. Modern texts use this stylistic device deliberately – in works of literature, or religious texts and exhortations where an elevated style can be regarded part of the genre. Otherwise, in many cases, we meet works written by non-native speakers or translations from another language, where perhaps the native tongue influences the choice of lexeme. In present-day English, however, the mind rather tends to take attributes referring to cognition, as Wierzbicka notes: “they [present-day *minds*] are described as ‘inquisitive’, ‘inquiring’ (seeking knowledge), ‘brilliant’ (good at thinking), ‘keen’ (active in thinking and seeking to know), and so on.”⁶

Thus, it seems that the mind was dispossessed of many of its emotional and moral qualities it still carried in older times, and our understanding of it thus differs from the earlier, the medieval one. But was there one “medieval mind”? We cannot state that, either. As we cannot talk about one Middle Age, but about the Middle Ages, we cannot talk about a unified medieval English mind, since the concept of the mental faculty changed significantly as the surviving texts of the six centuries in question demonstrate it.

One more thing must be made clear, however, before the discussion really begins. Even when we consider what *mod/mood* and *gemynd/minde* must have signified in given subperiods of Old and Middle English, we should not fall into the trap of claiming that ONE unified concept and its change and development into ANOTHER clear-cut understanding of the mind have been explored. Medieval people were individuals, just like us. Their thoughts about the mind must have been determined to a great extent by the culture they lived in, but nothing by all means is merely culture-specific. A Lindisfarne monk must have had a different view on the world than a warrior in Anglo-

⁶ Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations*, 45.

Saxon England; a well-off Londoner might have had another approach to it than a *cheryl* from the countryside in the 14th century. And let me go even further than that, as the dimensions are even deeper than being class-specific, depending on what rank, what layer of the society one comes from. It is determined by education, geography, age, gender, experience, and so many other factors that there must have been (as there are today) INDIVIDUAL approaches to what one thought about the human mind – *mod* or *minde*.

Nothing can be taken for granted. Even though general tendencies can be observed, individual approaches were and have always been present, and every person's understanding must have meant a different shade in the colourful palette of the concept of the mind. Therefore, when we venture to study and map the changes in the socio-cultural and linguistic atlas of an abstraction, like the mind, what we can get is a stereotyped view only. It is like looking at a mountain-range from a distance, seeing and admiring its unity, but after taking the binoculars, we find that what had been seen before is made up of hills and dales, peaks and canyons, and an infinite variety of stones and pebbles. Taking off the binoculars, however, we once again see all these individual creations' union, a panoramic view of the mountain-range. The present thesis will examine this stereotyped view, the mountain-range itself, taking the binoculars as many times as possible, and trying to provide a fair and close approximation of what the general traits of thinking must have been. The picture, however, can never get complete. From this distance of centuries, from the limited range of the surviving texts, one can only provide a glimpse into the medieval concepts about the mind. This glimpse, however, will hopefully present a better understanding of the mental faculty and the general changes that happened in its conceptualisation. We must keep it in mind, however, that even though the mountain-range depicted from this distance of a millennium or at least five centuries shows a unity, there must have been individual approaches to the question at all times.

2. Approaches to the Anglo-Saxon Mind

2.1. Introduction

“Language reflects the human interpretation of the world,” as Anna Wierzbicka noted.⁷ As historical linguistics requires the consideration of socio-cultural factors when studying the lexicon; it is also true that some knowledge of culture-specific elements helps us understand processes in the language. With other words, it is not only culture through which we can understand more about the whys and hows of a language’s history, but it is also the history of a language that gives us an insight into some particulars of culture, the two closely connected, and reflecting on the other.

Looking at the lexicon of the Anglo-Saxons, we can state for certain that the notion of the mind was of central importance for them. The central nature and the particular significance attached to the concept are witnessed by the prolific use of mind-words in Old English vocabulary in both prose and verse. Dieter Kastovsky lists some “densely populated lexical fields”⁸ in Old English, and his examples come under the concepts of “man”, “warrior”, “battle”; and under “heart, mind”. Stephen Barney also, in his treatment of Old English vocabulary, especially *gemynd*, calls our attention to the fact that judging from the words of this group, it seems that memory and intention were of great interest to the Anglo-Saxon poet.⁹ The fact that there were several nouns, either simplex or compound ones – complemented by the large number of kennings – for the first three concepts (as well as various types of weapons, for example) is not surprising, given that Anglo-Saxon society was essentially a heroic one. Old English literature represents a society whose ideals were governed to a great extent by a heroic code of behaviour, and in which warrior heroes, the lord and his retinue, feuding kinsmen, fight and revenge all played a significant role. However, even if we disregard the often stylistic mirror given to us by works of literature, we must say that Old English society was a fighting one. A journey back in time would confront us with an England fighting against powerful enemies, like the Vikings, and reading the *Anglo-Saxon Chronicle*, we

⁷ Anna Wierzbicka. *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations*, 7.

⁸ Dieter Kastovsky, “Semantics and Vocabulary,” 298.

⁹ Stephen Barney, *Word-Hord: An Introduction to Old English Vocabulary*, 28.

frequently encounter accounts of English kings fighting just as often against one another. The period was marked by political instability, different kingdoms: for example, Wessex and Mercia were almost always at war. But kings did not only fight against each other. There are numerous accounts where they overran churches and monasteries, and also many where monasteries turned against each other. Knowing this, it becomes obvious why there existed several synonyms for words like “warrior” or “battle”, given the fact that a language has several synonyms and near-synonyms for a concept if it is of central importance. Kastovsky’s statement, therefore, might seem a surprising one, as after the first reading, it comes unexpectedly that the “heart” and “mind” were among the most often mentioned concepts with a “densely populated lexical field.”

Truly, the list of synonyms for the mind is very long. Jane Roberts’ and Christian Kay’s *A Thesaurus of Old English*,¹⁰ a resource listing word-groups according to the concepts they denote, gives a long list under the heading “mental faculties”, and another similarly long one under “emotion.” Besides the general headings, we find more specific notions of the mind, more specific fields of referents; and taking the whole list into consideration, as well as other dictionary evidence, we must say that the number of synonyms and near-synonyms for the mind in Old English is about fifty, and even disregarding compounds, we end up with more than ten simplexes. A list compiled from *A Thesaurus of Old English*, the Bosworth and Toller’s *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*¹¹ and the Clark Hall, *Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*¹² demonstrates this rich area of focus in the Old English lexicon.

¹⁰ Jane Roberts and Christian Kay, with Lynne Grundy, 2 vols. London: Kings College, 1995.

¹¹ *An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*, edited by Joseph Bosworth and T. Northcote Toller. Oxford: Clarendon, 1898. *Supplement Volume*. 1921.

¹² *A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary*, edited by John R. Clark Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

andgit,	ferhþcofa,	heortscraef,	mod,
breastcearu,	ferhþloca,	hordcofa,	modgemynd,
breost,	ferhþsefa,	hordgeþanc,	modgeþanc,
breostbedern,	gast,	hreðer,	modgeþoht,
breostcofa,	gastcofa,	hreþercofa,	modhord,
breostgeðanc,	gearowita,	hreþerloca,	modsefa,
breosthord,	(ge)hygd,	hyge,	myne,
breosthyge,	gemynd,	hygesceaft,	orþanc,
breostloca,	geþanc,	incofa,	sawol,
breostsefa,	geþoht,	ingehygd,	se innra man,
ferhð,	gewitloca,	ingemynd,	sefa
ferhðsefa,	(ge)witt,	ingepanc,	
ferhþcleofa,	heorte,	lichord,	

Given this cornucopia of Old English mind-vocabulary, it is surprising that relatively little attention has been dedicated to it so far. Vic Strite wrote over fifteen years ago in the *Old English Semantic Field Studies* that the mental lexicon had hitherto been quite neglected and “terms for knowing and the intellect in OE have not been studied extensively,”¹³ and this statement still holds true. Although parts of the field have been treated, there hasn’t been much focus given to the area as a whole, it has not received particular critical attention. The most extensive studies so far are Malcolm Godden’s article “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind”,¹⁴ Michael Phillips’ unpublished dissertation entitled *Heart, Mind and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*,¹⁵ and the recent book by Antonina Harbus *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*.¹⁶ Besides these, other works tend to focus on the nuances of some selected mind-expressions.

The reasons why there have not been many attempts towards a fuller understanding of the Old English concept of the mind, and drawing a complete picture of it, are manifold. Even though the language is lavish with mind-vocabulary, the evidence is still narrow, and grasping one of the most abstract cultural notions from it is definitely a hard task. Although we can rely only on the surviving textual sources, they certainly reflect the given culture and people, and are precious pieces of the puzzle – providing us with a good guess at what the actual image(s) might have been. Truly, we will never be able to acquire all the pieces to solve the whole, but what has come down

¹³ Strite, *Old English Semantic Field Studies*, 78.

¹⁴ Godden, Malcolm R. “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind.” In *Learning and Literature in Anglo-Saxon England*, edited by Michael Lapidge and Helmut Gneuss, 271-298. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. And in *Old English Literature*, edited by Roy M. Liuzza, 284-314. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.

¹⁵ Phillips, Michael J. *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, unpublished PhD dissertation. University of Illinois, 1985.

¹⁶ Harbus, Antonina. *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2002.

to us is an invaluable cornerstone to base our research on. Another difficulty that is sometimes claimed is that the material we can rely on is basically poetical, texts full of kennings and repetitions; linguistic innovations and possible archaisms are also likely to appear in them. Yet, I could not agree more with Harbus when she notes that even the approximations we can obtain from the surviving literary sources can provide us with a precious image of the model of the mind.

Since our Old English data is derived purely from written material, most of which is specifically literary, any analysis must be confined to the rather narrow textual vehicle of cultural expression, where scribal and literary conventions, traditional phraseology, and perhaps deliberate archaism or innovation come into play. It is worth noting, then, that we cannot hope to attain a complete cultural picture of the mind as it was conceived of in Anglo-Saxon England, but we can formulate or at least suggest from lexical data the model of the mind on which the production of texts has been predicated, and thereby consider how that model might inform aesthetic choices.¹⁷

In the first part of my dissertation, I would like to concentrate on some general approaches to the Anglo-Saxon mind based on the different standpoints it has been discussed from. Although the thesis will particularly concentrate on the curious semantic shift from *mod* to *minde*, during the discussion, it is inevitable to glimpse into the history of some other basic mind-words of the Old English period, such as *hyge*, *myne* or *sefa*, as through them, the understanding of the two main words will become more complete. In the following chapters, therefore, I will treat different aspects of the mind-vocabulary as a whole, and specific characteristics of some basic near-synonyms of *mod* and *gemynd*, in order to give a fuller understanding of the process.

The aim of the study will be to demonstrate some particular trends in the treatment of mind-vocabulary. In this discussion, I will focus on three specific approaches. The first is the Germanic vs. Christian approach, one which has already passed its heyday. Lively arguments followed each other in the 1950s-60s, but after these decades the interest subsided. The second approach is the classical vs. vernacular one, a much more moderate and careful standpoint, which, after a long period of silence, appeared in the 1980s in Malcolm Godden's article and also with a reach back to Onians's famous and

¹⁷ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 26.

consistently republished monograph.¹⁸ Finally, there is the semantic-literary approach, which cannot be strictly separated from the previous two, as all incorporate literary evidence as well as linguistic. The major question that it focuses on is whether the Old English mind-words were synonyms for the same notion, and it was merely Anglo-Saxon poetic diction that was responsible for the birth of such a high number of lexemes. In this aspect, the chapter elaborates the discussion of the previous ones, and aims at providing a better understanding of the concept of the mind and a wider scope for possible further research. As this approach tries to get closer to the question from a grassroot-level point of view of the lexemes, instead of viewing it from the more general, cultural angle, this perspective needs to be discussed separately, before my own analysis is presented.

2.2. A Germanic vs. Christian Approach

As seen from the huge number of mind-words in the Old English vocabulary, both in simplex and in compound forms, cognition, emotions and spirituality itself – basically everything that mind denotes – was of central importance for the Anglo-Saxons. The tradition goes back to multiple roots, and the Anglo-Saxon concept of the mind is rooted in both Christian and native Germanic traditions. When treating the mind-words and trying to grasp their essence and meaning through works of literature, some scholars tend to opt for one, others for the other, and even though they acknowledge the legacy of both roots, they do not always find a careful balance in their argumentation, but rather shift towards a biased view, either partial to one or to the other tradition. With the course of time, the treatment of mind-words has changed a lot, and as new trends in criticism appeared, some approaches became “fashionable”, while others “went out of fashion.” The early trend of searching for possible pagan elements in Old English literature became bygone, and many felt a need for some counter-balance was necessary in proving the essentially Christian side. In the 1950s-60s, these two approaches clashed and major confrontations and disputes appeared, especially when studying the Old English elegies. In this chapter, I will attempt to give insight into the most particular focus of the Germanic vs. Christian debate, which stemmed from

¹⁸ Onians, R. B. *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.

some curious aspects of the Old Icelandic words *hugr* and *munr* and the Old English words *hyge* and *myne*, especially in relation to the Old English elegies. The studies centred around the flight of the mind/soul and thus I will especially concentrate on the various treatments of the words *hyge* and *myne*, two prominent synonyms among mind-words. The common characteristic of these early discussions is a search for parallels in either pagan or Christian sources, most often starting out from individual words and reinterpreting them, or finding new readings for the manuscript versions. These approaches remain most often biased, committed to either the pagan or the Christian interpretation of a given text. The arguments are usually fascinating, and several propositions of these scholars must be right, but due to their biased nature, they fail to recognise common tenets. In the following chapters, therefore, some of these early approaches will be mentioned, in order to provide an idea on the contradictory and slippery nature of the field, and to show what the more global discussions of the late 1980s and 1990s grew out of.

2.2.1. The Mind as a Bird – The Flight of the Soul in a Germanic Reading

First of all, let us turn to Icelandic sources to highlight some of the most interesting concomitants of the concept of mind, with a special emphasis on the two Old Norse words, *hugr* and *munr*. One of the fascinating pieces of Germanic evidence for the significance of the mind is the image of Odin, the supreme deity of Germanic mythology, the patron of the slain warriors in Valhalla. He is accompanied by four animals: two wolves (Geri and Freki) and two ravens (Huginn and Muninn).¹⁹ In *Málskrupsfræði* we read:

Flugu hrafnar tveir
Af Hnikars öxlum,
Huginn til hanga,
en á hræ Muninn.²⁰

(Two ravens flew
from Óðin's shoulders –

¹⁹ Both the wolf and the raven are animals that – together with the eagle – follow the fight and then feast on the corpses when the battle is over. Interestingly, the wolf and the raven were sacred to the Greek god Apollo, as well.

²⁰ Jón Helgason, ed. *Eddadigte*, 3 vols. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1955. As in Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued),” 15. Translation by Smithers.

Huginn to a hanged man,
but Muninn on to a corpse.)

The two birds are brave and wise, sit on the shoulders of Odin, and fly out every morning to spy out the land. Upon return at the time of the main meal, they sit back on the shoulders of the god and report to him what they have seen. As Snorri comments in *Gylfaginning*, this is the reason why Odin is called god of ravens. There are several sources where we can meet them. In *Njáls Saga* we find travellers who were followed by two ravens all day: “Síðan fara þeir til Odda. Hrafnar tveir flugu með þeim alla leið” (After that they fare to the Point, and two ravens flew along with them all the way);²¹ and in Snorri’s *Heimskringla*, Odin’s two ravens appear in order to testify that the sacrifice had been accepted by the deity.

En er veður það kemur er honum þótti sem hann mundi í haf bera þá skaut hann á land upp öllum lærðum mönnum en hann sigldi þá út á haf en veður gekk til útsuðurs og vesturs. Siglir jarl þá austur í gegnum Eyrarsund. Herjar hann þá á hvorttveggja land. Síðan siglir hann austur fyrir Skáneyjarsíðu og herjaði þar og hvar sem hann kom við land. En er hann kom austur fyrir Gautasker þá lagði hann að landi. Gerði hann þá blót mikið. Þá komu þar fljúgandi hrafnar tveir og gullu hátt. Þá þykist jarl vita að Óðinn hefir þegið blótið og þá mun jarl hafa dagrað til að berjast. Þá brennir jarl skip sín öll og gengur á land upp með liði sínu öllu og fór allt herskildi.²²

(When a wind came with which he thought he could get clear out to sea, he put all the learned men on shore again, and set off to the ocean; but as the wind came round to the south-west, and at last to west, he sailed eastward, out through Eyrarsund, ravaging the land on both sides. He then sailed eastward along Skane, plundering the country wherever he came. When he got east to the skerries of East Gautland, he ran in and landed, and made a great blood-sacrifice. There came two ravens flying which croaked loudly; and now, thought the earl, the blood-offering has been accepted by Odin, and he thought good luck would be with him any day he liked to go to battle. Then he set fire to his ships, landed his men, and went over all the country with armed hand.)

²¹ Chapter 79. *Njáls Saga*. Edited by Magnús Finnbogason. Translation from the *Online Medieval and Classical Library* by Sir George W. DaSent, <http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/OMACL/Njal/5part.html>

²² http://lind.no/nor/index.asp?vis=s_i_olav_tryggvason#62 Translation from: *Heimskringla: A History of the Norse Kings*, <http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/OMACL/Heimskringla/>



Image 1. – Odin and one of his ravens on the Thorwald Cross from the Isle of Man. Here the god is depicted as being eaten by the gigantic wolf, Fenrir.²³

The two ravens' names are telling. Huginn is derived from *hugr* and Muninn from *munr*, two Old Norse words for the mind, the relatives of Old English *hyge* – a mind-word appearing only in poetic texts – and *myne*. Certainly, it would be beneficial if we had a precise definition of what qualities of the mind *hugr* and *munr* exactly stood for. But just as in the case of other mind-words, their referents are very complex and we cannot clearly state that the two lexemes, as nicely escorting each other as Odin's ravens, stood actually for two contrasting or complementing functions of the mental faculty.

Munr, according to the Cleasby – Vigfusson *Icelandic-English Dictionary*,²⁴ is in its primary meaning defined simply as the “mind.” The other interpretation that the

²³ Lebowitz, *Norse Gods and Goddesses*, <http://www.pebbleversion.com/html/NorseGods.htm>

²⁴ *An Icelandic-English Dictionary*, edited by Richard Cleasby and Gudbrand Vigfusson. Oxford: Clarendon, [1874] 1957.

dictionary gives us is “longing” and “delight”, appearing in expressions as, for instance, *leita e-m munar*, “to comfort one”; *e-m leikr munr á e-u*, “to have a mind for”; *grata at muni*, “to weep heartily”; and in compounds like *munar-lauss*, “joyless”, “orphaned”; or *mun-strönd*, “mind-strand” and *mun-tún*, “mind-town”, kennings for the breast. The meanings of the Old English cognate *myne* are very similar. *Bosworth-Toller* give three definitions. The first one is “the mind” itself, standing as a general reference, as in the quotation “mod mægnade, mine fægnade” (*The Riming Poem* l.: 33). Secondly, “mind” (as in “to have a mind for anything”), “purpose” and “desire”, as in “læssan hwile mærum þeodne, þonne his myne sohte” (*Beowulf* ll.: 2571b-72). The third meaning is not far from this semantic field at all, “love”, as in *The Wanderer*: “hwær ic feor oððe neah findan meahte ðone ðe in meoduhealle min mine wisse oððe mec freondleasne frefran wolde”(ll.: 26-28).

The semantic referents of Old Icelandic *hugr* are a little more complex, but similarly to *munr*, the primary meaning is “mind.” However, the *Cleasby – Vigfusson Dictionary* adds that the notion of “thought” can be perceived in this word, and a long list of relevant phrases are given, such as: *í hug eða verki*, “in mind or act”; *hafa e-t í hug*, “to have a thing in mind”, “intend”; or *koma hug á e-t*, “to call to mind”, “remember.” Likewise, the Old English *hyge* also denotes “mind”, but the *Bosworth – Toller Dictionary* does not lay further emphasis on other cognitive qualities of it, instead, it equates the word with “heart” and “soul.” Judging from this, it would be very easy to say that when Odin sends out his two ravens, they stand symbolically for the two parts of the human mind, emotion and cognition, the faculty from which our love and desire stem, and the one with its rationalising qualities. But this conclusion would be a rash one, as longing and intention, two meanings of *hugr* and *munr* stand very close to each other, and also, we find that *hugr* does also stand for affections. *Cleasby – Vigfusson* lists instances where the lexeme denotes “mood”, “temper” and “feeling”, as in *í góðum hug*, “in a good mood”, *í hörðum hug*, “in hard (sad) mood”, “distressed.” The expression *hugir þeirra fóru saman* also indicates kind affection – literally it could be translated as “their minds went together”, which indicates that “they loved each other.” There are several further manifestations of the emotive qualities of *hugr*, too, where the mind wishes for and desires something or somebody. When a man loves a woman in Old Icelandic, he lays his *hugr* on her (*leggja hug á konu*); wishing for a thing is *leika hugr á e-u*; and to be eager for something is to have one’s *hugr* on it (*e-m*

er *hugr á e-u*). Interestingly, in both Old Icelandic and Old English, *hugr* and *hyge* can stand for “courage”, while *munr* or *myne* do not. If somebody is not brave enough, he fights with half *hugr* (*með hálfum hug*), and in *Andreas* we find that “ne wæs him bleaþ hyge” (l.: 231b), where the Icelandic expressions *hug-blauðr* “timid” and *hug-bleyði* “cowardice” resound in our minds.

Vilhelm Grönbech, in his book on the culture of the Teutons, devotes a whole chapter to the Germanic concept of the soul. He circumscribes the two mind-words very carefully, and for him *munr* is “love and pleasure, [...] love as the manifestation of the soul”; and casts light on this statement by claiming that “when the hero in his barrow mourns – as Helgi in the Eddic poem – that he has lost joy and land (*munar ok landa*), *munr* is not to be understood as the joy of life, but as life that is in itself joyful.”²⁵ Thus *munr* is not happiness and joy itself, but soul and life with all its joy and happiness. *Hugr* on the other hand, or rather to complement it, indicates the soul “as desire and inclination, as courage and thought. It inspires a man’s behaviour; his actions and his speech are characterised according to whether they proceed out of whole *hugr*, bold *hugr*, or downcast *hugr*.”²⁶

So the two wise and cunning ravens of Odin represent qualities of the mind somewhat overlapping, still – to a certain extent – distinguishable to some scholars. Nevertheless, there is one characteristic of them certainly in common. That they fly away. The saying “swift as thought” in Old Icelandic is expressed as “fljótr sem hugr manns”, flies as man’s *hugr*, and there is ample evidence that a person’s soul, or even his or her will (be it ill or good) wanders away.²⁷ At death, the soul leaves the confines of the body and flies out into other realms. And in dreams, too, it may cross the boundaries of our “bone-house”, travel to the corners of the earth, and return upon awakening. The word *hugr*, especially when standing in plural form, becomes personified, and just like *fylgja* or *hamingja*, it wanders around pursuing its object, as in *Hávarðar Saga Ísafirðings*: “En er þau voru komin heim að bænum þá vakti Torfi mig og veit eg víst að það eru manna hugir,” (And when they arrived home at the farm, Torfi

²⁵ Grönbech, *The Culture of the Teutons*, 269-70.

²⁶ Grönbech, *The Culture of the Teutons*, 250.

²⁷ See also *hug-renning*, “mind’s-wandering” for “thought” and “meditation.” Smithers expounds on the various instances when *hugr* wanders away or is actually sent out, and elaborates on how often it indicates malevolent, evil intention directed against someone, as demonstrated, for example, by the expression *úlfhugr*. For further details see: Smithers, G. V. “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued),” *Medium Aevum* 28. (1959): 1-22.

wake me up and I know for certain that they were spirits of men).²⁸ Just as Odin's ravens were not flying out purposeless but reported all the tidings to the god, the *hugr* also carries a sense of foreboding in itself, as demonstrated by the countless instances where reports, suggestions come from it. Grönbech also contends that the *hugr* resides in a person and urges him, it sits within the man giving him counsel and warning. It can get uneasy; in this case, life is not "healthy." But when one follows the good counsels of his soul, it laughs within his breast in victory.²⁹

In Anglo-Saxon poetry, there is an interesting parallel to the flying *hugr*, the one which prompted the long discussion on the Germanic vs. Christian aspects of the mind, where the *hyge* is represented as roaming, flying outside the confines of the human body. In *The Seafarer* we read the following passage:

Forþon nu min hyge hweorfeð ofer hreþerlocan,
 min modsefa mid mereflode
 ofer hwæles eþel hweorfeð wide,
 eorþan sceatas, cymeð eft to me
 gifre ond grædig, gielleð anfloga,
 hweteð on hwælweg hreþer unwearnum
 ofer holma gelagu. (ll. 58-64a)

The translations of this passage vary greatly. "Hyge hweorfeð ofer hreþerlocan" is interpreted in several ways; Whitelock translates it as "my thoughts are now roaming beyond the confines of my breast,"³⁰ Mackie interprets it as "truly my heart is restless within my breast."³¹ *Hweorfan* literally means "to wander", "to change", "to turn", and is frequently collocated with mind-words, indicating the soul's departure at, for example, death. Most editors have regarded this passage as a figurative expression of meditation, the seafarer pondering the golden past, distant fortune, kin and comrades. In 1960, in the time when there was a renewal of interest in pagan elements in Anglo-Saxon elegiac literature, Vivian Salmon gave a fascinating insight into the essence of the passage and shed light on it, which – nowadays – is very often neglected or cast

²⁸ *Hávarðar Saga Ísafirðings* 20. From the collection of the University of Iceland: <http://www.hi.is/~terry/ntfylgjur.htm>. The translation is mine.

²⁹ Grönbech, *The Culture of the Teutons*, 250.

³⁰ Whitelock, "The Interpretation of *The Seafarer*", 266.

³¹ Mackie, *The Exeter Book*, 5.

aside.³² For her, the *anfloga*, or “solitary flyer” is not a reference to the cuckoo; she agrees with Kershaw, who said that “surely it merely carries on the metaphor which describes the speaker’s imagination as a (solitary) seabird.”³³ She emphasises that *floga* occurs only in compounds which refer to something supernatural, like the dragon in *Beowulf*, and thus it serves as further evidence that the referent here is rather the soul than the cuckoo. Therefore, the image of the soul flying away like a bird, screaming and returning to the person it belongs to unsatisfied, becomes a fascinating parallel to other Germanic (and presumably even Indo-European) thoughts. Salmon realises that inquiring into traces of ancient pagan beliefs in Anglo-Saxon England is a dangerous enterprise, as the sources we can turn to are almost only the Icelandic ones, which are relatively late and which – due to the long separation from the Scandinavians – are not by all means to be relied on in an Anglo-Saxon context. Still, with her careful treatment of Old Norse literature, she provides us with an intriguing insight into an archaic concept of the mind and soul.

There are numerous instances in Icelandic sagas where the soul leaves the body, travels far and wide, gathers information, and carries out errands. In this case, the soul might take either human or animal shape. When it leaves the body as an animal, it can shapeshift into the form of a bear,³⁴ wolf, or even a whale. Jacob Grimm notes that in the state of trance or while asleep, the soul can also run out of the body in the shape of a mouse, snake or weasel.³⁵ Most often, however, it flies out like a bird. Grönbech lists several such examples. One of them is when, in the *Atlamál*, Kostbera had warning dreams about the death of her husband. She saw an eagle fly into the hall, dripping with blood, and realised that it was Atli’s soul. Also, the *hugr* of Gunhild, Eric Bloodaxe’s wife, once took the shape of a bird. Egil, on one occasion, after being shipwrecked, was forced to compose a laudatory poem of Eric Bloodaxe. One night, when he was working, a bird appeared in his window and kept pestering him. It was no one else but the *hugr* of Gunhild.³⁶

³² Salmon, Vivian. “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul,” *The Modern Language Review* 55. (1960): 1-10.

³³ Kershaw, Nora. *Anglo-Saxon and Norse Poems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922. In Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul”, 2.

³⁴ Bodvar Bjarki

³⁵ Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 2:829.

³⁶ Grönbech, *The Culture of the Teutons*, 1:263-264.

As Salmon argues,³⁷ this concept of the soul taking shape as a bird and flying out of the body is one of the fundamental conceptions of shamanistic cultures. For many peoples, the transcendental shaman's figure was connected to the bird, as it is evidenced by, for example, some typical Siberian shamans' robes, all decorated with feathers. But we do not have to go as far as the Russian mountains or the taiga. In Norse legends we can come across the *fjaðrhamr* – the feather dress,³⁸ Old Irish parallels can also be found,³⁹ and even in the Old English *Genesis*, we read that Satan was able to visit the world with the help of a *feþerhoma*. Wings, feathers, therefore, were in many instances connected to the transcendental wayfaring of the soul, and the spirit itself was in many cultures imagined as a bird, able to leave the body.

Salmon, following the pagan parallels, draws upon Christian ideas that reflect the same concept of the soul leaving the body – often imagined as a bird – and then argues that such beliefs must have been well-known to the Anglo-Saxons and therefore must have formed part of their cultures. Returning to the passage from *The Seafarer* quoted above, we find it justified that *anfloga* is not a simple variation of the cuckoo, but rather one of the body-leaving spirit. She then calls our attention to a fascinating parallel from the *Grímnismál*,⁴⁰ where the above mentioned two ravens of Odin are being described.

Huginn ok Muninn
 fljúga hverjan dag
 jörmungrund yfir.
 Óumk ek Hugin
 at hann apr ne komi,
 þó sjámk ek meir at Munin.⁴¹

(Huginn and Muninn
 fly out each day
 over the earth.
 I fear for Huginn
 that he does not come back,
 but I am even more anxious for Muninn.)

³⁷ Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul”, 3.

³⁸ See for example *Brymskviða* or the *Prose Edda*, as mentioned by Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul”, 3.

³⁹ The cloak of the *filid* as pointed out by Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul”, 5.

⁴⁰ Similarly to Smithers in: “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued)”

⁴¹ *Snorra-Edda*. The translation is mine. The original text is from the collection of the University of Iceland, <http://www.hi.is/~eybjorn/>

The parallel is rather remarkable, for some lines of it haunt our imagination when we look back to the elegy. “Fljúga hverjan dag / Jörmungrund yfir” reminds us of “hweorfeð wide, / eorþan sceatas” and “at hann aftr né komit” resounds in “cymeð eft to me.”



Image 2. – Odin with his animals. Copper plate on a helmet. found in Vendel, Uppland, Sweden. Late 7th century.⁴²

Salmon thus equates *anfloga* with the spirit that can leave its body at death or in sleep, and notes that “in view of the evidence from the general cultural background, *anfloga* must refer to the soul in its bird form, which, crossing the confines of the breast, traverses the earth *gifre* and *grædig* (like the raven of battle) and returns screaming to the body to incite it to a physical journey over the sea.”⁴³ This parallel with Odin’s ravens, and the pagan reading of *The Seafarer* brought great debates in the following discussions on the Old English elegies in particular and the interpretation of the Anglo-Saxon mind in general. Those opposing the search for pagan roots in Old English were quick to respond to these ideas and brought up their own arguments against Old Norse parallels.

2.2.2. The Mind as a Bird – The Flight of the Soul in a (Partly) Christian Reading

The notion that the soul crosses waters is a common belief among many peoples,⁴⁴ but it usually takes place at death. G. V. Smithers, another scholar seeking Germanic

⁴² Lebowitz, *Norse Gods and Goddesses*, <http://www.pebbleversion.com/html/NorseGods.htm>

⁴³ Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul”, 6-7.

⁴⁴ See: Grimm.

elements in the elegies, while analysing the flight of the soul, disagrees with Salmon in this sense.⁴⁵ On the basis of what Smithers says, *The Seafarer* seems to be an interesting mixture of genuinely pagan and Christian elements. He regards the poem as “essentially eschatological”⁴⁶ and a *peregrinatio*, and claims the following:

It remains conceivable that the actual practice of peregrination [...] encouraged the choice of ‘seafaring’ as an allegorical device [...]. In an eschatological setting, a reference to the journey of the soul after death (in *wælweg* of *The Seafarer*) is altogether appropriate. And the logic of structure (which is not to be ignored) demands a transition between the ‘seafaring’ of the individual human being and the universal topics of the Last Things: it is precisely the launching of the soul (*hyge*) on the *wælweg* that provides this specific transition.⁴⁷

As seen from the quotation, Smithers does not agree with the usual emendation of *wælweg* to *hwælweg*.⁴⁸ In his way “whale-road”, the kenning for the sea, becomes “road taken by the dead” or “the road to the abode of death”, a compound noun made of *wæl* “dead body”, and *weg* “road.” He enumerates similar Old Norse compounds to support his statement, as for example *helvegr* “road to Hel”, Hel being the abode of the dead, or *valsinni*, an equivalent of *neosið* “journey made by a dead man”, which would correspond to OE **wælsið*. In this sense, for him the soul’s journey is an allusion to its leaving the body after death; but even though he sees a specifically Christian framework in the poem, in the second part of his article he goes on exploring the pagan background. As he continues his argument about the poem, he claims that

The Seafarer 58-61 refers to the impending or wished for (cf. ll. 63-5) death of the person speaking, and that it does so in terms of the belief (here expressed by the pagan conception concerning the *hyge/hugr*) that at death the soul would make a journey by sea to the abode of the dead.⁴⁹

He then treats the often disputed *anfloga*, and argues that the word’s first element might come from the preposition *an-*, *on-*, meaning “against”, as demonstrated by the existence of such verbs as Old Icelandic *fljúga(st) á*, MDu *aanvliegen*, and early

⁴⁵ Smithers, G. V. “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer,” *Medium Aevum* 26. (1957): 137-153.

⁴⁶ Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer,” 141.

⁴⁷ Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer,” 151-152.

⁴⁸ The reason for the emendation is that according to Sievers’ rules, if there is a noun or an adjective in the first halfline, a verb cannot alliterate in preference to it. Smithers, however, claims that there are at least thirty such examples.

⁴⁹ Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued),” 20.

modern German *anfliegen*, the sole Old English example from *Leechdoms*: “gif men his leoþu acen oððe he ongeflogen sy;”⁵⁰ and the nouns *onflyge* and *onflygen*. Smithers indicates that all these words refer to “attacks” of sickness which were caused by something that “flies against;” and after claiming that the *hugr* was most often – when it flew out – a projection of someone’s malevolence, a baleful intention against someone, he concludes that *anfloga* in this passage “belongs to the same sphere of ideas as *hyge* in that passage.”⁵¹ With this sudden leap, Smithers states that the *anfloga* is used in the sense “disease-bringing malign influence”, and with an even greater leap, he suddenly equates it with “a creature of some such type as the valkyrie.”⁵² He leaves us with a cliffhanger here, as the more elaborate explanation follows only in his appendix,⁵³ where we read the following:

The *anfloga* of *The Seafarer* (i) brings about the death (i.e. by sickness) of the person speaking [...]; (ii) is characterised as *gifre* (the ON cognate of which is used substantivally as the noun *gifr*) and *grædig* (iii) has the power to move through the air; (iv) ‘yells’ [...]. It is therefore possible that the *anfloga* designates a valkyrie.⁵⁴

As seen from Smithers’ article, even though initially he insists that the poem has a specifically Christian framework, he lets his imagination wander away, as the *hyge* does from the *hreþerlocas*, but in his case he does not return to this original statement, and through his interpretation of these lines, we get an essentially pagan impression of the elegy, without being reconfirmed in its specific Christian framework. Such Norse parallels are obviously thought-provoking and lend wings to everyone’s imagination, for certain. Nevertheless, cautious treatment is inevitable, and the evidence provided should get a firm foothold on multiple levels, from multiple sources. The equation of the *anfloga* with a valkyrie is certainly a very interesting and exciting idea, but it is hard

⁵⁰ *Leechdoms* I. 86, 21 as in Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued),” 20. “if a man’s limbs ache or he is attacked by disease.”

⁵¹ Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued),” 21.

⁵² Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued),” 22.

⁵³ Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued),” 99-104.

⁵⁴ Smithers, “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued),” 104. Earlier the author adds: “OE *wælcyrige* means ‘one with supernatural or magic powers’; ‘one whose gaze kills’ (as a gloss on L *gorgoneus*); ‘goddess of war’ (glossing *Bellona*); ‘Fury’ (glossing *Erinnys*). The cognate *wælceasiga*, applied to the raven in *Exodus* 164, contains the root **geus-* in the ancient sense ‘to taste’ (as in the cognate OHG *kiosan* and L *gustare*). ON *valkyrja* and OE *wælcyrige* therefore represent a word which at an early stage must have meant ‘a demon that preyed on corpses’. This last is regarded by Falk as a personification of the carrion raven, with which our word is linked by the fact that the valkyrie is represented as a being able to speed through the air *like a raven*” (104.)

to find it well grounded given the lack of supporting evidence. Compared to Smithers' argument, Salmon seems a bit more circumspect and careful, nevertheless, her ideas are also truly brave and thought-provoking in the way she treats Old Norse parallels.

Salmon, in addition to analysing the problematic lines of *The Seafarer*, also turns to some equally puzzling lines of *The Wanderer*. We read in lines 50-57 the following:

Sorg bið geniwad,
 þonne maga gemynd mod geondhweorfēð;
 greteð gliwstafum, georne geondsceawað
 secga geseldan. Swimmað eft⁵⁵ on weg!
 Fleotendra ferð no þær fela bringeð
 cuðra cwidegiedda. Cearo bið geniwad
 þam þe sendan sceal swiþe geneahhe
 ofer waþema gebind werigne sefan.

Several suggestions for the translation of these lines have been offered, as the interpretation of many key words causes difficulties. The most common idea, represented by the translations of, for example, Robert E. Diamond,⁵⁶ Benjamin Thorpe, Michael J. Alexander⁵⁷ and Rick McDonald,⁵⁸ or Bernard F. Huppé,⁵⁹ is that the wanderer remembers his long lost kinsmen, comrades in battle, but as he greets them, they disappear, vanish into thin air. Some, like Thorpe's interpretation, suppose a visitation by the spirits of fellow warriors; but others – doubting that in Old English literature there may exist a thought of free-ranging souls, detached from their bodies – try to give a literal translation, like Sedgefield, putting forward the idea that the wanderer is watching the seafarers of other ships passing. Salmon adds one more interpretation, namely that of W. J. B. Owen, who “finds that the Wanderer is watching for familiar faces, not as other sailors pass by on board ship, but as they land in harbour.”⁶⁰ Without doubt, the translation of several words is problematic. What do *swimmað* or *fleotendra* mean? Do they swim and float or simply fade away? And what is *gliwstafum*? For many, it simply means “joyfully”; Thorpe suggests greeting “with songs”, Alexander combines the two and writes that the wanderer “singeth out gladly.”

⁵⁵ The word *oft* is almost always amended to *eft*.

⁵⁶ *Old English Grammar and Reader*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970.

⁵⁷ *Old English Literature*. New York: Schocken Books, 1983.

⁵⁸ *The Wanderer Project*. <http://research.uvsc.edu/mcdonald/wanderweb/>

⁵⁹ All these translations are collected by *The Wanderer Project*.

⁶⁰ Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul,” 7. Owen, W. J. B. “Wanderer, Lines 50-57,” *M. L. N.* 65, (1950): 161-165.

For Salmon, none of the explanations is satisfactory. She agrees with those who think that the wanderer sees the spirits of kinsmen and friends, and explains that the word *glivstafum* immediately suggests that those are right who suppose that the wanderer is “in touch with the spirit world.”⁶¹ For Bosworth and Toller, *stæf*, the second element of the compound, is meaningless, but we know that there are several implications of the word, as *stæf* has close connections to magic practices and runes.⁶² Moreover, *gleo* does not only mean “joy”, but “music”, as well: music, which in Germanic culture was one of the primary requirements to get in touch with the spiritual world.⁶³ There is evidence in Old Icelandic literature for such practices, but even some English ballads (carrying deep and traditional layers of folklore in themselves) and the Old English words *galere* for “magician” and *gealdor* for “spell” indicate that songs had a significant function in magic, since they are both connected to the verb *galan* “to sing.”⁶⁴ On this basis, Salmon translates the word as “with music-runes” or “with magic songs”, and proposes, coming to the expression *secga geseldan*, that the wanderer here communicates with spirits. The phrase is commonly interpreted as “warrior companions”⁶⁵ or simply “warriors”, “comrades”, but the literal meaning is “companions of men”, as she comments. She regards them as synonymous with and even equal to an Icelandic equivalent of *hugr* – the “guardian spirit of the body” as she calls it – which is *fylgjur manna*, also meaning “companions of men.” Certainly, her argument is fascinating, but it has a soft spot, namely the linguistic, etymological unrelatedness of the two expressions. Yet, if she is right in her argumentation, the lines of *The Wanderer* could

⁶¹ Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul,” 8.

⁶² See, for example, German *Buchstabe* “letter”, literally meaning “beech stave”, and also Tacitus’ *Germania* for how the priests gave advice by runes carved into twigs: “Auspicia sortesque ut qui maxime observant: sortium consuetudo simplex. Virgam frugiferae arbori decisam in surculos amputant eosque notis quibusdam discretos super candidam vestem temere ac fortuito spargunt. Mox, si publice consultetur, sacerdos civitatis, sin privatim, ipse pater familiae, precatus deos caelumque suspiciens ter singulos tollit, sublato secundum impressam ante notam interpretatur. Si prohibuerunt, nulla de eadem re in eundem diem consultatio; sin permissum, auspicio ad huc fides exigitur.” From *P. Cornelii Taciti Opera*. The Latin Library, <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/tac.html>. Translation: “Augury and divination by lot no people practise more diligently. The use of the lots is simple. A little bough is lopped off a fruit-bearing tree, and cut into small pieces; these are distinguished by certain marks, and thrown carelessly and at random over a white garment. In public questions the priest of the particular state, in private the father of the family, invokes the gods, and, with his eyes toward heaven, takes up each piece three times, and finds in them a meaning according to the mark previously impressed on them. If they prove unfavourable, there is no further consultation that day about the matter; if they sanction it, the confirmation of augury is still required.” – UNRV History, <http://www.unrv.com/tacitus/tacitus-germania-2.php>

⁶³ Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul”

⁶⁴ Although the word means “yell”, “scream”, “shout”, as well.

⁶⁵ Rick McDonald’s translation.

refer to the common belief in the guardian spirit (*fylgja* or even the *hugr*). This way, the other two dubious words, *swimmað* and *fleotendra* become less obscure, too. How can a spirit float and swim? An allegorical rendering is obviously an easy shortcut to solving the problem, but Salmon here calls back to evidence from ballads and Old Icelandic culture, and suggests a possible interpretation on the basis of what has already been elucidated: the common belief in the soul shapeshifting into the form of an animal, especially a bird, inhabiting its body after, for example, death. She, summarising her ideas, claims the following:

Lines 55-57 seem to contain the idea of the soul as a bird; the preceding lines may refer to the Wanderer's summoning of the bird-souls of dead or absent comrades, which, however, swim and float on the water silently. To the student of OE the idea may seem fantastic; to the student of OI or the anthropologist little more than commonplace. To the objection that the lines would have been equally obscure to the poet's contemporaries, since they contain no reference to birds, the answer must be that it all depends on the meaning of *secga geseldan*; if this was a 'technical term' equivalent to *fylgur* then the implications would have been clear enough, but while this remains the sole occurrence of the phrase we can never know for certain.⁶⁶

Some scholars entirely deny possible Norse links to the elegies. For them, such ideas should not be pursued. Due to the scarcity of evidence and the lack of continuity between the two cultures, many regard it as mere fantasising, fabrications and castles in the air. Diekstra claims that supposing and looking for Norse links is far-fetched and has no relations at all with reality. When she refers to Salmon's article, she does not see much merit in it, and, oversimplifying Salmon's observations, and taking expressions out of context, she summarises Salmon's statements as follows: "she sees the seafarer as a 'shaman', a 'psychically unstable person, who has received a call to the religious life', and who is capable of passing at will into a state of mental dissociation."⁶⁷ Diekstra, in her analysis, does not acknowledge any Germanic parallel, views the poem only on Christian terms, and regards the ominous lines as a further proof of the *peregrinatio* motif. For her, the work reflects "the traditional conception of the cloistered soul, which on the wings of contemplation obeys the urge to return to its ancestral home."⁶⁸ In this interpretation, the soul or *hyge* tries to leave the confines of the body, and in its contemplative flight gains an insight into the heavenly bliss that it hopes for. In

⁶⁶ Salmon, "The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul," 9.

⁶⁷ Diekstra, "The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland," 434.

⁶⁸ Diekstra, "The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland," 433.

claiming this, she lists several parallels in medieval Christian writings for the free-ranging soul, and confirms her statement by demonstrating how frequent the idea of the winged soul was in the Middle Ages. Psalm 55: 6-8 reads:

Oh that I had wings like a dove! For then would I fly away, and be at rest.
Lo, then would I wander far off, and remain in the wilderness. Selah. I
would hasten my escape from the windy storm and tempest.⁶⁹

Isaiah 40:30 was also a popular reference of mystics, and Proverbs 23:5 was frequently quoted, too:

But they that wait upon the Lord shall renew their strength; they shall mount
up with wings as eagles; they shall run and not be weary; and they shall
walk, and not faint. (Isa. 40: 30)

Wilt thou set thine eyes upon that which is not? For riches certainly make
themselves wings; they fly away as an eagle toward heaven. (Pro. 23: 5)

Truly, ever since Dorothy Whitelock,⁷⁰ there have been several interpretations of the text as a poem with a motif of *peregrinatio*, where the seafarer realises that he is only a pilgrim on earth and looks for his true, heavenly home. Diekstra adds that “just as the exile feels the persistent urge to travel back to his homeland, the soul, constantly mindful of its origin, attempts to escape from the prison of the body and fly to heaven.”⁷¹ Therefore, just as the seafarer is an exile in the world, the soul is an exile in the body, a subtle, heavenly element, which is hindered by the heavy earthly body to escape upward, towards God eternal, even though it would like to.⁷² That this idea is not brought forth only by the later mystics is evidenced by Boethius and the *Consolation*’s Alfredian translation. Diekstra provides us with an insight into this by quoting the well known lines where soul and body, heavenly and earthly matter are described as having been mixed by God, and the soul is constantly hoping to return to the Creator:

Hwæt þu, ece God, eac gemengest
þa heofoncundan hider wið eorðan,
saula wið lice; siððan wuniað
þis eorðlice & þæt ece samod,

⁶⁹ All the quotations from the Bible are from the King James Version.

⁷⁰ Whitelock, Dorothy. “The Interpretation of *The Seafarer*.” In *The Early Cultures of North-West Europe*, edited by Cyril Fox and Bruce Dickins, 261-272. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950

⁷¹ Diekstra, “The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland,” 435.

⁷² Diekstra, “The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland,” 438.

saul in flæsce. Hwæt, hi simle to ðe
 hion fundiað, forðæm hi hider of ðe
 æror common; sculon eft to ðe

[...]

forgif nu, ece God urum modum
 þæt hi moten to þe, metod, alwuhta,
 þurg þas earfoðu up astigan,
 & of þisum bysegum, bilewit fæder,
 þeoda walend, to þe cuman ⁷³

In book IV, metre 1, the mind of Boethius is also supplied with feathers, thus becoming a Christian parallel to the Norse *fjaðrhamr* – the feather dress, and showing that the image of the feathered soul/mind cannot exclusively be traced back to Germanic origins:

Sunt etenim pennaе uolucres mihi
 Quae celsa conscendant poli.
 Quos sibi cum uelox mens induit,
 Terras perosa despicit [...]⁷⁴

Ic hæbbe fiðru fugle swiftran,
 mid ðæm ic fleogan mæg feor fram eorðan
 ofer heane hrof heofones þisses,
 ac ðær ic nu moste mod gefeðran,
 ðinne ferðlocan, feðrum minum,
 oððæt ðu meahte þisne middangeard,
 ælc eorðlic ðing, eallunga forsion. [...]⁷⁵

And how to get out of the prison of the body? How does the soul obtain wings in a Christian understanding? Through contemplation upon God, as Gregory the Great says in several places,⁷⁶ and by realising that it is only temporarily exiled in the body; in reality it belongs to incorporeal realms, and thus we have to ascend to God in our hearts, and the soul must fly to him in contemplation. With this approach, Diekstra tries to give a new explanation to the word *anfloga*, as well. To her mind, it can be reinterpreted in

⁷³ XX, ll.: 234-40, and ll.: 252-56. Sedgefield, *King Alfred's Old English Version of Boethius De Consolatione Philosophiae*, 184. Quoted in Diekstra, "The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland," 439.

⁷⁴ Quoted in Diekstra, "The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland," 439.

⁷⁵ Metre 24. Krapp, *The Paris Psalter and the Metres of Boethius*, 188-189.

⁷⁶ *Moralia in Job and Homiliae in Ezechielem*

terms of the exiled soul, as the noun can be related not only to *fleogan* but *fleon*, too, and therefore may “carry the notion of ‘fugitive’ as well as ‘flyer’”.⁷⁷

2.2.3. Comments on the Two Approaches

One thing is certain: due to the scarcity of parallels in Old English literature, it is impossible to fully map the Anglo-Saxon ideas about the mind. As we can witness several times, just as through Diekstra’s article, many scholars think that it is not well-based to search for pagan, pre-Christian elements in Old English literature. Nowadays it is not fashionable after the – often fanciful – Norse connections that were brought up by late 19th - early 20th century scholars. Yet, we must not forget that our purpose should not be defeated by going to the other extreme and neglecting the underlying layers of a culture surviving for a long time in folklore, superstitions and other traditions even long after the arrival of Christianity to England.

As I have mentioned, the urge to reach back to Germanic roots comes up time and time again. Certainly, there must have existed an essentially pre-Christian concept of the mind for the Anglo-Saxons, before the advent of the new religion. This tradition goes far back in history, to Germanic and even Indo-European times. It has often been emphasised that approaching the mind-words from this direction is an error. Objections against it include scarcity of evidence, almost all of which is from Icelandic sources. The problem with these literary works is that most of them are relatively late and there is no directly proven cultural continuum between Old Icelandic and Anglo-Saxon cultures. Although the Eddic poetry is much earlier, the sagas were written mainly in the 12th and 13th centuries and are generally regarded as unreliable historical sources. As written in one of the sagas about St Olaf: “you can accept from this saga whatever you think most likely, for in old sagas many things are confused.”⁷⁸ Yet, they provide us with invaluable information about the Scandinavian way of life, and they contain skaldic poetry, rooted in ancient lore, and are therefore much earlier than the sagas in which they are embedded. Furthermore, we must not disregard Old Icelandic sources entirely, as they are the almost only literary evidence we might look into for the further understanding of pre-Christian Old English culture. Even though they must be treated

⁷⁷ Diekstra, “The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland,” 443.

⁷⁸ Quoted in Sawyer, *The Age of the Vikings*, 41.

with a certain restraint, and we should not bring forth too far-reaching conclusions on the basis of them, we must keep in mind that traces of popular pre-Christian beliefs persisted well after the conversion. As evidenced by contemporary documents, after the Viking invasions, there was a possible revival of paganism,⁷⁹ and due to the close contact with the Scandinavians, the Anglo-Saxons could (re-)familiarise themselves with pagan practices.

The changes in religion only slowly affected the people as a whole. The records that we possess were exclusively produced in ecclesiastical circles, the only depository of 'written culture'. The documents are, therefore, rather misleading. Since almost certainly most of the documents referring to heathen practices among the English were destroyed at the early stages of conversion, we will never get a picture of what religious practices among people of the countryside were like. It is rather certain that the worship of stones and trees was common among them even considerably late. Wulfstan deals with this topic in the *Canons of Edgar*:

And we lærað þæt preosta gehwile cristendom geornlice arære and ælcne hæþendom mid ealle adwæsce; and forbeode wilweorþunga, and licwigunga, and hwata, and galdra, and manweorðunga, and þa gemearr ðe man drifð on mistlicum gewigungum and on friðsplotum and on ellenum, and eac on oðrum mistlicum treowum and on stanum, and on manegum mistlicum gedwimerum þe men on dreogað fela þæs þe hi na ne sceoldan.⁸⁰

The subject reappears in other literary works of the period, i.e. Wulfstan's homilies, and Ælfric's *De Falsis Diis*, this latter being less homiletic and concentrates more on the scholarly aspects.⁸¹ Reading the penitential documents of the thirteenth

⁷⁹ Heathenism is defined by Cnut in his laws as follows: "Hæðenscipe byð, þæt man deofolgyld weorðige, þæt is þæt man weorþige hæðene godas ond sunnan oþþe monan, fyr oððe flod, wæterwyllas oþþe stanas oððe æniges cynnes wudutreowa, oððon wiccecræft lufige oððon morðweorc gefremme on ænige wisan, oððon on blote oððon fyrhte, oððon swylcra gedwimera ænig þincg dreoge." Translation: "Heathendom is for a man to worship heathen gods, and sun or moon, fire or flood, springs or stones, or any kind of trees, or to be addicted to witchcraft, or to compass any deed of murder in any wise, either as an act of sacrifice or through fear, or to perform any follies of this kind." From Ashdown, "The Attitude of the Anglo-Saxons to their Scandinavian Invaders", 94.

⁸⁰ Wulfstan, *Canons of Edgar*, quoted with translation in Kellogg, "The Context for Epic in Later Anglo-Saxon England," 143. "And we urge that every priest zealously support Christianity and utterly suppress all paganism; and forbid worship at wells, and necromancy, and augury, and magic spells, and the worship of evil, and those errors committed in various incantations and in protected precincts and at elder trees, and also at various other kinds of trees and at stones and in many kinds of superstition which people should never practice."

⁸¹ Kellogg, "The Context for Epic in Later Anglo-Saxon England," 143-144.

century – a surprisingly late date – we are still confronted with penitence for sins suggesting pagan practices.

As for a return to paganism owing to the Viking invasions, we can find different documents concerning the problem, indicating that in the late ninth – early tenth centuries many Christians abandoned their religion and sought support and help from pagan deities. In the last decade of the ninth century, Pope Formosus wrote a letter to the bishops of England, accusing the clergy of remaining silent, “though paganism has reasserted itself in England.”⁸² In the early tenth century, when Ivarr's descendants arrived in Northumbria, a new impulse of paganism manifested itself, and soon heathen symbols appeared on the coins of York, namely Thor's hammer and the raven.⁸³



*Image 3. – The Anlaf Guðfriðsson silver penny with the image of the raven. King of York between 939-40.*⁸⁴

All in all, even though some find it a dangerous venture to look for Old Icelandic evidence for the treatment of the mind or to find Germanic traces in Anglo-Saxon literary works, we should not be negatively biased, either. Certain credit must be given

⁸² Fisher, *The Anglo-Saxon Age c.400-1042*, 204.

⁸³ It must be noted, however, that the question of a pagan revival is much more complex. On the one hand, contemporary documents testify to a decline in monastic life and Christianity. Several historians claim that the decline of moral standards among English churchmen is proof of the decay of monastic life and the decrease in the respect for the Church. It is undeniable that the problem is frequently described by contemporaries but the situation was not much different a century before the first Viking raids. We cannot state, therefore, that the Scandinavian invasions alone could actually be blamed for the apparent decline. Although some scholars would say that the high number of synods held in the eighth and ninth centuries point to the emerging problem (Godfrey, *The Church in Anglo-Saxon England*, 260.), others would consider it just the opposite: i.e. the large number of councils indicate good ecclesiastical organisation, and instead of being milestones of decline they are the marks of reform (Fisher, *The Church in England Between the Death of Bede and the Danish Invasions*, 19). Moreover, we must not forget that the coin had two sides. The Viking troops must really have had some temporary recoiling effect, but the Anglo-Saxons' missionary activity also had great effect on their invaders, which is indicated by the quick conversion of the Danelaw after the settlement. Converting the Danes proved to be so successful that the former Viking intruders soon provided churchmen of the highest rank, such as Oda of Canterbury, and Oscytel and Osbryht of York.

⁸⁴ The Fitzwilliam Museum, http://www.fitzmuseum.cam.ac.uk/gallery/normans/gallery/coin_8.htm

to some possible overlap between elements of the concept of the mind appearing in Old English literature and Icelandic sources. It will not be possible to find satisfactory proof for many claims of the advocates of pagan elements in Anglo-Saxon literature, but a glimpse into the Germanic notion of the mind can provide us with some light upon some often neglected parallels.

No real conclusion can be reached, no advantage can be given to either of the parties. Perhaps the only way to reconcile those who seek for an essentially Christian or an essentially pagan origin to the above mentioned lines from the elegies is to say that we must not think that Germanic and Christian conceptions about life, mind and soul were entirely detached from each other. As we have seen, even in Christianity, spiritual journeys are possible. The soul is capable of stepping out of the confines of the body, as is evidenced by, for example, St Godric's biography, where Godric once gets as far as Jerusalem by means of a spiritual journey. The soul, leaving the body at, for example, death, is often pictured as a bird – though usually not as a raven but as a dove – flying out of the person's mouth,⁸⁵ and the association of the spirit with birds is even more emphasised and gains further significance by the Holy Spirit descending upon Jesus Christ in the form of a dove at His baptism. Jacob Grimm gives ample evidence for Christian beliefs that connect birds and souls, ranging from scorched birds who were once souls flying in the underworld, to Christians' souls being numbered among birds.⁸⁶ The soul, flying on wings of birds, also frequently appears in medieval mystic writings, and there are also numerous instances where birds, just like Huginn and Muninn, perch upon heads and shoulders of people, and instruct them and report God's will. Even St Augustine and Thomas Aquinas are portrayed with a white dove upon their shoulders, this being an obvious influence of the baptismal image of Christ and the Holy Spirit. As for the raven, we can also find Christian sources. Oswald's raven flies to his shoulder and later he not only talks to, but even kneels before it.⁸⁷ Noah also sends out a raven to determine the extent of the flood: "And he sent forth a raven, which went forth to and fro, until the waters were dried up from off the earth."⁸⁸ St Gregory is escorted by three

⁸⁵ Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 2:828.

⁸⁶ See: Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 2: chapter 26, on souls.

⁸⁷ Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 148.

⁸⁸ Gen. 8: 7. The raven is a contradictory bird in the Bible. According to Psalms 147:9 and Job 38, 41, God takes particular care of them, providing them with food. In other places it belongs to the abominable creatures (Deut. 14:14 and Prov. 30: 17).

flying ravens, just like the travellers in *Njáls Saga*, and, in a like manner, three others fly with St Benedict.⁸⁹

All in all, it seems that there are numerous parallels between the pagan ideas about the mind and the soul and Christian ones. Anglo-Saxon society had a rich cultural background. The new concept brought by Christianity must have found a fertile ground among a people for whom their ancient Germanic traditions and concepts of mind and soul cannot have been entirely forgotten and must have lived on for centuries, even after the advent of the new religion. The soul and the bird-symbolism attached to it did not fade away with the appearance of Christianity, but to some extent – even though in a modified form – it was supported by Christian beliefs. After a while, new significance was attached to it, but the idea of the spirit leaving the body upon death, in state of trance or while asleep, and associating it with a bird, even though there is no direct Old English evidence for it, must have been a reality for the Anglo-Saxons. The two backgrounds, the pagan and Christian, should therefore be read in this case more in terms of how they supported and reinforced each other in Anglo-Saxon society. It must be realised that there exist some universal concepts about the mind, too, which might surface in the much-debated bird-image and the flight of the soul, for instance.

In the following chapters, this idea will be developed further, accepting that there exist some common tenets concerning the mind and soul in different traditions. I will show how these basic ideas manifest in various readings and how they developed and changed through the centuries, founding my discussion on the other chief interest of scholars who deal with the Anglo-Saxon mind: that of the classical vs. vernacular debate, one that is much more general in perspective than the pagan – Christian argumentations.

2.3. A Classical vs. Vernacular Approach

The first clash of ideas about the pagan versus Christian reading of the elegies and the concept of the mind was followed by a long period of silence in the study of mind-words, until, in the late 1980s, early 1990s, they were partly rediscovered. The classical vs. vernacular approach thus supplements the Germanic vs. Christian one, and to some

⁸⁹ Grimm, *Teutonic Mythology*, 2:671. and 4:1333.

extent is connected to it. However, it treats the question of the Anglo-Saxon mind with much more caution, paying much more heed to the balance of two coinciding traditions. As opposed to the Germanic vs. Christian one, the classical vs. vernacular approach does not study the mind from a doctrinal, ideological point of view. The clash is not essentially a pagan vs. Christian one, but is based on contemporary “scholarliness” or learnedness. Thus, it differs from the previous approaches significantly in its standpoint. It is not biased, but attempts to draw a rather objective picture of the possible cultural influences at play, examining the question in a circumspect and more cautious way. The rediscovery of the question of mind-words in Anglo-Saxon England brought along discussions less dominated by an urge to find Old Norse parallels and links often by complete reinterpretation of texts and a tempering with their words. It rather rests more on facts than detective work matched with the power of imagination. In this case, the focus leaves the strictly pagan vs. Christian frame, and shifts to one based on the surviving Old English evidence, trying not to read any – to many people questionable – Icelandic parallels into it, and broadening the panorama by showing the influence of some possible learned – antique heritage. This new approach to the question of mind therefore achieves what the previous one failed to do: after looking into the binoculars and examining the infinite variety of stones and pebbles, it takes the binoculars off again, and manages to see the panorama and the unity of the mountain-range with fresh eyes.

Through the centuries of thinking about emotions and cognition, the views of different cultures, religions and social groups have also mixed. We should not fall into the trap of seeking some definite concept of the mind, but must be aware that side-by-side there might have existed different approaches formed by different cultural impacts, which, in turn, might also have influenced each other. Here I must give credit to Malcolm Godden, who begins his argument by clarifying two different trends in Anglo-Saxon England, and whose terms: “classical tradition” and “vernacular tradition”, I will be using frequently throughout the dissertation:

Two distinct traditions of thought about the mind are evident among the Anglo-Saxons. There is, first of all, a classical tradition represented by Alcuin of York (writing in Latin and on the continent, but influential for Anglo-Saxon vernacular writers), King Alfred and Ælfric of Eynsham, who were consciously working in a line which went back through late antique writers such as St Augustine and Boethius to Plato, but developed that tradition in interesting and individual ways. In particular they show the

gradual development of a unitary concept of the inner self, identifying the intellectual mind with the immortal soul and life-spirit. Secondly, there is a vernacular tradition more deeply rooted in the language, represented particularly by the poets but occasionally reflected even in the work of Alfred and Ælfric. It was a tradition which preserved the ancient distinction of soul and mind, while associating the mind at least as much with passion as with intellect.⁹⁰

In Anglo-Saxon England, the two traditions went hand-in-hand. As already mentioned, the arrival of a new religion does not and cannot put to flight the old culture in its entirety. For centuries they exist side-by-side and represent themselves in different ratios in the different areas of life. New concepts can at times disturb old ones and cast brand new light upon special aspects of existence, but they can also reinforce and confirm old traditions. This is what happened in England, and this is what Old English literature testifies. We are in a transitional period, an era of cultural turmoil when fresh ideas about the mind and soul are either in contradiction with the ancient ones or are at the stage of reconciliation, and distinct traditions – the classical one and the vernacular one – are at constant interplay. The following chapters will try to explore this interplay of the classical and the vernacular ideas about the mind, and explain how they affected each other. There will be two major focuses in my discussion. First, the two distinct traditions existing in Anglo-Saxon England will be introduced, based especially on the discussion of Godden. Then, I will examine the backgrounds of the two traditions, and moving back in chronology, explain how they had been developing through the centuries, leading up to the interesting mixed image of the Old English mind that Godden explores.

2.3.1. The Consciousness in the Classical Tradition

When Godden tries to reveal some aspects of these two entwining traditions, he begins with the classical one. Now I, deeply indebted to his thought, will closely follow his approach in summarising it. Concerning our period of interest, it is Alcuin, who – based mainly on Augustine and Lactantius – with his *De animae ratione* was the first milestone in the treatment of the soul. The soul to him was a primarily intellectual agency, the chief part of which is the mind (or *mens*). Even though in the beginning he accepts the classical view when he argues that the soul comprises not only the intellect

⁹⁰ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 271.

but desire and emotions as well, later the soul becomes the equivalent to him not only of the immortal life-spirit, but also of the rational mind.⁹¹

The second milestone is Alfred the Great.⁹² His translation of Boethius' *De consolatione philosophiae* is a significant treatment of the mind and the soul in Old English literature. Boethius very carefully distinguishes the human mind and soul. For him, the soul (*anima*) is the life-surviving spirit, an entity that existed before and will exist after the life of the human being. Mind (*animus, mens* or *cor*), on the other hand, is equated with the human consciousness, which contemplates good and bad and which is sometimes troubled by passions. Alfred, however, is much closer to Alcuin in his treatment. For him, the *mod* (the usual translation of *animus*) is very close to *sawl* (*anima*), and thus mind and soul sometimes are interchanged and the mind becomes identical with the life-surviving spirit, too.⁹³ Further confirmation is brought by his version of Augustine's *Soliloquies*, where he gives further thought to the eternal *mod*. This equation allows him to use the word *mod* in a special personified way, as a reference to the persona of Boethius, a substitution for the subject "I".⁹⁴

Godden also calls our attention to Alfred's use of the word *gast* in the translation of *De consolatione philosophiae*. *Gast* appears only once as a translation of *spiritus*, but in an entirely different sense than Boethius' use. Boethius says that not all of our acts come from our will and consciousness, but some are "natural impulses", like taking breath in our dream, "quod in somno spiritum ducimus nescientes."⁹⁵ Alfred, however, gives a completely different interpretation, and talks about the flying away of the spirit while we are asleep:

Swa eac ure gast bið swiðe wide farende urum unwillum and ures ungewealdes for his gecynde, nalles for his willan; þæt bið þonne we slapað.⁹⁶

This approach is a clear reflection of the belief, already mentioned, that the soul is capable of freeing itself from the confines of the body and can wander far and wide

⁹¹ Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 271-274.

⁹² Godden discusses him on pages 274-277.

⁹³ See for example Otten, Kurt. *König Alfred's Boethius*. Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1964.

⁹⁴ See: chapter 3.2.1.

⁹⁵ III. pr. 2.

⁹⁶ Sedgefield, *King Alfred's Old English Version of Boethius 'De Consolatione Philosophiae'*, 93: ll.: 6-9.

during dreaming or a state of trance. Godden comments on the use of the word *gast* here in the following way:

The reference is presumably to dreaming. Alcuin mentions dreaming as an activity of the soul and also uses journeying outside the body as an image of thought and imagination, but he is insistent that the soul does not actually leave the body except at death. Alfred seems to be referring to actual journeying, and his emphasis that it is not guided by our conscious volition or control makes it unlikely that he sees it as an activity of the mind or soul as these are understood by him. Hence the use of *gast* rather than *sawl*. Alfred seems to be reflecting the common folk-belief that in dreams and trances an inner spirit or soul (usually quite distinct from the conscious mind) leaves the body and wanders about the world. [...] What it suggests is a distinction between the *sawl*, which is identified with the conscious mind and the immortal life-spirit, and the *gast*, which represents a kind of alien subconscious. But it may be that Alfred is referring to two quite separate traditions without seeking to reconcile them.⁹⁷

Alfred, thus, was certainly familiar with the popular notions concerning the wandering away of a “kind of” mind, and incorporated it into his treatment of the Boethian text. However, even though it may suggest a familiarity with and a reference to the other living tradition, the vernacular one, Alfred still draws mostly upon the classical legacy and represents it.

The third milestone in the classical tradition is Ælfric.⁹⁸ His sources for the treatment of the mind and the soul are Alcuin and Alfred. For him, the soul (*sawl*) is immortal, and also a chiefly rational, intellectual agency; but he does not equate it with the mind (*mod*) and does not even say that the mind is the soul’s principal part. This latter is only “the instrument or locus of the soul rather than an inner personalized spirit or self, as Alcuin and Alfred see it.”⁹⁹ Godden further argues that the reason why Ælfric seems to consciously emphasise the distinction between the mind and the soul might be that he would not like to be misled by the false suggestion that “the dimension or ‘degree’ of soul in an individual varies with his intellectual powers.”¹⁰⁰ Ælfric therefore concludes that the soul and the mind are concepts in very close association with each other, but *mod* is *sawl*’s knowledge and understanding.

⁹⁷ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 277.

⁹⁸ Godden’s discussion on Ælfric is on pages 278-285.

⁹⁹ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 279.

¹⁰⁰ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 282.

Let me turn here to a quotation, through which we learn about Ælfric's definition of the terms, as this will lead us to the next important point about the two traditions existing side-by-side. Ælfric claims, in his *Lives of Saints*, the following:

Heo [seo sawul] is on bocum manegum naman gecyged, be hyre weorces þenungum. Hyre nama is anima þæt is sawul and seo nama gelympð to hire life. And spiritus gast gelimpð to hire ymbwlatung. Heo is sensus þæt is andgit oððe felnyss þonne heo gefret. Heo is animus þæt is mod þonne heo wat. Heo is mens þæt is mod þonne heo understent. Heo is memoria þæt is gemynd þonne heo gemanð. Heo is ratio þæt gescead þonne heo toscæt. Heo is voluntas þæt is wylla þonne heo hwæt wyle. Ac swa þeah ealle þas naman syndon sawul.¹⁰¹

By this definition, *mod*'s functions seem entirely different from what we observe in the surviving corpus of Old English literature. As demonstrated already, and as this passage clearly indicates, for Ælfric the mind is a uniquely cognitive agency, responsible for knowing and understanding, and it does not involve any touch of emotion, or the *mod*, which could overflow a person, the “intensified self” – as we shall see it later. Compared to the way Alcuin and Alfred treat the mind, we do not find much contradiction here, as for all three of them it was a chiefly cognitive agency. From this aspect, the approach corresponds to our modern treatment of the mind, the one which tends to regard it as an intellectual faculty. If, however, we compare these views with the evidence brought by the analysis of the entire corpus of Old English texts, we find a surprising contradiction. It seems that while Ælfric calls the *mod* a rational agency, 41.47% of the surviving *mod* examples contemporaneous with him testify that it was regarded as an emotional agency, as well¹⁰²; what is more, in several cases it was far detached from all rationality and rather meant some kind of an internal fire, a state of emotional saturation, pride, courage or even anger. This basic contradiction causes much confusion around the mind-words, and this is what indicates the existence of two traditions in Anglo-Saxon England: that of the classical and that of the vernacular. Those who were not that well versed in Latinity and the traditions stemming from the philosophers and thinkers of antiquity had in many aspects very different conceptions about the mind and the soul.

¹⁰¹ Ælfric's *Lives of Saints* (Christmas) 180-88. See also: chapter 2.4. footnote 264, with Antonina Harbus's translation.

¹⁰² See: chapter 3.4.

2.3.2. The Consciousness in the Vernacular Tradition

As there is not much direct evidence of what the vernacular ideas about the mind were, there is great temptation to reach out for help to Old Norse literature, as we have already seen. This might prove useful in many ways but, as demonstrated, it has always been and will always remain a breeding ground of heated debate and disagreement. Old Icelandic parallels certainly seem to cast light on some aspects of a Germanic, pre-Christian concept about the mind, and I believe that although there is no clear-cut cultural continuity between the two peoples, the sagas and especially the skaldic poems can provide us with a precious insight. The disregard of Icelandic parallels, their neglect would be an oversimplification of the matter. All in all, however, perhaps the only way to reach a conclusion based on unshakable grounds is putting these parallels aside and starting out solely from the surviving, narrow Anglo-Saxon evidence, both linguistic and literary. Indeed, this is what meant a major difference between the starting point of the scholarly discussions on the mind in the 1960s and that of the 1980s - 1990s.

“Language reflects the human interpretation of the world,”¹⁰³ as I quoted earlier. By looking at the surviving Anglo-Saxon texts and the linguistic evidence of Old English, we can begin to outline an intriguing portrait of some specific aspects of the duality of cognition and emotions in the Anglo-Saxon mind, aspects which support and to some extent explain the interesting contradiction between Ælfric’s definitions and the finds of the corpus research I carried out for this thesis. When feelings and states of mind are concerned, the interpretation of the world as reflected in language becomes a rather conspicuous mirror image. We find that the approach to the question of emotions and feelings is radically different from our modern ideas, and indeed, referring to “states of mind” is an inaccurate, what is more, misleading, expression itself. The correct phrase should rather be “actions of mind.” During a discussion with professor Godden on the questions of the Old English mind and emotions, he called my attention to some fascinating lexical evidence, namely the compelling use of active, simplex verbs for mental states. When Modern English prefers the periphrastic combination of “to be” and an adjective for the description of such states, as for instance “to be sad”, “to be happy”, “to be angry”, “to be brave”, “to be proud”, Old English prefers simple active verbs:

¹⁰³ Wierzbicka, *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations*, 7.

murnan, gladian, yrsian, bealdian or *modigian*.¹⁰⁴ This indicates that the workings of the mind were imagined from this aspect in a way different from ours, and these feelings were not at all considered as passive passions happening to a man, but as active actions in the human mind. Godden elaborates on this fascinating comparison between Old and Modern English emotional vocabulary in his article, too:

The Modern English use of ‘feel’, adapted from terms of sensory perception, does not seem to occur in Old English; there is no equivalent to *feeling* sad, angry, hostile, affectionate; the verbs *gefelan* and *gefredan* seem only to be used of physical sensation. On the other hand it is quite common to speak of ‘taking’ various mental states, such as anger or love, using the verb *niman*: ‘nimð lufe to Gode’, ‘gif ure mod nimð gelustfullunge’, nam micelne gramam and andan’, ‘genam nið’, ‘nam oferhygd’, ‘naman ondan’, ‘niman geleafan’, ‘niman mod’, ‘genom wynne’, ‘genaman æfest’ and ‘niman ellen’. A few similar usages do survive in Modern English but seem to be either rather archaic, petrified phrases (‘take courage’) or used to suggest a rather wilful, often artificial, variety of emotion (‘take delight’, ‘take offence’, ‘take umbrage’). The Old English examples do not seem to be similarly restricted in tone. There was presumably some rooted sense that passions, or feelings towards other people and things, did not just take hold of one from outside or inside, but involve, at some level, an act of will.¹⁰⁵

As demonstrated by these examples, mental states (actions) of emotion were expressed in distinctively different terms from the modern ways. Simplex verbs were preferred to periphrastic phrases, emotions and passions were “taken”, thus they were represented in a much more active way, involving in many cases an act of will, volition. The question might arise here whether there existed a different approach to cognition, too.

Interestingly, by looking at the mental vocabulary of Old English, we find that a great number of the mind-words stood for both the emotional and the rational faculties, aspects of the mind. *Sefa, hyge, breostcofa, hreðer, heorte, mod, myne, modsefa, etc.* all stood for both emotions and cognition at the same time. Even though a definition aiming at “scientific” precision would claim even today that the mind is actually such an all-comprising term, the general tendency is that people think of it rather as rational.¹⁰⁶ In the Old English period, it was not exactly so. The works of Alcuin, Alfred and Ælfric seem to indicate that for the Anglo-Saxons the workings of the mind were

¹⁰⁴ Of course, Modern English also has active verbs like grieve, rejoice, flaunt, but the use of the periphrastic form is much more common in everyday language.

¹⁰⁵ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 286.

¹⁰⁶ See: chapter 1.

chiefly intellectual, but this is the evidence of the learned Latin tradition only. A second look into this part of the vocabulary indicates the co-existence of another tradition, a vernacular one, as Godden names it, which carries distinctively different features.

By having a closer examination of the word *mod*, for example, one which Alfred very closely related to the immortal life spirit, and which was predominantly the rational, intellectual inner self, and which for Ælfric was responsible for knowing and understanding, we find – as mentioned above – that a huge percentage of the corpus examples still indicates an agency related to passion and feelings. Its meanings comprise “courage”, “anger”, “magnificence”, “pride” and “arrogance”, and such derivatives as *modigian* “to be proud”, *modig* “brave” or “proud”, and *modignes* or *ofermod*¹⁰⁷ as “pride”, “arrogance” all indicate this emotional heatedness, the fact that the chief Old English word for the mind was not at all used for a predominantly intellectual agency. At least in works which were not much influenced by the tradition that the above mentioned three authors represent. Malcolm Godden defines this aspect of the *mod* in the following words:

In so far as it refers to a power rather than a location or centre of consciousness, *mod* seems to convey to many Anglo-Saxon writers not so much the intellectual, rational faculty but something more like an inner passion or wilfulness, an intensification of the self that can be dangerous.¹⁰⁸

Mod was therefore a faculty which involved intensity and force, and even when it stands for rational meanings like “thought” or “concern”, it very often carries a touch of volition and will in it.

Hyre þæt deofol oncwæð: Nu ic þæt gehyre þurh þinne hleoþorcwide, þæt ic nyde sceal niþa gebæded mod meldian, swa þu me beodest, þreaned þolian.
(*Juliana*, ll.: 460b-464a)

Me is willa to ðam mycel on mode, ond min mundbyrd is geriht to þære rode. (*The Dream of the Rood*, ll.: 129b–131a)

Mod is not passive, but predominantly active, and “wilful” as Godden says, and even when cognition is concerned, it often involves an act of will. Thus, it seems that the predominant mind-word – similarly to many other mind-words of the Old English

¹⁰⁷ At least in *Genesis* its meaning is the closest to “pride.” For further discussions on the word, see: later in this chapter and chapter 3.3.1.1.

¹⁰⁸ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 287.

vocabulary – carried two mental functions in itself, two which to us might seem to stand quite far from each other. Just as it was regarded as a rational faculty, much of the evidence shows that it was a clearly emotional one as well. Moreover, these two – to us so different – fields shared one important element, namely the act of will. *Mod* was intensive, and consequently, *mod* was to overflow and *mod* was sometimes to be controlled. Here, however, I must emphasise “sometimes”, as there was a certain degree of contradiction in this usage. The following examples indicate this required control of the mind.

Stieran mon sceal strongum mode, ond þæt on stapelum healdan (*The Seafarer*. l.: 109)

Þæt mæg æghwylc mon eaþe geþencan, se þe hine <ne> læteð on þas lænan tid amyrran his gemyndum modes gælsan ond on his dægrike <druncen> to rice (*Vainglory*, ll.: 9-11)

Ne mæg werig mod	wyrde wiðstandan,
ne se hreo hyge	helpe gefremman.
Forðon domgeorne	dreorigne oft
in hyra breostcofan	bindað fæste (<i>The Wanderer</i> , ll.: 15-18)

Harbus tries to explore this phenomenon of the Anglo-Saxon mind by emphasising that there are several examples where such control is observable.¹⁰⁹ She stresses that in these cases it seems that the “self”¹¹⁰ is in charge of controlling the mind, thus there is a dislocation between the mind and the self, both of them being quite independent of one another.

The implied dislocation of self and mind in this poem [The Wanderer] allows the self to situate its subjectivity outside the mind and acknowledge the desirability of self-control.¹¹¹

This dislocation and independence also indicates, as she claims, that “the self is constructed as being only partially aware of the motives behind the mind’s state,”¹¹² and

¹⁰⁹ Harbus, Antonina. “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” *Self and Identity* 1. (2002): 77-97.

¹¹⁰ Often indicated by the personal pronouns in these poetic texts.

¹¹¹ Harbus, “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” 87.

¹¹² Harbus, “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” 87.

that there is “disjunction that is unfamiliar to us today,”¹¹³ the self and the mind being two independent thinking entities, as observable in another excerpt from *The Wanderer*:

Forþon ic geþencan ne mæg geond þas woruld
 for hwan modsefa min ne gesweorce,
 þonne ic eorla lif eal geondþence
 (*The Wanderer*, ll.: 58-60)

This sharp distinction between the mind and the self, and the self, having executive control over the mind, is not that familiar to us today, and marks a fascinating difference between the Old English and the modern conception of mind. Harbus’s conclusion in her introduction to the relationship between the mind and the self is therefore that

[in] Anglo-Saxon self-conceptualization, the mind is one attribute of the individual, ideally though not always under the control of the self. [...] The poetry captures that particular construction of the self in its executive function of asserting its dominance over the mind and thereby its shaping power over individual reality.¹¹⁴

Godden also points out that even in Ælfric’s works we find occasional references to this controllable *mod*. Even though he does not identify it with the soul (which he traditionally describes as having memory, understanding and will as its three parts), he regards the mind as the instrument of it and its faculty for knowing. Notwithstanding these, he still claims that man can lose control of his *mod* through anger, and commit evil deed; and at another place he describes it “as a slightly wilful, independent faculty, less rational than the self.”¹¹⁵

Se feorða leahtor is ira, þæt is on englisc weamodnyss, seo deð þæt se man nah his modes geweald, and macað manslihtas and mycele yfelu (*Lives of Saints*, 16. l. 286)

Deofol tiht us to yfele, ac we sceolon hit onscunian, and ne geniman nane lustfullunge to ðære tihtinge: gif þonne sceole we huru wiðstandan, þæt ðær ne beo nan geðafung to ðam yfelan weorce. Seo yfele tihting is of deofle; ðonne bið oft þæs mannes mod gebiged to ðære lustfullunge, hwilon eac aslit

¹¹³ Harbus, “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” 88.

¹¹⁴ Harbus, “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” 93.

¹¹⁵ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 288. Quotations: *Lives of Saints* and *Catholic Homilies* also from this page. Skeat, Walter W. ed. *Ælfric’s Lives of Saints*, EETS OS 76, 82, 94, 114. London: Kegan Paul, 1881-1900. Thorpe, Benjamin ed. *The Homilies of the Anglo-Saxon Church*. London: Richard and John E. Taylor, 1843-6. Reprinted: New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1971.

to ðære geðafunge; forðon þe we sind of synfullum flæsce acennede
(*Catholic Homilies*, I. p. 176)

This treatment of the *mod* recalls what Godden calls “the vernacular tradition”, where a controllable mind is presented, one filled with volition, be it either the cognitive or the emotional part of our mental faculty. Godden mostly sees the vernacular mind as controllable, but this is not always so. When considering this intensive, wilful aspect of the word in question, we must not pass a special usage of it without saying a few words about it, which will lead us to the idea of the Anglo-Saxon mind, which was to overflow, but the control of which was not necessary. I have already mentioned the special term *ofermod*, and indicated that it means “pride.” Some claim that emotions are culture-specific, that “not only ideas, but emotions too, are cultural artifacts”¹¹⁶ and to some extent they are influenced by the society one lives in. This statement can be argued as a whole, but from some aspect it may be true. Looking at the semantic field that the word *mod* covers, one is puzzled by the abundance of meanings it has. How is it possible that one word can denote genuinely positive ideas just as well as negative ones? What might account for the fact that one lexeme was capable of standing not only for “mind” but also for “courage” and “magnificence” as well as “pride” or “anger.” These last ones are two of the seven deadly sins, still come together with fortitude, itself a definite virtue. *Ofermod* displays this controversial nature of the lexeme very well. If *ofermod* denotes the overflow of this wilful vernacular mind with pride, how can we reconcile it with the fact that the *mod* has other meanings with exclusively positive overtones? *Mod* and *ofermod* can certainly denote “pride.” It is obviously so in the Old English *Genesis*, but when we consider *The Battle of Maldon*, we cannot in all certainty claim this. It is no wonder that it has been in the focus of scholarly discussion for decades.

ða se eorl ongan for his ofermode
alyfan landes to fela laþere ðeode.
(ll.:89-90)

In this case, I would like to join those who do feel hesitant towards translating it as “pride” or any other word which currently carries negative connotations. As the poem is a heroic epic, written possibly for the commemoration and the celebration of Byrhtnoth’s and his retainers’ courageous fight against the Vikings, I feel that a

¹¹⁶ Geertz, “The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind,” 81.

negative adjective would be out of place here. As we know, *mod* meant much more than simply ‘pride’. It was an overflow of passionate emotions, some sort of an internal fire that urged the hero to act and fight a heroic battle. *Mod* was necessary for such valiant action, and its overflow did not by any means indicate negative processes, but an inevitable concomitant of a heroic battle. As I have mentioned, *mod* had to be controlled at times. Still, in a contradictory way, in many other cases it was required of the hero and did not at all mean anything undesirable. If we take the nouns “pride” and “anger”, currently so negative in their meanings, we cannot state that they had the same connotations for the Anglo-Saxons. With the arrival of Christian doctrines and the teachings about the seven deadly sins, stating that *superbia* and *ira* are hateful to God and indeed among the worst sins, the treatment of these characteristics and states of mind predominantly changed. They started to be looked upon as evil, whereas it seems that earlier they had been regarded as natural feelings, and indeed good ones that incited action and urged the soul and body to do something. They filled the person with a will to act and a strong impulse to carry out deeds. Let us think of the hall, for example, and what took place in it as evidenced in literature. Boasting or flyting were regarded as parts of the heroic code of behaviour, the heroic ethos. It belonged to the communal joys of the hall, as strictly as feasting, drinking or gift giving. The debate between two warriors formed an important part of social life, and involved scorning the enemy and boasting about one’s own feats. It was a special way of competition, a collision of wit, which – given the importance of words in Old English heroic literature – was of great significance. It was not only a collision of wits and intellects, a boasting of one’s strength, but a means to establish and clarify one’s status and social role. Also, as it preceded heroic battles, it was a way to prepare the soul for the fight, to convince oneself and each other that they are capable of winning over the enemy. John M. Hill summarised the views on boasting:

[...] boasts are valued, deeply meaningful speeches to Anglo-Saxons. Moreover, in heroic poetry, boasts expressed temporal and social continuity by projecting violent engagement publicly in terms of past action and given group values. Thus, boasts are not egocentric. Through boasts, individuals stand out, to be sure, but in profoundly sociocentric ways. [...] Boast words and boasting speeches are traditional forms of public speech, and of vow or promise, that the community requires of its aspiring heroes. Boasts also in

part define the hero's purposes, establish his social identity, and suggest a kind of word magic over the future.¹¹⁷

Boasts are therefore about past achievements, triumphs of the past, or any past experience that demonstrates the participants' strength and valour. It was such a significant social activity, that it formed an organic part of the events during feasting or before battles, and it was in close connection with the events happening afterwards. In lines 2633-61 of *Beowulf*, when Wiglaf reprimands the cowards, he thinks back to the feasts where they were swearing oaths that they would fulfil their duties towards each other and their gold-giving lord, and were boasting of their strength. However, he does not only recall these memories, but reminds the warriors of them, too. Ælfwine, in *The Battle of Maldon*, does the same as Wiglaf. He remembers the oath and boasts and encourages the others to act similarly.

Gemunan þa mæla	þe we oft æt meodo spræcon,
þonne we on bence	beot ahofon,
hæleð on healle,	ymbe heard gewinn;
nu mæg cunnian	hwa cene sy.
Ic wylle mine æþelo	eallum gecyþan,
þæt ic wæs on Myrcon	miccles cynnes;
wæs min ealda fæder	Ealhelm haten,
wis ealdorman,	woruldgesælig.
Ne sceolon me on þære þeode	þegenas ætwitan
þæt ic of ðisse fyrde	feran wille,
eard gesecan,	nu min ealdor ligeð
forheawen æt hilde.	Me is þæt hearma mæst;
he wæs ægðer min mæg	and min hlaford.

(ll.: 212-225)

It was therefore not only gift-giving and feasting that belonged strictly to the communal elements of the gatherings in the hall, but boasting as well. These speeches of pride thus served for strengthening social bonds and belonging, and encouragement to act accordingly, to fulfil oaths. Pride raised awareness and filled the heart with fire, intensified the will to act and awakened the *mod* in its vernacular sense: that is, the intensified inner awareness. What happens in *The Battle of Maldon* therefore, is not an overflow of pride in the modern sense of the word, with all its modern connotations, but an intensification of this inner fire, the strong urge to act and fight; a feeling which was essential for bold fight. Boasting was an essential concomitant of the heroic ethos, it

¹¹⁷ Hill, "Social Milieu," 262. References in this summary are included to Dwight Conquergood, Barbara Nolan and Morton Bloomfield.

established one's rank and often prepared for fight. Pride was not considered essentially negative, even though later it was regarded as one of the deadliest of the sins.

Similarly to the role of pride, anger had also different functions in Anglo-Saxon society than it has nowadays. In a heroic culture, we can often meet angry heroes with seemingly no self-restraint. Stephen D. White, when exploring the "politics of anger,"¹¹⁸ notes that earlier there were quite controversial explanations for this, and refers to Marc Bloch's book of *Feudal Society*¹¹⁹ saying that "to explain the emotionalism of medieval society and resulting irrationality of medieval politics, Bloch looked first at 'the vicissitudes of the human organism' and proposed that poor diet and a 'low standard of hygiene' had produced an unusually 'nervous sensibility'."¹²⁰ It was also supposed that there were no moral and social conventions to restrain such expressions of emotional overflow, and in this absence of cultural control, the Anglo-Saxons (just like other warrior-societies) often put their anger on open display.¹²¹ I disagree with this statement and join the party of those who, instead of an absence of control and conventions, see indeed the presence of conventions, though certainly a different one, in a different cultural environment than ours. Catherine Peyroux elaborates on this, joining the circle of scholars and anthropologists, who claim that emotions are culturally and socially defined. She writes that

[...] its [anger's] meaning as an emotion is located in the particular social framework in which it is generated and expressed. Whatever the immediate felt experience or physiological component of emotions, feelings are "cultural acquisitions" intelligible only in the context in which they occur. Cultural anthropologists and historians of emotion alike point to a fundamental variance of pattern in the language and interpretation of emotions: both from place to place and from era to era, words signifying

¹¹⁸ White, Stephen D. "The Politics of Anger." In *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbara H. Rosenwein, 127-152. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.

¹¹⁹ Bloch, Marc. *Feudal Society*, translated by L. A. Manyon. Chicago: Chicago Press, 1961.

¹²⁰ White, "The Politics of Anger," 128.

¹²¹ For a semantic analysis of anger-words, see Fabiszak, "A Semantic Analysis of Emotion Terms in Old English." She does not devote attention to the positive sides of anger, only studies the selected words from a collocational point of view, and categorises them from the perspective of either one experiencing anger or one being the subject of the other's anger. She first claims that anger is a destructive and hostile force (140), then says that "anger, at least in some cases, seems to attain a negative value, is seen as undesirable, and should therefore be controlled (*stillan* 'restrain', *metgian* 'control') (144). With this, although without stating overtly, she acknowledges that anger can sometimes have a non-negative value as well in Anglo-Saxon society.

anger reside in different semantic fields, and expressions of anger take place and are received in ways that differ.¹²²

Truly, anger had its place in a heroic warrior society. If a hero got angry, or filled with *mod*, he was capable of fighting a fiercer battle. Besides, even though anger is considered to be a vice, it is very often openly displayed, not only in battle but in the hall or the court as well, and especially by kings and lords. “[...] the angry man was a sinner. Except, [...] when he was not,” as Richard E. Barton notes humorously.¹²³ Anger must be put, therefore, into a cultural perspective as well. Stephen D. White argues that anger was not only accepted instead of condemned, but was regarded as appropriate in particular situations, especially in case of high-status people, thus being in some part status-dependent.¹²⁴ It seems that there were different sorts of anger, and one of them was a righteous one. Even God was angry at times as we can find it in the Bible, and Barton explores that in certain cases there was a definite link between divine and royal anger and that anger therefore is considered righteous if it is displayed by men of legal authority.¹²⁵

As we shall see later,¹²⁶ with the downfall of warrior society, the appearance of a growing number of penitentials emphasising the virtues and vices, pride, boasting and anger got more and more dissociated from righteous or even required behaviour. A good king had to display other virtues, as the *specula regis* advised, passions needed to be controlled more and more, and new conventions were set for the “correct behaviour.” But at this stage, we are still in Anglo-Saxon England with its lords and retainers, and *mod* as a consequence carried no contradiction in itself denoting “courage” and “magnificence” as well as “pride” and “anger”, since in this society none of them is essentially negative in the secular sense, all of them belong to the norms of a heroic code. So, joining Richard E. Barton’s statement about anger, I would add that in this society where different cultural heritages meet, *mod* was to be controlled ... except when it was not.

¹²² Peyroux, “Gertrude’s *furor*: Reading Anger in an Early Medieval Saint’s *Life*,” 42.

¹²³ Barton, “‘Zealous Anger’ and the Renegotiation of Aristocratic Relationships in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century France,” 156.

¹²⁴ White. “The Politics of Anger,” 127-152.

¹²⁵ Barton. “‘Zealous Anger’ and the Renegotiation of Aristocratic Relationships in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century France,” 153-170.

¹²⁶ See: chapter 4.3.2.

Now let us return to the passage from *The Seafarer* (ll. 58-64a). Godden's views on these much-debated lines take a different standpoint than the Germanic vs. Christian one, and echo this classical vs. vernacular approach. When we state that *hyge* is capable of leaving the body at death and in the state of trance, it seems logical to state that we can equate it with the life-surviving spirit. While many argue so, Godden¹²⁷ approaches the question from a (seemingly) different perspective. He first of all states that *mod* is synonymous with the terms *hyge*, *sefa* and *ferð*, and they are thus used "more or less interchangeably."¹²⁸ Then, by quoting some examples in which these mind-words which all reflect a wilful – to him – controllable faculty that must be held and kept, he denies that these lexemes stand for the spirit. He states that "it does not seem to be used in poetry for the spirit which leaves the body at death or survives death."¹²⁹ In his view, *mod*, together with its synonyms, refers to an inner self, responsible for thought and emotion. The life-surviving spirit is *sawl* and *gast*.

Godden interprets the passage on the basis of his argumentation concerning the two existent traditions of the mind in Anglo-Saxon England. According to him, the vernacular view of the mind differentiated two different entities. While the *sawl* and *gast* mostly stood for the life-surviving spirit, the *mod*, *sefa*, *ferð* and *hyge* were a very different faculty, the active inner consciousness. For him, the passage therefore refers to "a dislocation of self from mind", where the mind is "no longer fettered by the self but escaping and assailing it, urging it to action."¹³⁰ In his discussion of the two elegies, he calls our attention to the fact that both of them dwell on this curious distinction of the self and the mind. In both *The Wanderer* and *The Seafarer*, the mind-words appearing are almost always emotional – often with a touch of volition – and associated with weariness, anxiety, sadness, and thus seem to reflect a passionate, active faculty, whereas references to understanding and thought are rather associated with the self. He equates *modsefa* in line 59 of the poem with "an inner self or consciousness which the conscious self cannot penetrate,"¹³¹ and he does not differentiate it from the simplex *mod* at all. Thus, the *hyge* and the *modsefa* flying away demonstrate one of the two

¹²⁷ Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 288-289.

¹²⁸ Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 289.

¹²⁹ Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 289.

¹³⁰ Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 293.

¹³¹ Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 292.

centres of consciousness, the “inner, urgent, passionate personality”¹³² leaving behind the confines of the other centre of consciousness which he defines as “a more reluctant self which controls action.”¹³³ He also contradicts Diekstra’s parallels that point to this journey as an act of memory and imagination and emphasises the act of will.¹³⁴ Godden calls our attention to *modes lust* earlier in the poem (line 36), where it is the *mod*’s desire to undertake a journey, and as seen from the argument of his article, he considers the traditional Anglo-Saxon mind as an agency filled with volition. Godden then makes a passing reference in a footnote to the Germanic (Norse) concept about the mind as discussed by Salmon, but does not elaborate on it, and leaves the question of these parallels untreated and open. He also contradicts Smithers,¹³⁵ as he claims that in the above quoted lines of *The Seafarer*, neither of the two centres of consciousness can be specifically identified with the life-surviving spirit, the soul leaving the body at the point of death, which in turn is mentioned in line 100, where death and judgement are treated.¹³⁶ All in all, Godden admits that in the poem the further function of the mind-words is unclear and he cannot with all certainty decide “whether the mind-words refer exclusively to the inner spirit.”¹³⁷ I would further like to add that even though his treatment of the vernacular tradition is convincing, his argumentation sometimes becomes difficult to follow due to his use of the Modern English term “self,” which at times – as “inner” – refers to the active, wilful, controllable consciousness (*mod*, *hyge*, *modsefa*, etc.),¹³⁸ at times to the other level of consciousness which is distinct from the mind but still not equivalent with the soul. This confusion created by the use of this Modern English expression is demonstrated well with the above quoted definition of the *modsefa*: “an inner self or consciousness which the conscious self cannot penetrate.”

Due to the lack of supporting evidence, we can only state one thing for certain. The mind in the Anglo-Saxon tradition was a much more emotional and wilful agency than it is today. It was burning with fire, it was a faculty filled just as much with “deep-

¹³² Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 294.

¹³³ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 294.

¹³⁴ See: chapter 2.2.2. Diekstra, F. N. M. “The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland.” *Neophilologus* 55. (1971): 433-446.

¹³⁵ See chapter 2.2.2. Smithers, G. V. “The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer,” *Medium Aevum* 26. (1957): 137-153.

¹³⁶ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 294.

¹³⁷ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 294.

¹³⁸ As on pages 289 and 292.

stirred feelings”¹³⁹ as with thoughts. In both cases, there was an inevitable touch of volition, some sense of will. When this fire started flaming from within, and the *mod* started thinking, it was ready to act and wanted to put its will into deeds. When the *mod* loved, it was also very often filled with will, and desire, an active agency. Certainly, there must have been two traditions mixed in Anglo-Saxon England, a vernacular heritage mixed with the classical legacy. Disentangling the two, however, is a difficult task, and even though we can only get precious glimpses into it, a full understanding is hard. This is due to the intricate web of intertwining views on the mind’s and soul’s functions incorporated into Old English literature, and also the possible common Indo-European heritage that Onians tries to explore. The complexity of the picture however does not allow us to break down the Anglo-Saxon mind into all its elements further than has been done. Still, Godden’s article was a groundbreaking one in the history of scholarly works concerning the workings of the Old English mental faculty. Compared to the discussions of the 1960s and 1970s, when precise parallels were sought in Old Icelandic literature (sometimes by brave guesses and the reinterpretation of whole texts) and the pagan vs. Christian aspects were put into the foreground by focusing on the details of texts, Godden managed to view the Anglo-Saxon mind in a different perspective. Starting out from the surviving evidence, and treating them from a much more moderate standpoint, he realised the complexity of the subject and managed to stay as objective as possible. He did not aim at proving the exclusiveness of either the pagan or the Christian influences in surviving texts like the elegies, but succeeded in showing the existence of two different parallel traditions: a classical and a vernacular one, surfacing in varying degrees in the literary works.

2.3.3. The Locus of the Mind in European Medical – Philosophical Texts

Expressions like “passionate mind” or “rational mind” might sound paradoxical today. When we think of the heart and mind, we immediately associate them with passion and the intellect, too. However, we do it the other way round. The heart denotes tender disposition, passionate feelings. The mind is mostly associated with the brain, and as such, with thinking and the rational self: peoples’ cognitive, decision making abilities. Can we state for certain, however, that the heart and mind have always meant

¹³⁹ Tolkien’s translation of *mod* as it appears in *Beowulf* ll.: 1150b-1151a. Tolkien, *Finn and Hengest: The Fragment and the Episode*, 140.

the same, have always signified the above mentioned concepts? Even when trying to define the meaning of relatively self-evident lexemes, we pause at the difficulties raised by the infinite possibilities a word carries in itself. In a Babel of languages, we cannot be sure that the one lexeme awaiting definition and explanation has completely the same referent for every person.

This and the following chapter are about the location of the mind in different traditions. Their aim is to supplement Godden's finds and to explore the socio-cultural, medical and even physiological backgrounds of the mixed classical vs. vernacular traditions existing in Anglo-Saxon England, in order to show what lead to the complicated web of ideas in Old English times. I will try to shed light upon some factors concerning the location of the mind that may have contributed to the fact that a thousand years ago in pre-Norman Conquest England, a person being asked about the heart, and being given the task to define what *mod* is, might have come up with some surprising answers.

The discussion will proceed from the general to the particular. Before treating the particular Old and Middle English words themselves, I wish to place them in context, starting out from some Indo-European parallels, and antecedents, namely those of Classical Greek and Roman thinking, and reaching medieval views on the location of the mental faculties with the help of contemporary medical knowledge. The focus will be manifold, because the localisation of the human mind can be approached from different angles, ranging from philosophy to medicine, from literature to linguistics. It must be kept in mind, however, that none of these sciences are autonomous, and there is mutual correlation among these fields. So when one of them is in a direct spotlight, the others stand right beside it, strengthening, supporting and explaining it. The goal will not be to give a comprehensive study in any of these aspects, only to provide some guidelines to a fuller understanding of the *mod* and *minde*, and especially their locus, and to serve as a starting point for possible further studies beyond the confines of this thesis. As the aim of this chapter is only to provide a greater insight into the possible cultural backgrounds and to show directions for research, I will mostly rely on secondary literature here, trying to give a "nutshell summary" of this fascinating development of science and thinking.

The localisation of the mind varied greatly through millennia. On the one hand, it greatly depended on whether the life-surviving spirit and human consciousness was

concerned, as there existed different beliefs in connection with the two. On the other hand, when trying to find a locus for the mind, it was always influenced by the anatomical knowledge of the people – or the relative lack of it. Since the mind had multiple functions from emotion to cognition, its localisation was a complex issue.

There are various standpoints to the question therefore that science and philosophy take when trying to explain the unexplainable and grasp the essence of the mind and find its locus. The most obvious alternative for a start is of course the observable, the body's reaction to mental effects. The simplest approach and ideas about the mind were, of course, based on everyday observations of physiological changes caused by some emotional influence; changes that people experience in their bodies when affected by sudden fear, anger, or even love, be it the heart jumping into one's mouth, having a lump in the throat, or butterflies in the stomach. Eve E. Sweetser calls our attention to Hans Kurath's old but still relevant observation and says:

Kurath (1921) notes that Indo-European words for the emotions are very frequently derived from words referring to physical actions or sensations accompanying the relevant emotions, or to the bodily organs affected by those physical reactions. (For example, the heart's physical function of blood-pumping is strongly and noticeably affected by love, excitement, fear and other strong emotions; therefore the heart comes to symbolize some of those strong emotions – such as courage and passion).¹⁴⁰

Emotions are very closely connected to their physical manifestations and the way they are observed. Several classical and medieval appearances of the “mind” mirror therefore this obvious approach, as we shall see later. The other interesting way in which ancient conceptions about the mind are reflected also start out from the observable: from various diseases affecting the visible functions of the mental faculty, some disturbances of the mind. This other spotlight on the location of the mind is when we have a look at some contemporary approaches to diseases with symptoms directly noticeable in a deterioration of mental functions such as speech or consciousness itself. These diseases, like epilepsy or apoplexy,¹⁴¹ were so difficult to come to terms with that

¹⁴⁰ Sweetser, *Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 54, From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure*, 28-32. Kurath, Hans. *The semantic sources of the words for the emotions in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and the Germanic languages*. PhD dissertation, University of Chicago. Menasha: The Collegiate Press, 1921.

¹⁴¹ The most recent works in this field are Axel Karenberg's and Irmgard Hort's articles about the history of apoplexy, which provide a precious insight not only into the ideas concerning stroke in late Antiquity and the Middle Ages, but in close connection with it, the question of the primacy of the heart or brain. Karenberg, Axel and Irmgard Hort. “Medieval Descriptions and Doctrines of Stroke: Preliminary Analysis

for ages those suffering from them were regarded as demoniac or possessed. The symptoms were at times so frightening and unexplainable that trying to find a cause was definitely a great challenge, and explanations varied greatly. Apoplexy itself is a cardiovascular disease, occurring in the brain. Its symptoms depend upon the area of the brain that it affects and may involve vertigo, aphasia, paralysis, sudden vision problems, loss of coordination, nausea, and a sudden loss of consciousness or a decrease in the level of it, manifesting in coma, fainting, confusion or seizures. Epilepsy is a condition of brain disorder that affects the nervous system and can also cause fits and seizures. The symptoms vary greatly from individual to individual. They can involve, besides the well-known petit mal and grand mal seizures, dizziness, confusion, loss of memory and consciousness. In several cases, unexpected behaviour occurs which is sometimes accompanied by strange sensations and mood changes of the patient. Since the immediate visual signals of the two diseases are mostly in connection with a disturbance in mental functions and the common recognition was that there was mental change behind them, their treatment – or at least the question of these diseases’ origin and their familiarisation – surfaced in discussions on the locus of the mind itself.

Medical writing of the age thus involved a great deal of contemporary philosophical thinking. Consequently, the arguments on the placement of the mind, its functions and its place in the human body are greatly reflected not only in the writings of contemporary thinkers and scholars, but in medical texts, too. It was – and has been – therefore a complex issue, involving many walks of life, many fields of science. In turn, bringing together some literary, linguistic, medical or philosophical evidence concerning the topic gives a fascinating insight into the question of the mental faculties and their locus in especially the classical tradition of the Anglo-Saxon mind.

The earliest texts’ precision is sometimes ridiculed, sometimes admired. Truly, ancient medical writings can surprise us in both ways. Anatomical knowledge was not based on the empirical evidence of dissection, as it was practised only for a short period in Antiquity, in the 3rd century BC, and was regarded as a forbidden area for a long time, until the age of the Renaissance.¹⁴² The knowledge of the human body was

of Select Sources. Part I: The Struggle for Terms and Theories – Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages (300-800)”, “Medieval Descriptions and Doctrines of Stroke: Preliminary Analysis of Select Sources. Part II: Between Galenism and Aristotelism – Islamic Theories of Apoplexy (800-1200)” and “Medieval Descriptions and Doctrines of Stroke: Preliminary Analysis of Select Sources. Part III: Multiplying Speculations – The High and Late Middle Ages (1000-1450).”

¹⁴² See Mondino dei Luzzi below.

therefore based on what people saw in the battlefields or during the slaughter of animals, and not much more. With such bases, and adding a certain proportion of philosophical speculation to it, several contemporary ideas stand very far from the anatomical reality; nevertheless, the precision of some other texts can surprise us.

2.3.3.1. The Antiquity

Most scholars state that the history of the issue from this medical-philosophical point of view begins in the 5th century BC with the authors of the Hippocratic corpus, and later Aristotle and Plato. It is generally held that it is only with the birth of Hippocrates that medicine started to emerge as a science to some extent independent of earlier conceptions based on religious and superstitious beliefs.¹⁴³ We must, however acknowledge Thomas M. Walshe's¹⁴⁴ claims that these well-known writings were preceded by some other surviving texts which – although indirectly – give us a little understanding of the neurological knowledge of ancient Greece, much predating the above mentioned documents. These texts are the Homeric *Odyssey* and *Iliad* epics, dating from at least the 8th and 7th centuries BC, but having linguistic evidence of the early Bronze Age, building from oral tradition of 1400-900 BC. The Homeric corpus includes the earliest references to neurological observations in western culture,¹⁴⁵ from which later Greek medical writing grew.

The Homeric texts do not treat neurology directly, of course. The insight into it is confined to battle scenes and descriptions of injuries. Evidently, the brain or *εγκεφαλος* was not conceptualised in these writings as the organ in association with distinct nervous functions. It was simply recognised as the contents of the skull. Still, the descriptions reveal careful observation, and several instances show how the nervous system reacts to some wounds, providing us with a view on anatomical knowledge antedating the earliest medical documents. According to Walshe, the Homeric epics do not indicate overtly that the workings of the mind were in direct connection with the brain or the head, though it is evidenced that head injuries caused changes in the mental

¹⁴³ Although we should not forget that the trust in charms and magic was maintained for centuries and centuries (perhaps millennia) after this, and early medieval conceptions were especially signalled by it, as well.

¹⁴⁴ Walshe, Thomas M. "Neurological Concepts in Archaic Greece: What did Homer Know?" *Journal of the History of Neurosciences* 6. no. 1. (1997): 72-81.

¹⁴⁵ Walshe notes that some even earlier Egyptian medical texts are known, but they were not available to the Greeks, therefore these cannot be regarded as direct precedents of the influential later Greek discussions. Walshe, "Neurological Concepts in Archaic Greece: What did Homer Know?" 72.

status of the person.¹⁴⁶ Walshe collects all the occurrences of the head and the brain in the *Odyssey* and the *Iliad*, and gives a fascinating summary of the ancient knowledge about them.

Onians also deals to a great extent with the Homeric texts. His approach to the corpus is a different one, his focus not being contemporary neurology and anatomy, but an attempt to clear how these texts reflect contemporary views on the mind. He emphasises that there must have been two different “minds” originally: consciousness and the life-surviving spirit. These two had different locations in the human body, which is still reflected in the Homeric texts.

According to Onians, in the classical understanding, emotions and thoughts (thus consciousness itself) had the same source, a location somewhere in the chest. For the Greeks, this place was the κηρ or κροδιη, translated as the heart; or even more often the φρενες – sometimes called πραπιδες – and even more specifically the θυμος residing in it. What these terms indicate is not easy to define. From the 5th century, φρενες was interpreted as the midriff or diaphragm, following the Hippocratic school of medicine. Earlier texts, however, indicate that originally it might have been something different. Onians, after examining a great number of surviving examples, concludes that this word must have originally stood for the lungs. The evidence is manifold ranging from the θυμος defined as something vaporous¹⁴⁷ and also in association with the blood,¹⁴⁸ to the φρενες described as “blackish organs,”¹⁴⁹ and a long list of relevant quotations supporting the arguments. The lungs’ association with the heart, the respiration with the flow of blood, was not uncommon even later. In Plato’s *Timaeus*, we find, for example, that the heart’s supporter is the lungs, and Robert A. Erickson, discussing the relationship of the two organs notes that there was an “implicit companionate relationship of the cool lung offering support to the hot heart” in Greek physiology.¹⁵⁰

¹⁴⁶ Walshe, “Neurological Concepts in Archaic Greece: What did Homer Know?” 77.

¹⁴⁷ Diogenes of Apollonia in the 5th century held that the soul – the consciousness and intelligence of men – consisted of ‘air’, having its locus in the chest somewhere around the heart. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 32

¹⁴⁸ “This thumos is not the blood-soul as opposed to the breath-soul nor indeed mere breath but breath related to blood, not mere air but something vaporous within, blending and interacting with the air without, something which diminishes if the body is ill nourished, but it increased when the body is well nourished” Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 48.

¹⁴⁹ Where blackness was used to describe rudy complexion, and applied to the colour of blood and grapes as well in Homeric texts. Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 23-87.

¹⁵⁰ Erickson, *The Language of the Heart*, 2.

The reason might partly be, according to Erickson, that “the hearts motion of alternate diastole and systole had long been associated with the similar expanding and contracting rhythm of the lungs.”¹⁵¹ The question might be asked then why the term φρενες later came to indicate the diaphragm, and the answer that might be given if this view is correct is that it is due to association, their closeness and their active cooperation in the breathing. Onians, therefore, on the basis of the Homeric corpus, asserts that the conscious mind was located in the lungs for the ancient Greeks. All in all, even if we do not wish to give a precise location, we must say that the mind, at least the emotional faculties and thinking, were placed somewhere in the chest.

The association with emotions is obvious, as I have already stated, emotions have physiological signs, like deeper breathing and heart-beating, and therefore the emotions were easily considered as originating from the chest. When θυμος is mentioned, the connotation is most often an emotional one. Walshe defines it on these terms, too, saying that “θυμος is the aspect of man’s being that allows for his emotional uniqueness. Control of the θυμος controls extreme behaviour.”¹⁵² Onians explains this association of consciousness and emotions with the lungs (or chest) in various ways:

The consciousness is naturally identified with the breath not only because to be conscious is to have breath, but also because the breathing is affected when there is violent emotion, and not only the breathing but the flow of blood.¹⁵³

Several examples indicate that courage (θαρσος) and energy (μενος) are breathed into a man by the gods before a fight, and anger (χολος) also enters a person’s φρενες or θυμος.¹⁵⁴ The association is not at all surprising. When in anger, we can “fume” with it – our breathing becoming heavier; and before fight, action, we also tend to take a deep breath, thus virtually taking courage and preparing for the act. Onians adds the following:

This association of the emotion with the breathing may seem strange to us, since we are in the habit of abstracting the emotion itself from its bodily expressions and thinking that the latter are epiphenomena or after-effects; ‘that the mental perception of some fact excites the mental affection called

¹⁵¹ Erickson, *The Language of the Heart*, 12.

¹⁵² Walshe, “Neurological Concepts in Archaic Greece: What did Homer Know?” 77.

¹⁵³ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 49.

¹⁵⁴ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 50-52.

the emotion and that this latter state of mind gives rise to the bodily expression'. We may be less scornful of the Homeric view when we remember that Lange, James, and other psychologists have held 'that the bodily changes follow directly the perception of the exciting fact and that our feeling of the same changes as they occur is the emotion'.¹⁵⁵

However, it was not only emotions that were associated with breathing and the lungs (or the chest), but thinking as well. The identification seems perhaps a little more problematic for us, as thoughts do not usually have bodily effects, and certainly, there is no physiological change that could be immediately connected to them. Still, Homer held that it was not only emotions that gods breathed into men, but thoughts as well. As I have mentioned, classical – and even early medieval – societies can be considered as active ones, where emotion, thought and action were more overtly and directly cooperating than nowadays. Emotions and the intellect seem to be more associated with each other than in our society. Therefore it is not surprising that these two faculties were supposed to be located at the same place. But still, it is a fascinating question how thoughts can be considered as coming from the chest. How people could actually think with the heart – lungs – thereabouts, not only feel with them.

The answer might lie in the tradition of associating speaking with thinking, probably due to the understanding that words play a significant role in expressing and formulating our thoughts. Consequently, words must be formed where the cognitive processes take place. Therefore, as words are uttered with breath, they were also identified with each other, and in turn, intellectual awareness and cognition were thought to be residing in the lungs, or at least somewhere in the chest from where breath came. "The belief that thoughts are words and words are breath [...] would lead to the belief that the organs of breath, the lungs, are the organs of mind."¹⁵⁶ And how is it possible that wisdom also enters the chest? We must not forget that the functions of the brain were not discovered until Alcmaeon of Croton in the 5th century BC, the first known person who held that the most important organ of the body and thus the seat of the mind as a whole, was the brain. The ancient belief¹⁵⁷ was that there was no direct connection between the ears and the brain. Instead, there was a passage from them to

¹⁵⁵ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 53. With reference to James, *Principles of Psychology II*. 449.

¹⁵⁶ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 67-68.

¹⁵⁷ Aristotle. See: Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 70.

the roof of the mouth. Through this, the words whispered to someone – the words being breath themselves – passed directly to the lungs (or chest).

We should not form the misconception, however, that the Ancients attached no significance to the concept of the brain and the head. Even though the brain's real function was discovered quite late, associating it with some mental aspects looks back to a more distant past. It seems that while emotions and cognition – a person's conscious self – was thought of as residing in one's chest, the head originally "accommodated" a different manifestation of the mind, or rather, a completely different mind in contemporary thinking. This was the ψυχη, the life-surviving spirit, the soul, the principle of life, which was supposedly not equivalent with θυμος in its original sense.¹⁵⁸

Onians defines it in the following ways:

The θυμος is constantly spoken of as feeling and thinking, as active in the lungs (φρενες) or chest (στηθος) of the living person, and as departing at death, but is not spoken of in connection with the succeeding state. The ψυχη, on the other hand, is 'in' the person but is not spoken of as being in the lungs or chest nor as thinking or feeling while a person lives. Rather it seems to be a 'life-principle' or soul not concerned in ordinary consciousness and to be what persists, still without ordinary consciousness, in the house of Hades, there identified with the ειδωλον, the visible but impalpable semblance of the once living.¹⁵⁹

It has apparently attracted little notice hitherto that while the chest (στηθος), and its organs, the φρενες or (πραπιδες) the κηρ, κραδιη, πτορ and the θυμος are continually mentioned in the poems as the seat of consciousness and intelligence, feeling and thought, the head is also important in a different way, is in fact regarded as in a unique degree precious or holy, identified with the person and equated with the soul or principle of life which the ψυχη appears to be.¹⁶⁰

Precious and holy it is, its descriptions and functions in early texts are very different from those of the conscious mind and its seat, the θυμος and the φρενες. The

¹⁵⁸ Walshe does not agree with Onians here. He claims that the ψυχη is "a distinct entity without anatomy or location" (77.), and he quotes a passage from the *Iliad* (5. 696-698), where equivalence is drawn between the two (although when he translates the text, he uses two different words). In Walshe's translation: "...and his (vitality) ψυχη left him, and a mist dropped down over his eyes; but he came to again; the North Wind blew over him and restored his (spirit) θυμος although it had gone in a terrible gasp." Onians, however, does not claim that the conscious mind does not leave the body at death. Both ψυχη and θυμος can depart, therefore this function of them is common, so drawing parallels between the two on this basis is not at all surprising. What they differ in is some other aspects of their functions.

¹⁵⁹ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 94.

¹⁶⁰ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 96.

head was very often equated with the life or even the person it belonged to. A long list of classical examples can be collected, from cutting off the head of the fallen enemy to the custom of swearing and making oaths to one's head in expressions as "you shall pay with your head" or "let my head be no longer on my shoulders if."¹⁶¹ Or even more precisely with a mention of one's brain, as Walshe draws our attention to a part of the *Iliad* where the end of some hostilities are hoped to arrive after an oath made directly to the brain.¹⁶² But it was not only at death that the head mattered, but at birth, as well. Being the locus of the life-surviving soul, the head was sometimes thought to be the source of life as well, the source of seed and engendering. Let me mention only one example here, perhaps the most well-known: Pallas Athena's birth, who was born out of his father's Zeus's head. It has been noted by several scholars that the head had a distinctive characteristic of being holy and especially honoured, and as a consequence, its spontaneous expressions, like nodding or sneezing, were accorded a great significance. They were interpreted as expressions of the life-surviving spirit, which were either prophetic in nature, due to the supreme holiness of the head, or – in case of sneezing – some disturbance of it.

All in all, in classical Homeric literature, scholars have noticed an intriguing distinction between two distinct types of mind and their locations, and this difference was maintained until the 5th century BC, when Alcmaeon of Croton discovered the significance of the brain and maintained that this was the most important organ of humans, the receiver of the senses and the seat of thought. With this recognition, the functions of the ψυχή started to change and it began to serve not only as the seat of the life-surviving spirit, but also as that of perception and thinking and feeling, originally the functions of the conscious mind in the chest.

By the fifth century B.C. the Greeks had completely changed and confused their conceptions of ψυχή and θυμός, so that ψυχή from meaning originally the vaporous life-soul associated particularly with the head, had come to include the θυμός in the chest, and the original identity of θυμός with the physical breath was obscured.¹⁶³

¹⁶¹ *Iliad* and *Odyssey*. See: Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 96.

¹⁶² *Iliad*, 3. 298-301. Quoted and translated in: Walshe, "Neurological Concepts in Archaic Greece: What did Homer Know?" 74. "Zeus, greatest and most glorious, and other immortal gods, whosoever first would begin hostilities in violation of the oaths, may their brain flow on the ground like this wine, both theirs and their children's, and may their wives be enslaved."

¹⁶³ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 168.

The original duality thus started to fade away, in Onians's views, and a single entity began to emerge. With this, the great dispute started to take shape among the thinkers of the following centuries – or even a millennium – and the subsequent theories greatly differed in whether the heart or the head could be regarded as the ruling part of man and also the location of the mind.

The first surviving medical discussions date from this period, and they truly mirror the confused ideas of this time about the location of the mind. It seems that the earliest real medical texts were quite divided. Without a proper knowledge of the nervous system, the circulation of blood, and pathology in general, the discussions, for example, on stroke and the “sacred disease” – that is epilepsy – varied. Some claimed that the brain was the source of apoplexy and epilepsy,¹⁶⁴ especially the Hippocratic writers,¹⁶⁵ while many maintained that the heart was responsible for the diseases. In connection with it, the location of the mind was also defined in different ways. As Axel Karenberg and Irmgard Hort summarise:

Alcmaeon of Croton¹⁶⁶ (early fifth century B.C.), most of the authors of the Hippocratic corpus (c. fifth to second century B.C.), Plato (d. 347 B.C.) and the Alexandrians Herophilus and Erasistratus¹⁶⁷ (c. 300 B.C.) placed the “higher functions” in the head or the brain. Some equally important philosophers, like Empedocles of Agrigentum (c. 483/482-423 B.C.), identified sensation and thought with the heart, “the blood around men's hearts” or the vessels.¹⁶⁸

¹⁶⁴ Hippocrates denied the idea that it was a disease sent by the gods – thus sacred – and said : “It is thus with regard to the disease called sacred: it appears to me to be in no way more divine nor more sacred than other diseases [...] The brain is the cause of this affliction [...]”. http://www.epilepsiemuseum.de/alt/body_historen.html

¹⁶⁵ However, in *De corde*, a part of the Hippocratic corpus, dating from much later than the rest of it, it is the heart where intelligence resides. For further details on the functions of the heart in *De corde*, see for example: Erickson. *The Language of the Heart, 1600-1750*. 3.

¹⁶⁶ One of Pythagoras' students. He did not only discover the difference between arteries and veins, but the optic nerve, also.

¹⁶⁷ It must be noted that after Aristotle, the centre of science and culture shifted to Alexandria, where its famous medical school was founded in around 300 BC. Herophilus and Erasistratus belonged to this school. Herophilus compared the body-structure of large mammals and men, and – in his detailed description of the brain – defined it as the centre of intelligence. Erasistratus also placed the mind in the head. Nevertheless, he mainly studied the heart, its valves and the circulation of blood, and supposed that the blood turned into air when it reached the arteries (as he thought that blood flowed from the veins into the arteries).

¹⁶⁸ Karenberg and Hort, “ Part I: The Struggle for Terms and Theories – Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages (300-800),” 164. With a reference to: Clifford, Rose F. “European neurology from its beginnings until the 15th century: An overview.” *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 2. (1993): 21-44. And: Clifford, Rose F. “The neurology of Ancient Greece – an overview.” *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 3. (1994): 237-260.

Aristotle, 4th century BC, can also be connected to this latter trend, as he represented a cardiocentric view, too, stating that the principal part of the human body was the heart, and the brain, which was described as cold and moist, served only as a cooling mechanism of the heart's heat. The heart was the organ that contained the different faculties like growth and sensation, however, he maintained that the mind (*νοῦς*) had no organ. It also seems that this cardiocentric view was more popular and prevalent until the 2nd century AD and favoured by more people than those supporting the supremacy of the brain. The change came about in the 2nd century AD with Soranus of Ephesus and Galen of Pergamum. Soranus was the most influential in the Latin West; his work's Greek original was lost, but it survived in the early 5th century Latin translation of Caelius Aurelianus. He described apoplexy as a disease originating in the "narrowing of the pores that were supposed to exist between the particles of the body" or "from an injury in the membrane of the brain."¹⁶⁹ Galen was a Greek doctor working in Rome. His knowledge of human anatomy partially came from his experience of working as a surgeon at a gladiatorial arena. Following the Hippocratic doctrines of the four humours,¹⁷⁰ Galen had an even greater impact on the medieval concepts of apoplexy and epilepsy and – consequently – of the locus of the mind than Soranus. Even though he recognised that the arteries contained blood¹⁷¹ and that the heart set the blood in motion in a flow and ebb way, he did not realise that the blood circulates, and placed the primacy (and with this *cogitatio*, *memoria* and *phantasia*) also in the head. As for epilepsy, he clearly stated that the centre of the disease was the brain. He wrote the following:

In all forms it is the brain which is diseased; either the sickness originates in the brain itself, (...) or it rises in sympathy into the brain from the cardiac orifice of the stomach (...) Seldom, however, it can have its origin in any part of the body... and then rises to the head in a way which the patient can feel (...).¹⁷²

¹⁶⁹ Karenberg and Hort, "Part I: The Struggle for Terms and Theories – Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages (300-800)," 166. With a reference to Caelius Aurelianus, *On acute diseases and on chronic diseases* (the Latin translation of Soranus), Book III, Chapter 5. edited and translated by I. E. Drabkin. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1950.

¹⁷⁰ It was Empedocles in the 5th century BC who introduced the idea that the universe was composed of the four elements: earth, water, fire and air, which later led to the doctrine of the four humours: choler (yellow bile), melancholy (black bile), blood and phlegm. Health depended on their harmony in the human body.

¹⁷¹ Not merely air as it was earlier supposed.

¹⁷² From: http://www.epilepsiemuseum.de/alt/body_historen.html

Stroke for him was also associated with the head, and he regarded it as coming from “an accumulation of a thick and sticky humour, particularly phlegm or black bile, in the cerebral ventricles,” and considered it as “some inflammatory disease that exists in the head.”¹⁷³ In connection with it, he stated that the primary organ of motion, sensation and mental functions was the brain.

When Onians discusses the developments of the views about the mind from a non-medical standpoint, he draws parallels between the Greek and Roman conceptions. As he explains, the Romans had very similar views to the Greeks, naturally of course, as many of the philosophical ideas must have been borrowed. For them, the principle of consciousness was most often the *animus*, thoughts and emotions being attached to it. The original seat of it was in the chest. It could be the *cor*, a location interpreted in different texts in various ways and sometimes now merely standing for the heart, and the *praecordia*,¹⁷⁴ as well – an organ also giving grounds to several contradicting interpretations as the diaphragm, midriff, lungs, breast or even stomach; all in all, another location in the chest. Intelligence, in a similar way, was connected to breathing and the blood, too. The other locus, the head or *caput*, was just as in Greek texts, often equated with life, and the *genius* residing in it was an analogue of the Greek ψυχή – the life-surviving spirit generating new life and independent of the person’s consciousness located in the chest. This *genius* was also usually equated with the *anima*. This was the main principle, the vital force, which was dissociated from the consciousness. In this word, however, there is a great confusion, as etymologically it also means “breath,” even though the life-surviving spirit, the entity that *anima* stood for, was not located in the chest where breath came from. Onians reconciles this contradiction by proving that the life-soul was also thought of as being vaporous.¹⁷⁵ Thus, there were two different “breaths” and minds. The *animus* was “the ordinary breath of respiration, the breath in the form of which pride, spirit, etc., i.e. *animus*, appears, and in the form of which – words – consciousness issues forth, thoughts are uttered.”¹⁷⁶ For the normal physical breath without any associations concerning consciousness, *anima* was used. This latter,

¹⁷³ Karenberg and Hort, “Part I: The Struggle for Terms and Theories – Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages (300-800),” 167.

¹⁷⁴ Identified by Pliny with the φρενες.

¹⁷⁵ Manifested for example in the function of sneezing. See: Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 168-173.

¹⁷⁶ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 170.

due to its obvious connections with life and being alive was also used for the life-spirit. Onians explains it as follows:

Being necessary to life, it [*anima*] might be confused with the life-soul when the conception of the latter had become indistinct. Like the Greeks, and doubtless influenced by them, educated Romans tended to unify, to identify the surviving soul with that which consciously controls a man in life.¹⁷⁷

2.3.3.2. The Middle Ages

After the fall of the Roman Empire, medical knowledge ceased to progress for a while. The Church viewed disease often as a punishment of God for people's sins, and real cure was thought to come only through prayer and repentance. Innovative thoughts and originality were often discouraged, dissection was forbidden, and this way there was a significant halt to development in the history of medicine. Galen's concepts, denying the primacy of the heart, prevailed for approximately eight centuries in Europe. So this period was characterised by a reworking of earlier, especially Galenic ideas, but considerable innovations in the history of medicine were not born. Perhaps the only significant step was Isidore of Seville's popular work, the *Etymologiae*, written in the early 7th century AD, which suggested that "apoplexia est subita effusio sanguinis,"¹⁷⁸ a sudden effusion of blood, hitherto the first text in the history of neurology recognising blood as being responsible for stroke. But all in all, the early Middle Ages remained without noteworthy new finds in this field, and the "cerebrocentric" ideas seemed to prevail, as the Aristotelian thoughts were lost during this period until – with the appearance of the Arabs – they were revived again.

In the east, the Nestorian Christians established a school of translators in the early Middle Ages, to which we can be grateful for the rendering of Greek texts into Arabic. These translations and Arabian medicine itself brought a great change. With the arrival of the ideas of Arab physicians and philosophers, a new era dawned on European neurology. The significant innovation introduced this time was that attempts were made to reconcile Galenic and Aristotelian views, which resulted in important new discussions on the locus of the mind, adding to previous discussions in their elaborateness and detail. The theories of Galen were prevalent and accepted, but

¹⁷⁷ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 171.

¹⁷⁸ Isidore of Seville, *Etymologiae*, Book IV, Chapter 6, 10. edited by Lindsay W. M. Oxford: Clarendon 1911. *Etymologiarum sive Originum Libri 20*, 2 vols.

reworked in many ways, and especially the “cell-doctrine” of Nemesius of Edessa, the 4th century philosopher, was put into the foreground. Nemesius stated that the brain consisted of three ventricles – or cells – responsible for the mental functions. The faculty of imagination was placed in the first one, reasoning, cognition in the second, and memory in the third.¹⁷⁹ Interestingly, emotion was not considered to be located in any of these ventricles. This doctrine became so influential in Europe that it dominated neurology and psychology for hundreds of years, until the 17th century.¹⁸⁰ As a consequence of this idea, the ventricular theory determined the consideration of both stroke and epilepsy for a long time, starting from the *Royal Book* or *Liber regalis* of Haly Abbas, an influential Muslim physician of the 10th century, whose work was translated into Latin in the late 1080’s by Constantine the African; and by the even more influential Avicenna – the prince of physicians as he was called¹⁸¹ –, who became known in the West in the 12th century and his principal medical work, the *Canon medicinae*, remained in use until the 17th century.¹⁸² They both wrote that in case of apoplexy, the ventricles of the brain were blocked, and this idea was taken further by several medieval philosophers and physicians, saying that if there occurred a severe stroke, all the three cerebral ventricles were congested.¹⁸³ Epilepsy was a similar case. Avicenna in his *Canon medicinae* defines it as the following:

Epilepsy is a disease which prevents those organs affected from using the senses, moving and walking upright [...] And this is caused by a blockage. Usually it is a general seizure, caused by some damage, which affects the front cerebral ventricle [...] and it is impossible for the person affected to remain standing upright.¹⁸⁴

¹⁷⁹ When Chaucer talks about Arcite’s “celle fantastik” (*The Canterbury Tales*: I, 1376), he must be referring to the cell doctrine and the first cell, the cell of imagination. For this and further reference for the treatment of “imagination” in Chaucer’s works, see: Burney, J. D. *Chaucer’s Language and the Philosophers’ Tradition*. Bury St. Edmunds: D. S. Brewer – Rowman & Littlefield, 1979.

¹⁸⁰ Karenberg and Hort, “Part II: Between Galenism and Aristotelism – Islamic Theories of Apoplexy (800-1200),” 178.

¹⁸¹ See: Avicenna. *Liber Canonis*. Venice, 1507. Reprinted. Hildesheim: Olms, 1998.

¹⁸² “History of Medicine” *Encyclopaedia Britannica*. Macropaedia. Vol. 11, 825.

¹⁸³ Haly Abbas was the first scholar who suggested that stroke might be caused by thick blood, thus contributing to the humoral doctrine of Galen. He, however, also mentioned black bile and phlegm as possible causes, and other sources ensured that the fourth of the humors, yellow bile, was not abandoned, either. See: Karenberg and Hort, “Part II: Between Galenism and Aristotelism – Islamic Theories of Apoplexy (800-1200)”

¹⁸⁴ From: http://www.epilepsiemuseum.de/alt/body_historen.html

This approach indicates that the brain was given high priority by this tradition, but as mentioned above, the major step the Arab philosophers made was an incorporation of Aristotelian ideas into the Galenic thought. The two most important names which influenced western thinking as well are the above mentioned Avicenna, who lived between 980-1037, and Averroes (1126-1198), whose work was translated into Latin soon after his death in 1225.¹⁸⁵ As we have seen, for Aristotle, the brain was merely a cooling mechanism for the heart, and this latter was the primary organ of the human body. The main question was posed by Averroes, who asked how it was possible that people paralysed in apoplexy could still breathe, since respiration was thought to be effected by the animal spirit, even though the mediation of the animal spirit to the muscles was blocked.¹⁸⁶ The only way to reconcile this contradiction was to reach back to the Aristotelian doctrines and draw the conclusion that the body has two primary organs, the brain and the heart, controlling breathing and motion together. The brain, however, did not entirely give grounds to the heart and did not lose its importance.

As I have already mentioned, before the translation of these Arab texts, the medical knowledge of western Europe was rather poor. Medieval medicine was often influenced by religious beliefs and superstitions. Epilepsy, for example, or the “falling disease” as it was known in the Middle Ages, was regarded as demoniac possession, and we find that sometimes a special amulet – most often a ring – was obtained to serve as an “effective” aide against the seizures, and in Anglo-Saxon medicine, a goat’s brain had to be pulled through it in order to protect a child against epileptic seizures. Therefore, when the Arabic texts started to be translated into Latin from the 11th century, no significant innovations were made. Respecting the authorities was more important than observation, and textual tradition overshadowed any attempt to bring novel ideas into medicine or the location of the principal organ. The first significant western school of medicine with an Arab influence was established in Salerno, in southern Italy, at this time, where Constantine the African, Johannes Platearius and later Bartholomaeus Salernitatus¹⁸⁷ played chief roles in acquainting Europe with the Greco-

¹⁸⁵ See: Averroes. *Colliget, Die medizinischen Kompendien*. Venice, 1562. Reprinted. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1962.

¹⁸⁶ Karenberg and Hort, “Part II: Between Galenism and Aristotelism – Islamic Theories of Apoplexy (800-1200),” 179.

¹⁸⁷ See: *Practica*, Transl. Capparoni A, Roma, Istituto di Storia della Medicina.

Arabic lore and the trifold influence of the heart, the ventricles of the brain and the humours – to differing degrees.

Probably the next important step in the history of neurosciences came about in the 13th – 14th centuries, with the appearance of three significant compendia. The first one was the *Compendium medicinae* by the Anglo-Norman Gilbertus Anglicus, whose name can be connected to the schools of medicine of Salerno and Montpellier. The other two are Bernard of Gordon's *Lilium medicinae* and John of Gaddesden's *Rosa Anglica* or *Rosa Medicinae*; both were teachers at Montpellier, the most significant medical school of the age after Salerno. They did not contribute much new material to the previous knowledge and theories about the heart, brain and location of mental functions, but an increasing influence of astrology can be observed in the discussion of medical problems.

The major breakthrough came about in the 14th century, with the Renaissance, when several beliefs of medieval medicine and superstitions in connection with it were rejected. It was not merely a revived interest in classical lore, the values of Antiquity, but a brand-new outlook, a quest for innovations, a time for posing questions and a desire for explorations. The foundations of the new way of thinking were laid down by the great scholastics in the 13th century, Albertus Magnus and his pupil Thomas Aquinas, who tried to reconcile the teachings of the Church and Aristotle. Aquinas stated that the reasoning mind was created by God and, as a consequence, man – or his intellect – in his reasoning cannot draw conclusions opposing the Christian thought. This novel idea gave a green light to rational thinking, and the revival of learning in the Renaissance. Galen was no longer regarded as the unquestionable authority, and the new discoveries of the age provided a landmark in the history of medical thought. Until this age, autopsy had not been practised due to the opposition of the clergy, and the respect for the authorities; the doctrines of Galen were taken so seriously that neuroanatomy had been neglected in the earlier Middle Ages. Régis Olry names Mondino dei Luzzi and Guido da Vigevano as the two pivotal persons in this breakthrough.¹⁸⁸ Mondino dei Luzzi, living between 1275-1326 and teaching at Bologna, was the first person who used dissection as the basis of his anatomical treatise

¹⁸⁸ Olry, Régis. "Medieval Neuroanatomy: the Text of Mondino dei Luzzi and the Plates of Guido da Vigevano," *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 6, no. 2. (1997): 113-123.

written in 1316, but coming down to us in a version of 1478.¹⁸⁹ The work remained influential and definitive for two hundred years, and out of the 22 leaves, 4 pages deal with the anatomy of the head and the central nervous system. He accepts the famous “cell-doctrine” mentioned above, and places imagination, reasoning, and memory in the cerebral ventricles. The other scholar, Guido da Vigevano, was born at the very end of the 13th century and died in 1349. His *Liber notabilium* of 1345 is a milestone, too, as its last treatise with its anatomical illustrations of originally 24 plates¹⁹⁰ is one of the first anatomical atlases, as Olry words it.¹⁹¹ Six illustrations are concerned with neuroanatomy, out of which the most interesting one from our point of view is plate No 15, which depicts a human head on a wooden table – or rather growing out of its edge – with the cortex removed. The brain itself is not depicted in the way we are used to it, as the gyri are not represented at all. Instead, there are five brown spots drawn, three of which stand for the ventricles, the place of the soul, and two in connection with the olfactory nerves.




Image 4. – Plate 15 of Guido da Vigevano’s *Liber notabilium*.¹⁹²

¹⁸⁹ For a list of editions, printings and translations of this text, see Olry’s appendix.

¹⁹⁰ Six have been lost.

¹⁹¹ Olry, “Medieval Neuroanatomy: the Text of Mondino dei Luzzi and the Plates of Guido da Vigevano,” 114.

¹⁹² From: Olry, “Medieval Neuroanatomy: the Text of Mondino dei Luzzi and the Plates of Guido da Vigevano,” 117, figure 3. Original in Chantilly: Musée Condé.

The plate has an explanation, too:

Hec est quintadecima figura anothomie capitis, in qua nobis ostendit totum cerebrum nudum ab omnibus pelliculis, in quo nobit ostendit esse in medio cerebri tria foramina que vocantur ventriculi cerebri, in quibus viget anima, sicut a primo ventriculo deferuntur duo parvi nervi <oriuntur ab eo ventriculo>, portantes spiritum audibilem ad aures et ostendit esse et duos alios ventriculos anteriores in parte cerebri, dantes hodoratum.¹⁹³

(This is the fifteenth anatomical plate of the head, showing the brain without its membranes, the three foramina called cerebral ventricles that house the soul, a first ventricle from which originate the two nerves that bring the auditory spirits to the ear and two other front ventricles that govern olfaction.)

To sum up, the classical heritage of the concept of the mind is very rich. As philosophico-medical texts testify, the understanding of the mind constantly changed with the development of scientific knowledge. The earliest sources, such as the Homeric texts, indicate that there was a distinction between consciousness and the life-surviving spirit, the former including emotions and thoughts and residing in the chest, whereas the latter was located in the head. The reason for placing human consciousness in the area where the lungs and the heart can be found must be primarily physiological. We feel emotions affecting our body, consequently, emotions must originate in the areas that we can feel. Placing thinking in the chest must have had similar reasons. Thinking and speaking were associated, and as thoughts are uttered with breath, cognition must reside where breath comes from. The life-surviving spirit, on the other hand, was thought to reside in the head. After the 5th century BC, with Alcmaeon of Croton's discoveries, the brain started to be recognised as the receiver of senses and the place of thinking, and the functions of the life-spirit started to expand and include the functions of the conscious mind, as well. This way the original duality was lost, and great debates started whether the heart or the brain was the ruling part of humans. The cardiocentric view was preferred first by most of the philosophers, but, in the 2nd century AD, priority was given to the brain, and from that time on, the cerebrocentric view was dominant.

Learned Anglo-Saxon writers drew from this tradition of classical philosophical ideas, and their views must have been influenced to a great extent by the writings that reached them. The translations of Arabic texts were not yet available to them, of course,

¹⁹³ Quoted with translation in Olry, "Medieval Neuroanatomy: the Text of Mondino dei Luzzi and the Plates of Guido da Vigevano," 117.

so their influence can be considered only later in the Middle English period, when – as the semantic development of the words *mod/mood* and *gemynd/minde* also indicate – the notions about the mind and its functions started to change. Still, Alcuin, Alfred and Ælfric were the precursors of a strengthening learned tradition in medieval England, which represented classical inheritance. This classical tradition, later enriched by new finds and the arrival of Arabic lore, started to gain grounds and slowly superseded the vernacular tradition of the mind in the Middle English period.

2.3.4. The Anglo-Saxon Locus of the Mind

After this cultural “field-trip” to the regions of the classical mind, we can have a look at the Old English mental faculty and see whether similar tendencies can be observed in its functions and location. As we have seen, various views have existed on the Anglo-Saxon mental faculty, even in contemporary documents, and a fascinating mixture of classical and vernacular tenets appear in the approaches to the question. Ælfric, Alfred and the authors in general who were indebted to antique lore, reflected traditional views on the mind, ideas borrowed from classical sources and then incorporated them into Anglo-Saxon writings. Several of the documents which follow the classical tradition are translations of Latin philosophical texts into the vernacular, and others heavily influenced by them. Most of these form a considerable part of the Old English prose corpus. Poetry, on the other hand, surviving mostly in manuscripts of the 10-11th centuries, reflects a tradition rooted in earlier centuries, as the poems themselves must have been written considerably earlier than the date of the four manuscripts they can be found in. These poetic sources seem to cast a different light on the question, as has already been discussed.¹⁹⁴ This vernacular approach is certainly a distinct one, showing a tradition existing side-by-side with the inherited classical and Christian concepts. While the classical tradition of the Old English mind drew more upon thinking and conscious conceptualisation of the functions of the mind, the vernacular one seems to have relied mostly still on physiological observations, similarly to the earliest ideas about the *θυμός*. Nevertheless, the traditions are not always clearly separable, as they mutually affect one another: the classical and Christian tradition affected the Anglo-Saxon one, while the native vernacular tradition had an impact on the translators of classical texts. Doubtless, a closer look at the location of the Anglo-

¹⁹⁴ Chapter 2.3.2.

Saxon mind can also help in broadening our knowledge about the words in question and the understanding of the differences that exist between the medieval and modern constructs of the mental faculties.

From the evidence that Old English poetry gives us and on the basis of the terminology used by the Anglo-Saxons, we can find some significant implications pointing to the Old English function of *mod*. Reading texts containing this word, we can clearly see that this most often used lexeme seemingly denoting “mind” had a very complex group of referents. In most of the texts, *mod* cannot be translated as “mind” and there is no one-to-one correspondence between the two words at all. For us, the mind is mostly a person’s cognitive powers, or our consciousness; and it is only a more thorough definition that would include the emotional faculty, as well. Even though the Anglo-Saxon lexeme comprised all these, too, it still does not cover all the referents of *mod*, which was much more complex. The Old English vernacular mind shows interesting similarities to the Homeric *φρενες* and *θυμος* and their associations with such emotions as anger and courage. This Homeric mind, often referred to as “consciousness” by Onians, was similar to the *mod* – especially to its usage in poetry – and the association is again not surprising, taking the physiological side-effects of intense emotions elaborated earlier. Godden, therefore, rightly defines the Anglo-Saxon mind as a concept conveying – as I have quoted earlier – “to many Anglo-Saxon writers not so much the intellectual, rational faculty but something more like an inner passion or wilfulness, an intensification of the self that can be dangerous.”¹⁹⁵ Thus, this faculty seems independent of the individual will and decision. It acts on its own, it is a wilful and free agency that sometimes needs to be controlled, at other times must overflow to provide the Anglo-Saxon hero with the power and energy essential for a heroic life.

If however, it is such an independent agency, shall it be rendered as “soul,” the spiritual, non-material part of humans, surviving death? Certainly, in modern versions, the word is occasionally translated this way. However, these examples are most often connected to works much influenced by classical tradition, as for example the Alfredian translation of *Cura Pastoralis*. Usually the Old English *mod*, as it appears in poems, is not equal to the life-spirit that leaves the body at the point of death and survives – for this, OE poetry uses *sawl* or *gast* most often.¹⁹⁶ It is much more akin to consciousness,

¹⁹⁵ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 287.

¹⁹⁶ For references, see: Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 289.

and thus *mod* comprises the intensified – often emotional – self and the conscious self-awareness.

The case is similar to the development that Onians posited in classical thinking, where an original distinction existed between the *ψυχη* and the *θυμος*, which conceptions later became mixed in the 5th century BC, and the life-surviving spirit was no longer a completely distinct entity from the conscious mind. According to Onians, *anima* and *animus* developed in a similar way, as we have seen, and taking the separate classical and vernacular traditions of Old English literature and thinking into consideration, we find that authors who were much influenced by the ancient writers have a standpoint similar to this mixed view of the mind and soul, the consciousness and the life-surviving principle. As stated above,¹⁹⁷ for both Alcuin and Alfred, the mind and soul were inseparable. Alcuin's soul was a primarily intellectual agency with the mind as its chief part, later becoming rather equivalent. Alfred's mind is also very close to the soul and the two terms (*sawol* and *mod*) get at times interchanged, the human consciousness becoming equated with the life-surviving spirit. Perhaps the only difference from this point of view is that of Ælfric, who does not treat the soul and the mind as synonyms and does not even say that the mind is the principal part of the soul; but even for him, there is close connection between the two concepts. Therefore, it seems that it is rather OE prose where such an association is employed and no clear distinction is made between the two minds: consciousness and life-surviving spirit (or soul). Poetry rather mirrors the tradition of two separate faculties, somewhat similar to the pre-5th century conceptions mapped by Onians.

Harbus, in "The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England," supports Godden's division of the two traditions and also emphasises the difference between prose texts and the surviving poetic documents. On this basis, she also stresses that while the vernacular verse tradition keeps to the distinction of the mind and soul, the prose corpus – indebted to classical authorities – very often identifies the soul (for Harbus a reference to the "self") with the intellectual mind¹⁹⁸ – a process very similar to that of the Greek mind-words. As Harbus notes:

¹⁹⁷ Chapter 2.3.1.

¹⁹⁸ Even though, when texts are translated from Latin into Old English, the two lexicons do not entirely match with each other, as these prose works and their struggle in explaining these abstract entities indicate. As a consequence, telling the one from the other proves at times very difficult.

[the] conception of the self changed once Christianity and Latin literacy were introduced into England, that even within the period in which England was “Anglo-Saxon,” there is a discernible historical development or change in the conception of the self: the once separate psychological source of agency and the cognitive apparatus of the poetic tradition were melded into a single entity within the prose tradition.¹⁹⁹

Therefore, discussing prose texts, *mod*'s translation as “soul” is usually much more appropriate than in the case of poetry, where the distinction between the two minds seems much more evident. Harbus, therefore, is also right in claiming that when verse is concerned, her research on the “self” becomes more fruitful, as the discussion is less “soul-based.”²⁰⁰ In these poetic texts, with the traditional distinction between the conscious mind and the life-surviving soul, the mind is a very different entity and, it was mostly equivalent to the above mentioned independent and wilful part of the human being, much more connected to passionate emotions than today's *mind*. As such, it needed control at times, and this control was mostly maintained by the self, as Harbus notes in a reference to Old English elegies:

There was a perceived need for the self to exercise some sort of control over the mind in order to achieve the desirable spiritual goal as well as mental tranquility, and also an awareness that this action was occurring. One has the personal responsibility of restraining the mind in its receptacle (the chest, as it was perceived in this culture).²⁰¹

Being such a wilful and independent psychological entity, the traditional Old English mind's location also differed from the locus imagined by our modern way of thinking, and here we can see other parallels with Onians's observations. Certainly, as has been elaborated,²⁰² when emotions are concerned, we easily associate them with physical sensations, whereas in the case of cognition independent of passion, we do not easily connect it to any bodily feeling. Thus, the *mod*, being both passionate and cognitive, should reside in a part of the human body which we can feel being affected by some emotion. The heart is an organ affected by emotions, its malfunctioning or sudden deviation from the normal beating can be felt by everyone. So we could draw the conclusion that the heart was the location of the *mod*. From a certain aspect, it is true; but it would be unwise to confine the residence of *mod* to this point only. Reading

¹⁹⁹ Harbus, “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” 82.

²⁰⁰ Harbus, “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” 83-84.

²⁰¹ Harbus, “The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England,” 86.

²⁰² Chapter 2.3.2.

Anglo-Saxon works in translation, we meet the Modern English word *heart* in higher frequency than *heorte* in the Old English originals. We might argue that it is a consequence of the high number of kennings and compound words used as a poetic device in Old English poetry, but the translators' problem is more complex than this. The Anglo-Saxons did not have a thorough knowledge of anatomy going much further than what they saw on the bloodstained battlefields. Therefore, when the internal organs were concerned, their functions frequently merged. Often, there is no one-to-one correspondence between the Anglo-Saxon and the modern names of organs, or at least – as a consequence of this confusion – we cannot be sure how to render them. Thus, the translation of several such words generally fall together in one Modern English lexeme: *heart*.

Since this anatomical distinction was not as clear-cut as it is today, all we can state for certain is that the *mod* found its location somewhere in the chest. The Anglo-Saxons defined this locus in various ways, and as I have pointed out, all of them often fall together, and are simplified as *heart* in translation. The *mod* could be simply connected to the breast, as the words *breostcofa*, *breastcearu*, *breostbedern*, *breostgeðanc*, *breosthord*, *breosthyge*, *breostloca* and *breostsefa* all indicate. There are, however, more precise references, too, most of which claim that the Old English *mod* resides in the *hreper*, a mysterious location defined in so many ways. Although, a wide range of suggestions exist about its exact meaning, dictionaries prefer: “breast”, “bosom”, and even “womb” besides “heart.” As both Godden and Onians argue, there could be another interpretation, as well, and the word might well be glossed as “lungs”; similarly to φρενες. Reading *Beowulf*, for example, we find that *hreðer æðme weoll* (l.: 2593) and also *hreðer [in]ne weoll* (l.: 2113); that is, it swelled with breath. Undoubtedly, it is not only the heart and quicker blood-pumping or intensified pulse-rate that can be felt being affected by emotions, but when meeting love, fear, fury and other passionate feelings, our breath-taking becomes deeper and faster, as well. The association between breathing and emotions, and breathing and consciousness has already been discussed; it is not merely our bodily, physiological reaction to impulses of fear, love, etc. in terms of deeper breath taking, but our consciousness itself is also signalled not only by heart beating, but by the presence of respiration as well.

Even on linguistic grounds, the connection between the mind, consciousness and its location is visible. Some scholars, like Thomas V. Gamkrelidze and Vjačeslav V.

Ivanov, have tried to explore the manifestation of the connection between consciousness and the working of the lungs in an Indo-European linguistic context.²⁰³ They discuss how the ancient PIE root **d^heu-H/s-*, **d^hu-H/s-* with the possible original meaning “breath” and “blow” appears in words like Goth. *dius*, OIcel *dýr*, OHG *tior*, OE *deor*, all denoting “animal” or “wild animal.” Similarly **anH-* developed in different ways either meaning “breathing”, “soul” or “living creature”, as in Skt. *ániti* “breathes”, Gk. *ánemos* “breath, wind”, Goth. *uz-anan* “exhale” and OIcel. *andi* “breath, soul”, Lat. *anima* “breath, soul” and *animal* “animal.”²⁰⁴ Others, like Emile Benveniste, have ventured to explore what heart might have signified for the Indo-Europeans. Besides the organ itself, the derivatives of the possible common root, **kerd* or **kord*, also reveal that the heart must have been a locus for emotions, which might explain why there exist derivatives like OSlav. *srūditi*, Russ. сердить “irritate”, parallel with OSlav. *srūdīce* and Russ. сердце “heart.”²⁰⁵ Later, by mentioning Latin *recordor* “remember, remind oneself”, the author concludes that the heart was “the seat of an affection, a passion, possibly of memory.”²⁰⁶

I would like to emphasise once again that we should not reduce the locus to either the heart or the lungs. Due to the Anglo-Saxons’ scant anatomical knowledge, we can assert to a hundred percent only that because of these obvious physiological concomitants of intensive emotions, the Anglo-Saxons placed emotions somewhere in the chest, as they could be felt in the lungs, heart and thereabouts. (Here I must note that from now on, whenever I refer to the locus as the heart, it is a reference to this undefined inner location in the chest). In addition, as the conscious being was inseparable from the manifestation of emotions, it is little wonder that the human consciousness was thought to reside in the same place, especially because consciousness is signalled by breathing and heart beating.

When analysing the Old English texts where mind-words and the mind’s location appear, we find that they are frequently collocated. Antonina Harbus in her extensive study on the Anglo-Saxon mind also touches upon the localization of the Anglo-Saxon

²⁰³ Gamkrelidze, Thomas V and Vjačeslav V. Ivanov. *Indo-European and the Indo-Europeans*, 2 vols. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995. Vol. 2, chapter 1. “The Living World: Gods, People, Animals.”

²⁰⁴ Gamkrelidze and Ivanov, *Indo-European and the Indo-Europeans* *Indo-European and the Indo-Europeans*, 2: 388.

²⁰⁵ Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society*, 144.

²⁰⁶ Benveniste, *Indo-European Language and Society*, 144.

mind, and attributes this overt and often occurring association with the chest to an emphasis on the emotional nature of the mental powers. She writes:

[...] Anglo-Saxon writers frequently situate the mind, or at least its thoughts, in the *hreþer*, *heorte*, or *breost*, perhaps to emphasize its emotional faculty and possibly clarify which connotation of *mod* is to be understood. It is indeed likely that writers contextualise *mod* and its fellow ‘mind’ words with these receptacle terms to specify the quality of the mind being invoked. The habitual use of two terms in close proximity and the reference to the mind’s location in the body does promote the concept to prominence, and brings the cognitive into close association with the emotional and spiritual aspects of the human being.²⁰⁷

She thus claims that by frequent references to the mind’s (and even the thoughts’) location in the breast, the Anglo-Saxon authors may have tried to emphasise its close relation to the emotional powers. I tend to be a little sceptical here, however. Although the Old English mind was much more emotional than our understanding of the mental faculties today, I would not suspect any conscious contextualising here. We should not forget about the special usage of collocations in Old English poetic diction, their prominent role in the formation of the formulae.²⁰⁸ Therefore, I would say that no further significance should be attached to a great number of these collocations, especially in cases when alliteration occurs, as in the expression frequently appearing in psalms: “on heortan þa hige.”

Harbus’s discussion calls for another comment here. “The mind was also associated with the emotional life by virtue of the belief that it was situated in the breast and, by transference, the heart or breast were afforded cognitive as well as emotional powers.”²⁰⁹ When she claims this, she justifies the emotional nature of the heart by emphasising that its location was the breast, which is certainly a related matter, but is unlikely to be a reason why the Anglo-Saxons attributed emotional powers to it. She oversimplifies matters here, because this sentence suggests that the mind was first thought to be located in the breast, and as a consequence it was given emotional qualities; then in turn, as emotions thus found a place for themselves, they brought along their “companions”, the cognitive powers, and from then on they resided together

²⁰⁷ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 39.

²⁰⁸ By Milman Parry’s well-known definition “a group of words which is regularly employed under the same metrical conditions to express a given essential idea” Parry, *The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry*, 272.

²⁰⁹ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 38.

in the breast. The logic behind the argument seems to lose its way, as I certainly believe that the mind was NOT associated with emotions only because it was thought to be located in the chest. Harbus thus fails to mention the most important point here: the physiological evidence mentioned by Sweetser and Kurath,²¹⁰ for example, namely that the heart – or at least an undefined location in the breast – can be felt in case of strong emotional effect (be it anger, or passion, or anything else); therefore it is not surprising that the locus of the emotional mind was believed to be in the chest. As Zoltán Kövecses writes: “in the case of many emotions, a large part of the experience of emotion is physiological experience.”²¹¹ He, examining the way “anger” is expressed in language, notes that “emotion-language is motivated either by conceptualisation (i.e., the theories that underlie it) or physiological experience” adding that “the two factors may work in combination or [...] both conceptualization and physiology may be informed by further factors, such as the broader cultural context.”²¹² It is very unlikely that by first locating the mind in the chest, as a second step, it acquired emotional qualities and – also – cognitive ones. Harbus’s discussion would be more logical the other way round, namely, that as emotions formed part of the human mind, and as several emotional states have physiological effects that can be felt in the chest, the mind – together with its cognitive powers – was thought to be located there. In this case, it is much more likely that it is the immediate and evident physiological concomitants that must have played a great part in the conceptualisation of the mind.

Harbus is right, however, that the *mod* was not only responsible for overflowing passion and the “intensified self” urging action and heroic behaviour. As mentioned

²¹⁰ Sweetser, *Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 54, From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure*, 28-32. Kurath, Hans. *The semantic sources of the words for the emotions in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and the Germanic languages*. PhD dissertation, University of Chicago. Menasha: The Collegiate Press, 1921.

²¹¹ Kövecses: “Anger: Its Language, Conceptualisation, and Physiology in the Light of Cross-Cultural Evidence,” 182. For further discussion on the physiological and humoral background of emotion terms, especially “anger” see also: Geeraerts, Dirk and Stefan Grondelaers. “Looking Back at Anger: Cultural Traditions and Metaphorical Patterns.” In *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, edited by John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury, 152-179. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995. Also: Caroline Gevaert’s works based on a diachronic studies of Old and Middle English. Gevaert, Caroline. “The Evolution of the Lexical and Conceptual Field of Anger in Old and Middle English.” In *A Changing World of Words: Diachronic Approaches to English Lexicology and Semantics*, edited by Javier Diaz. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002. Gevaert, Caroline. “The ANGER IS HEAT Question: Detecting Cultural Influence on the Conceptualisation of Anger Through Diachronic Corpus Analysis.” In *Perspectives on Variation, Sociolinguistic, Historical, Comparative*. SLE-Proceedings, 195-208. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005.

²¹² Kövecses: “Anger: Its Language, Conceptualisation, and Physiology in the Light of Cross-Cultural Evidence,” 182.

before, it shared some basic functions with our modern mind, and as such, people not only felt but thought with it. The *mod* was equal to the rational, cognitive faculty, too – similarly to the Homeric θυμός – and in certain cases it can only be glossed as ‘thought’ and the cognitive features, or interpreted as a general reference to the mind’s rational faculty. These two concepts – the rational and the emotional faculties – were not separated at that time, as in our age. As emotion was a mental action happening somewhere in the chest, thinking was an action taking place at the same place: in the *heorte* (heortan geþohtas) *hreðer* or the *breost*.

There are some questions that can be posed here. Why were the rational – cognitive powers thought to be located in the chest? In case of emotions, this association is evident, but thinking cannot be felt, it does not usually have perceptible physiological signs. Why is it then that it was possible to think with the *mod*, even though it was located in the chest? This question was answered when we examined the Greek idea of locating θυμός in the φρενες or στήθος. The explanation might lie in the tradition of associating thinking and speaking. Words are thought to be formed where cognition resides, and as words are uttered with breath, these are associated with one another and, consequently, cognition could find a locus in the chest from where words break through with breath. The Anglo-Saxon model, with the *heorte*, *hreðer* or the *breost* as a frequently mentioned place of the mind, therefore serves as an intriguing parallel to Onians’s observations about the θυμός, φρενες and the στήθος.

He ða mid þam maðmum mærne þioden
dryhten sinne driorigne fand,
ealdres æt ende; he hine eft ongon
wæteres weorpan, oðþæt wordes ord
breosthord þurhbræc. (*Beowulf*, ll.: 2788-92)²¹³

Ðeah þe hine mihtig God mægenes wynnum,
eafepum stepte, ofer ealle men
forð gefremede, hwæþere him on ferhþe greow
breosthord blodreow. (*Beowulf*, ll.: 1716-19a)²¹⁴

²¹³ Then he found the renowned prince, his lord with the treasures, bleeding, his life near its end; he started to sprinkle water on him until the beginning of words broke through the breast-board (breosthord = heart/mind).

²¹⁴ Though the mighty God exalted him over every man with the joy of strength and with power, his thoughts in the mind grew bloodthirsty. (breosthord = thoughts)

And a late example: *The Canterbury Tales* 6549f: “Hir thoughte it swal so sore aboute hire herte/That nedely som word hir moste asterte.”

Mary Carruthers, in her *The Book of Memory*, also gives some attention to the locus of the non-emotional mind. Her emphasis is not on the receptacle of thoughts or the mind as a whole, but that of another faculty: memory. She also mentions that in Aristotelian writings there were two chief organs, the heart and the brain, and notes in relation to memory that the heart was responsible for receiving the impressions from outside while the brain's function was storing the information thus received.²¹⁵ Even after the brain was agreed on as the chief locus, the metaphorical usage for "heart" as memory was preserved. Carruthers emphasises how often Chaucer employs the phrase "by heart" in the same way we use it today,²¹⁶ and for this she finds an etymological reason. As she notes: "'Memory' as 'heart' was encoded in the common Latin verb *recordari*, meaning 'to recollect'. [...] The Latin verb evolved into the Italian *ricordarsi*, and clearly influenced the early use in English of 'heart' for 'memory'."²¹⁷ She may be right in saying that the parallel Italian usages and the French "par coeur" might have facilitated and supported this reference of having the memories in one's heart, but there are some shortcomings in her argument when she returns to Old English.

Since the common Old English verb meaning "to remember" was made from the noun *mynde*, "mind", it seems probable that the metaphorical extension to memory of the English word *heorte* was made on the direct analogy of the Latin metaphor in *recordari* and its derivatives.²¹⁸

On the one hand, the immediate basis of her argument here is false, as she claims a Middle English word to be the origins of an Old English one. Moreover, when we correct the statement and take *gemynd*, the Old English precedent of *minde*, into consideration, we see that her ideas are not justified, as the word only sporadically referred to the mind, the whole of the mental faculty. It stood for remembering and memory at that time. All in all, even if *minde* had been an Old English term meaning "mind", I would not find that this could support her claims. She approaches the question from an inverted angle and goes back in time, mentioning first Chaucer, then claiming that *herte*, according to the *Middle English Dictionary*, already stood for "memory" in the early 12th century, and afterwards brings up her arguments concerning Old English. I

²¹⁵ Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 48.

²¹⁶ Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 49.

²¹⁷ Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 49.

²¹⁸ Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 49.

rather prefer another approach, namely that from the perspective of the history of the localisation of the mind and soul. Robert A. Erickson in his *The Language of the Heart, 1600 - 1700* also calls our attention to the fact that the image of the “thinking heart” was preserved to some extent as a popular and literary notion even in early modern works, and quotes John Donne’s “The Blossom”, where we find a “naked thinking heart.” As Erickson emphasises:

[...] it cannot be stressed enough that the ancient classical and biblical notion of the heart as the seat of both sensation *and thought* was still strong in the popular and literary mind, though most early modern anatomists considered the brain as superior to the heart.²¹⁹

I would say that due to the early understandings of placing the mind and even its functions like memory and knowledge into the heart and thereabouts, the phrase of “by heart”, just like the image of the thinking heart, retains this early concept of the organ as the locus of knowing and understanding. It does it the same way as the Latin word for remembering carries on in itself the locus *cor*.

The question still remains, however, why the brain was out of consideration. As I have already discussed, the Latin tradition often realises that the rational soul was located in the head, but even when Boethius is translated into Old English, these arguments are neglected or simply omitted.²²⁰ As Godden’s main focus is the difference between the classical and the vernacular tradition, he also approaches the question of the locus of the mind from this angle. He first summarises the classical views, but devotes only a few of lines to them, and mentions first Plato, who placed the rational soul (responsible for thinking) in the head, the irascible and spirited one (governing emotions and the provider of life-force) in the breast and the concupiscible one (which controls nutrition) in the abdomen/liver. Then Godden turns to Cassiodorus, who placed the locus of the soul in the head,²²¹ but does not elaborate further on the classical background, rather moves on to the Anglo-Saxon sphere and notes his fascinating observation that even if Alfred, Ælfric or Alcuin are concerned, the Anglo-Saxon writers who were indebted to the classical tradition and based their arguments on the mind and the soul on the classical legacy, such reference to the locus is omitted. He

²¹⁹ Erickson, *The Language of the Heart, 1600-1750*, 10-11.

²²⁰ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 291.

²²¹ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 290.

even considers the lack of the treatment of the mind's and soul's location deliberate and claims that

Alfred in translating Boethius deletes every one of his source's references to the heart as seat of the mind or soul, substituting *mod* or *gewit* or *sawl*, and when Ælfric argues that the 'head' in a particular biblical text stands for the mind he significantly does not use the argument that the mind is located in the head.²²²

He then asserts that the reason behind this might be that these authors tended to associate the rational mind with the life-surviving spirit, and this latter was thought to reside in the body as a whole – as both Alcuin and Ælfric observe. Later on however, he seems to contradict himself to some extent when he turns back to Alfred in his article and writes that even he sometimes, though not in his translation of Boethius, but in the *Pastoral Care*, talks about the thoughts and feelings as residing in the heart or breast.²²³ Similarly, he notes that Ælfric considers sometimes the heart and the breast as the location of thought and passions. Unfortunately Godden does not further elaborate on this contradiction, and although the confusion in the treatment of the locus of the mind, soul and its faculties seems very puzzling, even its presence can shed some light on the several difficulties arising in the exploration of the Old English concept of the mind. Although the above mentioned three authors all seem to follow the classical tradition to some extent in their writing, they are not always consistent.

Besides this, there is one more factor that explains why the head and the brain was not given higher priority as the place of consciousness in Anglo-Saxon England. Not until Aristotle and especially Galen reached England did they realise the importance of the brain. Let us think back to Aristotle, who thought that the mind had no organ²²⁴ and asserted that three of the senses (hearing, sight and smell) were in the head; but because he did not know about the nervous system, the brain for him was – as we have seen – merely a cooling mechanism for the heart (or a mysterious place somewhere in the chest – like that of the Anglo-Saxons – perhaps the lungs). Ruth Harvey notes that still, even in Aristotle's age the medical question was raised why someone hit on the head became

²²² Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 290

²²³ Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 290. – As he mentions, this is an adoption of Gregory's use of *pectus* and *cor*. He also adds one more example from his Boethius translation, where Alfred is not consistent and at one place maintains that man's inner self is locked up in the heart.

²²⁴ *De Anima*

“witless.”²²⁵ It was only in Galen’s time, however, and when the nervous system was discovered, that they started to claim that the brain was not only the locus of some senses, but the residence of important mental powers, like *cogitatio* and *memoria*. This knowledge, however, reached the English only much later than the period we are treating now, so it is only in such late sources that we can read similar lines:

[...] on a tyme was vexid with so grete a seknes in his head, þat it strake into his brayn, & tuke away his witt & his mynde from hym. So at þe laste he come vnto hym selfe, & axkyd to be howseld; (*Alphabet of Tales*, CLXI. *Communicanti non est administranda hostia non consecrata* – second half of the 15th century)

The Anglo-Saxon mind still found its residence in the chest. When Harbus comments on the possible locations of the mental powers, she notes correctly that it was most often associated with the *hreþer*, *breost* or *heorte*, thus a place somewhere in the chest. Later she also notes that in certain cases, the head is also considered as the location of the mental powers. She rightly states that most of these instances appear in prose,²²⁶ although they are very rare and insignificant in proportion to the examples where the mind is in the chest. She brings a quotation from Ælfric, for example, where we read: “on halgum gewrite bið gelomlice heafod geset for þæs mannes mode.”²²⁷ Another point needs to be made here, however. Even though Harbus mentions that this usage is infrequent, in her book we occasionally face the recurring but misleading usage of the adjective *cerebral* (pages: 73, 132, 141). The author sometimes quotes this word from secondary sources without commenting on its deceptive nature, and it seems that she employs the term herself without due thought for its implications. A look at the instances she discussed shows that *cerebral* cannot be more here than a synonym of *mental*, a reference to a notion related to the mind. There are two shortcomings here. First of all, the word derives from Latin *cerebrum* ‘brain’, and it still denotes a concept related to this part of the human body so it can never be used as an attribute of the Old English mind. When Harbus defines the Anglo-Saxon mind so excellently and states that “it was the venue of cognition, perception, memory, as well as the seat of emotions and the spiritual life, and was frequently perceived to be seated in the chest,”²²⁸ she

²²⁵ Harvey, *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*, 35.

²²⁶ Due to the classical influence, most probably.

²²⁷ *Catholic Homilies* I, 40 527.1. In: Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 38.

²²⁸ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 25.

contradicts herself with the application of the word, as the mind was not *cerebral* in most cases, not even when the process of thinking is mentioned²²⁹; consider the expression *heortan gepohtas*, for example. Another reason why the use of the adjective *cerebral* is inappropriate and even contradictory to the author's findings is that the word is used primarily in connection with the intellect. Contrary to this, even Harbus' explorations of the Old English beliefs about the mind show that the Anglo-Saxon ideas were significantly different from our modern way of thinking about it.

The head was not often mentioned in Anglo-Saxon poetic texts as the receptacle of emotions and cognition; but we should not be misled and think that it was only in classical-influenced prose that any further significance was attached to it. As in other cultures, the head was associated with life: "þolige he heafdes" (*Laws of Edgar*) "Fare seo buruhwaru sylf to and begyte ða banan cuce oððe deade heora nyhstan magas, heafod wið heafde" (*Laws of Ethelred*). When Beowulf and the dragon lie dead, Wiglaf guards the heads of them (*heafodwearde*)²³⁰ It was especially the head that had to be looked after in the battle *hafelan weredon* (*Beowulf* l.: 1327) and as Onians rightly mentions, this concept survived long after the Anglo-Saxon period and can be met even as late as the Robin Hood stories, like: "He gaf hym a gode swerd in his hond / his hed therwith for to kepe" (*Robin Hood and the Monk*)²³¹ Onians's explanation is thought-provoking here. He places the Old English appearance of the head into the Indo-European perspectives, and draws parallels with his observations concerning especially the Greek and Latin, but also other cultures', beliefs. For him, the association of the head with life, the cruel practice of the Germanic as well as other peoples' of cutting off the head²³² – sometimes ritually – all indicate that the head contained the soul: the soul, which was not equal with consciousness, but with the life-surviving spirit.²³³

²²⁹ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 73.

²³⁰ Quoted in: Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 100.

²³¹ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*. 100, fn. 8.

²³² Think of Saint Edmund and Oswald, or Tacitus' account in his *Annals* of the Germanic tribes fastening up human heads on trees (referred to with several other examples in: Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 100.)

²³³ Onians's observations are fascinating and certainly carry the possibility in themselves of prompting debate. He also adds that there were some beliefs that ghosts appeared as a head, and he indicates that this might explain why the Old English word *grima* means not only "mask" and "helm" but also "spectre." He goes even further and brings up another parallel from common Indo-European thought, namely that the head – as the seat of the life – was thought to be the seat of the life-soul even in its procreative function. This is why there are words like *heafodmaga* and *heafodmæg* referring to near-relations, or *heafodgebedda* for the consort. Here he rejects the possible metaphorical interpretation of *heafod* indicating "chief" (as in

2.3.5. Comments on the Different Approaches

In the preceding chapters, I intended to examine the backgrounds of the two traditions, the classical and the vernacular one, and explain how the concept of the mental faculty was changing, leading up to the fascinating mixed image of the Old English mind. To sum up what we have found out about the *mod* through a discussion of its location in Anglo-Saxon thought, let me return to the two seemingly paradoxical expressions: “passionate mind” or “rational mind.” The vernacular, Anglo-Saxon *mod* was by no means equal to our modern mind-concept. As we have seen, although it covered the functions the modern mind has, it was much more: it was a faculty independent of will and determination, an active agency, in fact being able to act on its own and urge the person to action. Also, compared to the modern mind, *mod* was much more concerned with emotions and passion, and besides referring to the mental faculty, it meant “pride”, “arrogance”, “courage” and “anger”, too. Moreover, the emotional and rational sides of the mind seem to have been much more connected and less differentiated for the Anglo-Saxons than they are today. There was no detachment between cold-blooded thinking and hot-headed emotions. In a heroic society determined by valour and courage, a man’s thoughts and actions were much more determined by his feelings than they are today.²³⁴ Since *mod* was the most frequently used word for mental faculties, it seems that what determined pre-Christian Anglo-Saxon thinking was much more centred upon the moment and the present that formed their actions, and which later perfected itself and culminated in a heroic death and afterlife. An afterlife the quality of which was determined by the achievement of heroic valour and thus the workings of the *mod*. This way, the *mod* joined the two faculties and it comprised both thinking and loving. As a consequence, the heart/*hreoðer* (or actually this hard-to-define location in the chest) was not merely the residence of passionate feelings but the location of thoughts as well.

Moreover, in the vernacular tradition, we can find that there is no equivalence between consciousness and the life-surviving spirit. In a simplified way, I could state

heafodport, heafodrice, heafodstede). Later he touches upon the cult of the boar-head and the boar-helmet (*heafodbeorg*: head-protector) as in *Beowulf* l.: 1111. He then quotes Tacitus that wearing the image of boars is a sign of the adoration of Freya, the female counterpart of Freyr, and claims that this cult “might mean that the head was committed uniquely to the protection of the god of procreation and fertility, Freyr, whose emblem the boar was.” (154.)

²³⁴ See also: Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 286. *Modigian, gladian* were active simplex verbs – linguistically mental actions not mental states. Emotion was an act of will (*niman mod, gif ure mod nimð gelustfullunge*), not like today.

that in Anglo-Saxon poetry, *mod*, together with its synonyms: *sefa*, *ferð* and *hyge*, refer to an inner self responsible for thought and emotion, the active inner consciousness, while the life-surviving spirit is mostly *sawl* and *gast*. Due to the entwining two traditions, however, which is often very difficult to disentangle, the usage of the Old English mind-words is much more complex.

All we can certainly state is that there seem to prevail two distinct views on the Anglo-Saxon mind. When works were translated from Latin into English, the different concepts about the mind easily mixed, partly because it was difficult to find exact equivalents for the Latin words. The learned classical approach influenced the vernacular one, while the traditional Anglo-Saxon approach left a mark on Alcuin's, Alfred's and Ælfric's works.

Interestingly, however, there is a fascinating parallel that we can observe in the development of the concept of the mind in the different traditions. The vernacular connotations of the Old English *mod* resemble those of the pre-5th century ideas of antiquity, which were especially based on physiological observations. Most of the learned prose texts, however, the translations of Alfred and the writings of Ælfric and Alcuin, reflect another tendency: the thinking and philosophy that probably emerged later and which was influenced by the ideas developing after the 5th century BC in the learned scholarly and scientific circles.

Due to this influence, the Middle English concept of the mind was different. When the mind shifted its locus to the head and the brain, its functions changed as well. The united vernacular mental faculty of thoughts and emotions seems to become much more divided, perhaps due to the fact that when emotions are concerned, having the head as a locus does not have as many physiological concomitants as having the chest. In the later Middle Ages when the functions of the mind were treated, the emphasis was much more on the rational function than the emotional one, as the two started to be separated, and the locus shifted to the brain.

2.4. A Semantic – Literary Approach

The third approach to the Anglo-Saxon mind-vocabulary is not sharply divisible from either of the previous two; still, it merits a separate chapter. Just as the Germanic

vs. Christian and the classical vs. vernacular approaches naturally incorporate linguistic elements into the discussions, the semantic – literary approach involves cultural considerations. Moreover, even though the starting point here is the surviving linguistic evidence, it is inevitable that we take cultural, extra-linguistic influences into consideration, as language is inseparable from the people who use it. In this chapter, therefore, I will attempt to show how the mind-words’ grassroots-level examination may be followed by drawing further conclusions from the corresponding socio-historical factors, and will call attention to some factors often neglected by semantic studies.

A few attempts have been made to clarify the meanings of certain mind-words. Some of these attempts treat the words as near-synonyms, while others are painstakingly trying to discover distinct shades of meanings that could possibly differentiate one from the other and place them into distinct “slots” of meanings. There are two main scholars who tried to view the Old English mind-vocabulary as a whole, and have devoted much attention to the question recently: Michael J. Phillips²³⁵ and Antonia Harbus.²³⁶ Harbus, with her moderate approach to defining the words’ connotations, criticises Michael J. Phillips’ in as much as his “attempt to distinguish shades of meanings extrapolates tendencies as firm rules,”²³⁷ and she somewhat “softens” the distinctions between the meanings of certain mind-words. The following paragraphs will summarise these approaches.

Mod, as the most common of all the mind-words and the most general, is used for several concepts. Phillips claims that it is both intellectual and emotional, and joins Godden’s arguments in his dissertation written in the same year, when he says that the *mod* is “that in a person which controls and needs to be controlled,”²³⁸ that it is an active agency, and that it is not transcendental or eternal.²³⁹ In this aspect, however, it agrees only with the statement on what Godden calls the “vernacular tradition”, as Alfred’s classical legacy talks about a *mod* that is associated with the soul and which IS eternal, unlike Phillips’ statement.

²³⁵ Phillips, Michael J. *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, unpublished PhD dissertation. University of Illinois, 1985.

²³⁶ Harbus, Antonina. *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2002.

²³⁷ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 34.

²³⁸ Phillips, *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, 293.

²³⁹ Phillips, *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, 181-183.

Harbus defines *mod* as “the default term, the general-use word for ‘mind’ in all its capacities” and adds that “it appears to have been able to connote more specifically the locus of intellectual activity, as well as ‘courage’ or ‘pride’, and to have been the most frequent verbal choice for ‘consciousness’.”²⁴⁰ She further distinguishes between usages of *mod* outside alliteration, as in these cases the word is less influenced by poetic concerns, and lists the most frequent meanings as “disposition”, “character”, “consciousness”, and “pride”.²⁴¹

Hyge for Phillips is a word carrying the connotations “thought” and “intention”,²⁴² and Harbus supports this by saying that “*hyge* appears to have connoted the place of thought or intention [...] though this word can function as a near-synonym for *mod*, connoting mind generally, rather than a specific cognitive, emotional, or spiritual aspect of the psyche.”²⁴³ The near-synonymous nature of the two words also shows in the fact that just like *mod*, *hyge* needs to be controlled.²⁴⁴ A distinction, however, that Phillips draws is that *hyge* is the most closely associated with action from among all the mind-words.²⁴⁵ As for Harbus’s finds for the occurrences outside alliteration, she does not associate the word any more with intention, but defines it as “emotional outlook” or “character”, “spirit”, “the dwelling place of wisdom.”²⁴⁶

Sefa for Phillips is “uniquely associated with perception,”²⁴⁷ and is a mind-word, very often involved in expressions concerning emotions. Harbus agrees with this on grounds that *sefa* – together with *andgiet* – is the favourite gloss for Latin *sensus*, and thus “this term apparently encoded the notion ‘perception’ or ‘outlook’”.²⁴⁸ She also notes that the word’s meaning is in some aspects parallel to *hyge*, but usually it cannot be translated as “mind” in general terms. While “*hyge* connotes the thinking, rational part of the mind, [...] *sefa* usually seems to connote ‘understanding’ or ‘frame of mind’ rather than ‘mind’, though in some cases the broader meaning is perhaps to be

²⁴⁰ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 47.

²⁴¹ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 48.

²⁴² Phillips, *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, 292.

²⁴³ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 47.

²⁴⁴ Phillips, *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, 201.

²⁴⁵ Phillips, *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, 35.

²⁴⁶ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 48.

²⁴⁷ Phillips, *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, 59.

²⁴⁸ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 47.

understood.”²⁴⁹ By examining the occurrences outside alliteration, she finds that the meanings “character” and “disposition” are the predominant ones.²⁵⁰

Ferhð is a term often appearing in constructions involved with emotions. It is “either afflicted or comforted by others,”²⁵¹ but just as much as it is in connection with emotions, it is related to the human spirit. As Harbus defines: “*Ferhð* often seems to connote the spiritual aspect of the mind, though it is also the place of wisdom and resolution, encoded in the collocations ‘frod on ferhðe’ and ‘ferhðe stapelian’ [...]” And “like *sefa* and *hyge*, unspecified ‘mind’ or ‘human consciousness’ could also be connoted by *ferhð*.”²⁵² In non-alliterating context, it denotes “spirit”.²⁵³

Myne is a word that Phillips is not much concerned with. Harbus on the other hand, devotes some attention to it and claims that it “usually connotes ‘intention’” and “in prose usage, which is disproportionately rare, it appears to have a closer affinity with ‘memorial’ than ‘intention/purpose’.”²⁵⁴ She also takes it sometimes as a mind-word in connection with “love” and prefers the translation “heart”, as opposed to the translation as “mind” in general terms.

Certainly, it is very difficult to distinguish among the meanings and shades of meanings of mind-words, even the simplexes. One of the main questions in the discussions of the cornucopia of Old English mind-vocabulary is, whether each and every term was used for a specific aspect of the mind, or whether the abundance could easily be ascribed to the particulars of Old English poetic diction. Evidently, the specific characteristics of Old English alliterative poetry make it especially likely that a large number of synonyms appear for the same notion, given the kennings and the repetitious elements. Many argue that the existence of the large number of mind-words in Old English merely bears witness to this phenomenon, and they do not much differentiate specific aspects of the workings of the mental faculty. Stephen Barney, for example, states that words like *ferhð*, *sefa* and *hyge* provided equal options for the *scop* in different metric circumstances, depending on what alliteration was needed, and they did not distinguish between specific aspects, functions of the mind, but simply provided the

²⁴⁹ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 47.

²⁵⁰ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 48.

²⁵¹ Phillips, *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, 292.

²⁵² Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 47.

²⁵³ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 48.

²⁵⁴ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 45-6.

poet with further chances for repetitions.²⁵⁵ A famous example of such a repetition is taken from *The Battle of Maldon*:

Hige sceal þe heardra, heorte þe cenre,
Mod sceal þe mare, þe ure mægen lytlað (ll.: 312-313).

The most common interpretation of these lines, just as of similar ones with variation,²⁵⁶ is that the words of the mental lexicon represent one and the same concept, without difference. Norma J. Engberg also argues that *hyge*, *heorte* and *mod* are simply variations and enumeration, they all denote the mind, but no further distinction should be sought. Definitely, in this case, the alliterations with *h* and *m* are very evident. Engberg says that “if we recall how the Anglo-Saxons have employed these nouns of mental process in their poetry, letting the niceties of alliteration and meter rather than sense govern choice among the alternatives, we are persuaded that the three are synonymous enough to constitute a variation.”²⁵⁷ Others, like Malcolm Godden, as we have seen, represent a middle-road standpoint, asserting that mind-words are “used more or less interchangeably.”²⁵⁸ And finally, there are scholars, as for example Harbus, who claim that it is unlikely that there was no important distinction between them, especially “in view of the conceptually central place of the mind and its complex range of perceived activities in Anglo-Saxon poetry.”²⁵⁹ Even Harbus, however, agrees that the words must have shared parts of their semantic fields, but when she continues her arguments, she seems to contradict herself.

Patterns of usage do suggest that the terms could share portions of their semantic fields, but this does not necessarily imply that they were routinely employed casually or could not be distinctively nuanced by context, especially in poetry. With this sort of vocabulary, idiomatic usage seems commonly to be governed by alliterative consideration, but not enough is known about the most frequent or default connotations of these terms to interpret such usage precisely.²⁶⁰

²⁵⁵ Barney, *Word-Hord: An Introduction to Old English Vocabulary*, 28.

²⁵⁶ Harbus gives a nice list of variations with mind-words (*The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 31, fn. 28.)

²⁵⁷ Engberg. “Mod-Maegen Balance in Elene, The Battle of Maldon and The Wanderer,” 218.

²⁵⁸ Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 289.

²⁵⁹ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 32.

²⁶⁰ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 32.

This argumentation is not consistently maintained by Harbus in later chapters dealing with the different genres of Anglo-Saxon literature, as there she does not usually distinguish between the mind-words appearing in her examples. Moreover, the examples she adduces do not always serve as unquestionable evidence, given the fact that rendering these words into Modern English is very rarely based on a one-to-one correspondence between the lexemes. Why should *modsefa* in ‘Helle gemundon/ in modsefan’ (*Beowulf*, ll.: 179b-80a) and ‘Syððan he his modsefan minne cuðe,/ wið his sylfes sunu setle getæhte’ (*Beowulf*, ll.: 2012-13) connote “the definite character of a person governed consciously by the will” or “individual moral character or consciousness”?²⁶¹ Why can it not be translated as ‘intention’ or in some other cases as ‘thought’? What is more, how is it possible that, although she argues that the terms are not likely to have been used interchangeably, but could be “distinctively nuanced by context,” their idiomatic usage still “seems commonly to be governed by alliterative consideration”? Had it been truly alliteration that governed their usage, we must give credit to Godden’s words about their more or less interchangeable usage. It is not difficult to agree to the statement to some extent that the mind-words were employed synonymously, as it is true that Old English poetic diction must have largely contributed to the existence of such a large number of mind-lexemes. Evidently, the types brought forth by mere poetic innovation can easily be found among kennings and other compounds that appear solely in poetry, such as *breostgeðanc*, *breosthord*, *breostloca*, *ferhðsefa* or *modgemynd*. The obvious deduction might be that words for which we can be grateful to the Anglo-Saxon *scop* should rather be sought for among these poetic compounds. But then what might be the reason why the great variety of simplex nouns occur mostly in poetic texts, as well? It is indisputable that not only the almost entire range of compounds, but also most of the simplexes can predominantly be found in poetry. Harbus argues that in the extant corpus of Old English texts, *hyge*, *ferhð* and *sefa*, the three simplexes mentioned by Barney, are all “disproportionately frequent in poetry.” *Hyge* appears 6 times in prose and 132 times in poetry, *ferhð* only once in prose and 85 times in poetry, and *sefa* 21 times in prose and 93 times in poetry.²⁶² We might argue that the surviving prose corpus is larger than the poetic one and this might be one of the reasons behind these ratios, but this is not clearly the case here. We must

²⁶¹ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 51: examples 1 and 4.

²⁶² Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 29.

give credit to Harbus when she refers to Roberta Frank's article²⁶³ and writes that when these terms occur in prose, they must witness occasional but deliberate instances of poetic diction used in prose. She also calls our attention to the fact that in the list of such rare occurrences compiled by Frank, "mind words are especially well represented,"²⁶⁴ and actually, all three simplexes mentioned above appear, mostly besides words describing nature (*heolstor, folde*) and man (*wiga, guma*).

Still, although even simplex mind-words seem to occur most often in poetry (except for *mod* and *gemynd*), it is doubtful that the sole existence of them should be explained completely by the particulars of Old English poetic diction. Kennings and repetitions are common features of Anglo-Saxon poems, there are several examples where mind-words appear in clusters, and in many cases they are mostly considered as synonymous; but given the central nature of the human mind in Anglo-Saxon England, as evidenced by its "densely populated lexical field," it seems unimaginable that these nouns were mostly employed interchangeably.

Some scholars, as I have stated, argue for this, and state that the mind-lexemes were not synonymous at all. Although I agree with those who do not believe in the *scop* choosing the words simply for the sake of alliterations and poetic repetitions, I find shortcomings of such argumentations, too. The primary problem is that we do not have enough evidence to help us clarify the precise meanings of specific mind-lexemes. It is also apparent from the surviving texts that the semantic fields of the simplexes, just as the compounds, overlapped at many points, and that there was a large semantic flexibility within this group of words. When Harbus tries to demonstrate the distinct nature of some of the lexemes, she brings quotations to support her claims, and lists them as clear instances where we can face examples of mind clusters that are syntactically not parallel constructions. One of these citations is certainly very convincing at first sight, and corresponds to the one I cited in chapter 2.3.1. After mentioning Phillips's treatment of mind-vocabulary, she follows him in quoting the

²⁶³ Frank, Roberta. "Poetic Words in Late Old English Prose." In *From Anglo-Saxon to Early Middle English: Studies Presented to E. G. Stanley*, edited by Malcolm Godden, Douglas Gray, and Terry Hoad, 87-107. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

²⁶⁴ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 30.

passage from Ælfric's *Catholic Homilies* where Ælfric glosses Latin with Old English words while commenting on the soul.²⁶⁵

Harbus's comment on this passage is that on its basis it seems clear that for Ælfric all the above cited words belong under one main heading: *sawul*; and, from among the other words, *mod* glosses two Latin lexemes *mens* and *animus*, thus covering a broad semantic field; and all the others only one. The text clearly indicates that in this case the mind-words were not regarded as synonyms, but were employed for different concepts. Harbus also calls our attention to the fact that although there were differences between *mens* and *animus*, the Old English gloss does not follow this observation by using only one gloss for the two; which also indicates how impossible it is to translate one language into the other, one culture into the other. However, keeping the classical vs. vernacular tradition in mind, Harbus's observations must be commented here, as the text indicates one more thing that she neglects to mention, namely the contemporary differences in the approach to the concept of mind. Ælfric provides only one reading, and his views must not be interpreted as the default ones. He is an author representing the learned, classical tradition – though sometimes influenced by the vernacular ways – and as a consequence, this understanding of the mind cannot serve as decisive evidence at all to show that *sawul* incorporated *mod*, making the Anglo-Saxon mind part of the soul, what is more, of chiefly intellectual nature.

Another quotation that Harbus brings in order to demonstrate that the mind-words cannot have been treated as synonyms is a passage from *Beowulf*:

Se ðe eall gem(an)
Garcwealm gumena – him bið grim sefa -,
onginneð geomormod geong(um) cempa
purh hreðra gehygd higes cunnian (ll.: 2042b-45)

²⁶⁵ Ælfric's *Lives of Saints* (Christmas) 180-88. Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 35. and Phillips, *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, 16. "Heo [seo sawul] is on bocum manegum naman gecyged, be hyre weorces þenungum. Hyre nama is anima þæt is sawul and seo nama gelympð to hire life. And spiritus gast gelimpð to hire ymbwlatung. Heo is sensus þæt is andgit oððe felnyss þonne heo gefret. Heo is animus þæt is mod þonne heo wat. Heo is mens þæt is mod þonne heo understent. Heo is memoria þæt is gemynd þonne heo gemanð. Heo is ratio þæt gescead þonne heo toscæt. Heo is voluntas þæt is wylla þonne heo hwæt wyle. Ac swa þeah ealle þas naman syndon sawul." Harbus's translation: "The soul is called many names in books, according to its functions. Its name is *anima*, that is *sawul*, and this name is fitting to its life. And *spiritus*, *gast*, appertains to its contemplation. It is *sensus*, that is *andgit* or *felnyss*, when it perceives. It is *animus*, that is *mod*, when it knows. It is *mens*, that is *mod*, when it understands. It is *memoria*, that is *gemynd*, when it remembers. It is *ratio*, that is *gescead*, when it reasons. It is *voluntas*, that is *wylla*, when it wills something. But nevertheless, all these names are for *sawul*." Both Phillips and – on his basis – Harbus note that the passage comes from Alcuin's *De Animae Ratione* (PL 101.644), which itself derives from Isidore's *Etymologarium* XI.i.12-13.

(He who fully remembers the spear-death of men – his *sefa* will be grim – will begin, sad in *mod*, through the *gehygd* of his *hreþer*, to test the *hyge* of the young champion) - Harbus's rendering²⁶⁶

It is true that *hyge* does not share the same syntactical function as the rest of the mind-words. However, I do not think that it is satisfying evidence here for the careful selection of the words. What is more, there is nothing in the context that definitely rules out *gehygd* and *hyge* being synonymous, as they form an alliterative pair. Harbus' chief claim is that *sefa* and *-mod* do not share an alliteration here, therefore "it makes no sense to assume that they have not been chosen with care."²⁶⁷ Nevertheless, on the one hand, being "grim at *sefa*" might have a very similar meaning to being "sad at *mod*"; on the other hand, the word *mod* cannot be treated as a noun in its own right, as it is part of a compound adjective. Thus, although the example is remarkable for abounding in mind-words, one probably cannot safely draw any far-reaching conclusions concerning the function or semantics of *-mod/mod* here. Further, although the quotation is meant to be an example where *mod* and *sefa* are chosen with care and most probably have distinct meanings, being free from the constraints of alliteration, we must keep in mind that for *geomormod*, a bahuvrihi compound, it might have been impossible to choose a second constituent other than *mod*.²⁶⁸

Her third example, through which she tries to prove that the selection of mind-words is not a common variation, is taken from *Homiletic Fragment II*, where we read:

Gefeoh nu on ferðe ond to frofre geþeoh
 Dryhtne þinum, ond þinne dom arær,
 Heald hordlocan, hyge fæste bind,
 mid modsefan (ll.: 1-4b)²⁶⁹

(Rejoice now in *ferhð* and act as a comfort
 to your lord, and establish your glory,
 hold the *hordloca*, bind fast the *hyge*,
 along with the *modsefa*)

– Harbus's rendering

²⁶⁶ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 32.

²⁶⁷ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 32.

²⁶⁸ For this idea I owe thanks to Dr. Matti Kilpiö at the University of Helsinki. He found that among the *MOD* compounds in Old English poetry where *-mod* is the second element, 42 out of 44 compounds are bahuvrihi ones. As a comparison, there are only 5 *SEFA* compounds, all of them with *-sefa* as the second element, and only one of them (*wissefa*) is a bahuvrihi one. There are no bahuvrihis with *hreþer* or *hyge*, as they never function as the second element of a compound.

²⁶⁹ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 33.

When explaining these lines, Harbus claims that *modsefa* and *hyge* cannot refer to the same notion here, and that “the *ferhð* (a place where emotion is registered) is in a separate category from these and other mind terms which connote an entity ideally requiring restriction.”²⁷⁰ In this latter statement, she can be right, at least considering this particular text. In the *ferhð* one should rejoice, while the “other minds” should be bound or held. However, I cannot see any reason why *modsefa* should be differentiated here from *hordloca* or *hyge*, as all have to be restricted in some way, and they appear as if in a list. Further, *hyge* and *modsefa* appear elsewhere in parallel constructions, as for example in the often-quoted passage from *The Seafarer* (ll. 58-64a), where they doubtlessly form a pair in repetition. Salmon claims that there *modsefa* “seems to be a mere variation for *hyge*,” and examines the connection of the two words through different examples, arriving at the conclusion that it is not only them, but *sefa* and *mod*, as well, that might join the row of synonyms; at least “in suitable contexts.”²⁷¹ Moreover, even though *ferhð* is a receptacle here and thus distinguishes itself from the other words, there are contexts in which it does not restrict itself to a reference to the location of mental powers, but seems closer in meaning to one of the powers itself. Such an example is “ðin ferhþ bemearn” (your *ferhþ* mourned)²⁷² or “he wiste ferhþ guman” (he knew the man’s *ferhþ*),²⁷³ or the compounds *ferhþcleofa*, *ferhþcofa*, or *ferhþloca*, where the word denotes a place rather through the second element of the compound.

Summing up, I would say that although Harbus’s argument that the mind-words must have had clearly distinguishable meanings – though their semantic fields overlap at places – seems plausible and acceptable, the examples she brings cannot without restraints be regarded as decisive proof. In my opinion, even though there existed certain shades of meanings, it is extremely difficult to unravel them. Therefore, I myself follow the moderate standpoint, and agree with those who simply state that the Old English mind-words were used “more or less interchangeably,” and support the idea of near-synonymity. I find one aspect an especially crucial deficiency in this semantic-literary approach to the mind-words. Many scholars, such as Harbus, do not at all distinguish between two traditions, as Godden does. Harbus, for example, tries to define the meanings of mind-words very effectively, but by not focusing upon the differing

²⁷⁰ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 33.

²⁷¹ Salmon, “The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul,” 6.

²⁷² *Genesis* 2309 or *Elene* 174

²⁷³ *Genesis* 2793

classical and vernacular traditions incorporated into the Old English literary texts, she calls for complementation from this aspect when she is trying to give distinct shades of meaning. For example, when she draws the important distinction between our modern concept of the mind and the Anglo-Saxon one, and remarks that we tend “to distinguish the cognitive from the emotional and the spiritual,”²⁷⁴ whereas “in Anglo-Saxon England, it appears that the mind was considered to be a person’s spiritual centre, as well as the seat of emotions and thought,”²⁷⁵ she is only partially correct. In many texts it is clearly so, but in others it is distinguished from the *sawl* or the *gast*,²⁷⁶ so although it can function as a spiritual centre, it is not always such a clear-cut equation.

The existence of several parallel cultural trends, the traditional old views on the mind, the learned classical, and the new Christian ideas all left their marks on the literary manifestation of the Anglo-Saxon mind-vocabulary. When considering the linguistic evidence, this is often forgotten, and therefore what remains is only a confusing mixture of lexical fields, impossible to disentangle, though leaving scholars with a feeling that the mind-words must have some distinct meaning specific to each and every one of them. Without the notion of these cultural traditions living side-by-side, however, nothing can be done.

Furthermore, as a second objection, I would say that a higher priority must be placed on the function of alliteration in the selection of the word. We must keep in mind that in every age there were people who paid particular attention to the workings of the human mind and placed special emphasis on disentangling its functions. Several views have been born, philosophers have been writing volumes on the question from Antiquity until the 21st century. Understanding the mind and the soul is a mission impossible, but whoever writes about the question adds some newer approach to the topic. For people, such as philosophers, dedicating their time to the understanding of the human mind and its workings, the question is a much more settled and cleared area. They are able to draw a distinction between *mod*, *sefa*, *hyge*, *ferhð*, and the other mind-words; and may insist that they might be enclosed in separate “boxes”, considered as notions of entirely different though similar and related categories. When Ælfric, Alcuin, Isidore or Boethius treat the question of the mind, they all seem to see clearly concerning its hows

²⁷⁴ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 38.

²⁷⁵ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 38.

²⁷⁶ See, for example, Godden, “Anglo-Saxons on the Mind,” 288-291.

and whys, as they were all thinkers preoccupied with philosophical issues. However, we must not forget that all these approaches remain subjective to a certain degree. As every one of us is an individual, we all have an individual view on the world, we perceive it in sometimes very, sometimes only slightly, different ways. Also, everyone's perception, just as that of Ælfric or any of the philosophers of the mind, is formed by or often firmly based on previous "philosophising" on the issue; therefore the way the question is dealt with is not only individualistic and subjective, but also influenced by or even committed to some previous approach. Therefore those in whose focus of interest the mind stood always seem to see clearly and more categorically than others. For them, the functions of the mental faculty are more clear-cut, much more settled. Their statements about it appear authoritative and with their resoluteness and firm standpoint, they leave their mark on our understanding and approach as well. We should not be misled, however, by thinking that these authorities must give the final word on the question. When Ælfric glosses Latin words and explains what the soul and what, for example, *mod* is, he does not necessarily reflect the average or the sole understanding of the faculties. He does not even regard it as a partly emotional agency, even though the surviving texts testify that *mod* was used in contexts involving emotions in high frequency. This fact therefore demonstrates that there must have been differing views of the mind-words, and even though we have authoritative statements about the question, they might not exactly reflect the one and only truth, but form an individual approach which may or may not have been influenced by a lot of reading, and thinking about other authorities. Nevertheless, if the person who wrote down these words in any of the documents that have come down to us is not a particularly learned and well-read individual, or his aim is not a special focus on differentiating the workings of the mind, we might as well get a new image of the mental faculty. A new image in which the borderlines are not that sharp, the categories fall together, and words that represent distinct entities for the thinker, the philosopher, are treated as mere synonyms.

When an average man talks about the mind nowadays, it is not entirely sure that she or he will carefully distinguish reason, intellect and understanding, soul and spirit. These distinct concepts mingle into one and become mere synonyms for the mind for many, whereas a philosopher would immediately tell the difference – or rather an individual, subjective notion of difference – between them. It was certainly not otherwise in Anglo-Saxon times, either. For most of the people, they must have been

relatively synonymous lexemes, even though deeper consideration of them might have encouraged everyone to find more differences between the words' meanings. And especially for the poet, who – because of the rules of Old English poetic diction – was in need of a great number of words that could be used interchangeably, the main concern in many cases was certainly their similarity and not their difference. Therefore, even though there must have been some connotative difference between many mind-words, in most sources these do not come very clearly and directly to the surface. As a consequence, to me, the choice whether *hyge*, *sefa*, or *modsefa*, etc. is selected by the *scop* in a given context is rather a matter of poetic considerations, many times a routine, or casual practice, since the distinction between them is so minute. This does not mean, however, that I argue in favour of these words' entire synonymy, but rather for their individual use and understanding.

All in all, from the above summary, it seems clear that no matter how painstakingly one tries to distinguish different meanings for these lexemes, it is impossible. Even if we take the instances where the words occur outside the confines of alliteration, we find that most of the above listed lexemes, especially *hyge*, *ferhð* and *sefa*, share the majority of their meanings and may stand for “disposition” or “mind”, “consciousness.” There is a huge semantic overlap between these words, and we cannot by any means agree on clearly distinct meanings. The best standpoint, therefore, is a moderate one, not mistaking tendencies for rules, and perhaps agreeing with Harbus' final summary of her treatment of simplexes that

[...] rather than viewing the ‘mind’ vocabulary as a group of exactly interchangeable synonyms governed entirely by the requirements of alliteration, we might prefer to interpret this lexicon and its deployment in the extant poetic corpus as a range of polysemous terms which cover variously overlapping segments of a huge and culturally significant concept, ‘mind’.²⁷⁷

²⁷⁷ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 49.

3. The Corpus Research

After the presentation of the various approaches scholars have taken concerning the Anglo-Saxon mind-vocabulary and the changes in the concept of the mind through the Middle Ages and before, the following chapters will introduce a detailed analysis of the semantic changes of the two main lexemes: *mod/mood* and *gemynd/minde*. The discussion will be based on different principles than those of the previous works on the mind-words, as it will start out of the entire surviving corpus of Old and Middle English texts. The analysis, therefore, will first show how the two words changed their meanings in the time-span between the late 9th and the beginning of the 16th century – from period to period and dialect to dialect. Starting out from the surviving texts and looking at all the occurrences of the words and their possible meanings must provide a reliable basis for exploring how the medieval English ideas about the mind developed, and how the English lexicon reflects this development. By an objective corpus-based analysis, it is possible to trace the shift from *mod* to *minde*, and it will serve as excellent grounds for answering the question why this semantic shift took place. This new approach will try to place the question into a different light and supplement the finds of the previous decades with novel ideas and further insight. After the introduction to my corpus building principles and the difficulties I faced during the work, I will present the guidelines for my analysis and for the interpretation of lexemes. In the second half of the chapter, I will present the results of my research.

3.1. Guiding Principles for Building the Corpus

During the corpus research, first a pilot study was carried out, using the diachronic part of the *Helsinki Corpus of English Texts*.²⁷⁸ The results of this study will also be presented here for the sake of comparison, and because the two analyses reinforce and cross-check each other. The *Helsinki Corpus* was compiled at the University of Helsinki in 1991. It contains altogether about 1.5 million running words and covers approximately one thousand years in the history of English literacy, comprising examples from the earliest surviving texts of the Old English period until 1710. All the three major periods (OE, ME, EModE) have been given further subdivisions, each

²⁷⁸ *The Helsinki Corpus of English Texts*. Helsinki: Department of English, University of Helsinki, 1991.

covering a span of 70-100 years. Further details on these subdivisions are given in Table 1.²⁷⁹

Table 1. – The subperiods and word-counts of the *Helsinki Corpus*

Subperiod	Years	Words	Prose	Poetry
OE1	– 850	2,190	1,960	230
OE2	850 – 950	92,050	91,680	370
OE3	950 – 1050	251,630	174,010	77,620
OE4	1050 – 1150	67,380	67,380	–
Subtotal		413,250	335,030	78,220

ME1	1150 – 1250	113,010	92,760	20,250
ME2	1250 – 1350	97,480	31,210	66,270
ME3	1350 – 1420	184,230	140,380	43,850
ME4	1420 – 1500	213,850	193,750	20,100
Subtotal		608,570	458,100	150,470

EModE1	1500 – 1570	190,160	179,590	10,570
EModE2	1570 – 1640	189,800	189,800	–
EModE3	1640 – 1710	171,040	171,040	–
Subtotal		551,000	540,430	10,570

TOTAL		1,572,800		
--------------	--	------------------	--	--

The first difficulty I had to face while collecting the examples from the *Helsinki Corpus* was not only that there are several inflected forms of the nouns that had to be found, but the large number of spelling variants I came across. Without an established written standard, some imaginative power is required to find all the forms of the same word appearing in different texts. Table 2 below shows the variants of *mod* and *gemynd* in the *Helsinki Corpus*. The number in brackets indicates the number of instances of

²⁷⁹ For a full description of the Helsinki Corpus, see: Kytö, Merja. *Manual to the Diachronic Part of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts: Coding Conventions and Lists of Source Texts*. Helsinki: Department of English, University of Helsinki, 1996. accessible at: <http://khnt.hit.uib.no/icame/manuals/HC/INDEX.HTM>

each spelling variant in each period. It can clearly be seen that the spelling variants get more diverse by the end of Middle English. We can also detect how the frequent *ge-* prefix of *gemynd* gradually became obsolete, first being shortened into *i-* in ME1, then rapidly going out of use. This process indicates the general EModE tendency of the deletion of this prefix.²⁸⁰

Table 2. – Spelling variants and inflected forms in Old and Middle English

Period	mod / mood	gemynd / minde	memorie	remembraunce
OE1	-	-	-	-
OE2	mode (38) modes (27) modum (1)	gemynd (7) gemynde (2)	-	-
OE3	mod (85) mode (128) modes (68)	gemynd (32) gemynde (13) gemyndum (9)	-	-
OE4	mod (16) mode (15) modes (7) modis (1) modo (1)	gemynd (5) gemyndae (1) gemynde (5)	-	-
ME1	mod (7) mode (13)	imynde (1)	-	-
ME2	mode (6) mood (1)	minde (2) mynde (7)	memorie (2)	-
ME3	mod (2) mode (12)	minde (3) muynde (2) myende (2) mynd (1) mynde (39) myndes (1)	memoire (1) memorye (2)	remembraunce (2)
ME4	mode (1) moed (2) moede (1) mood (1)	mend (2) mende (13) mynd (4) mynde (47) myndes (1)	memoire (1) memorie (5) memory (10) memorye (2)	remembrance (6) remembraunce (6)

Looking at Table 2, we can observe that the OE1 period of the *Helsinki Corpus* contains no example of either of the two words; their first appearance is in OE2, in texts such as Alfredian translations, for example *Cura Pastoralis*, Boethius' *De consolacione*

²⁸⁰ See, for example: Rissanen, Matti. "The Loss of Wit 'Know': Evidence from the Helsinki Corpus." In *English Far and Wide: A Festschrift for Inna Koskeniemi*, edited by R. Hiltunen and others, 195-206. Turku: University of Turku, 1993.

Philosophiae, or Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica*. ME1 has only few examples, which is due to the relatively low number of surviving manuscripts from this time, a period that can be called a transitional one. On the one hand, in ME1 the syntactic, morphological, lexical changes characteristic of Middle English were only in the starting phase. On the other hand, most works dating back to these years are copies of earlier OE sources, and the usage found in the manuscripts of this era thus reflects the language of the preceding centuries. From ME2 and ME3 two other words were included in the table. These are *memorie* (ME2) and *remembraunce* (ME3). It is essential to mention them, as we will later see that the appearance of these French loanwords must have contributed to the gradual disappearance of *minde* with the meaning “memory.”

Even though the Old English part of the *Helsinki Corpus* is smaller in size than the *Dictionary of Old English Database* (also called *DOE* or the *Toronto Corpus*),²⁸¹ it is a very well balanced one. It contains about one seventh of the material of the *Toronto Corpus*, and indeed, its material was drawn from the text files of the *DOE*. When compiling the *Helsinki Corpus*, careful consideration was given to make it as representative as possible, and this gives it its balanced nature. The corpus was created to present as many different genres and dialects as possible in a selection of about 400 texts. Taking even sociolinguistic factors into consideration (relevant from Middle English on), the *Helsinki Corpus* presents a rich and diverse compilation of works from a wide variety of text types. Table 3 gives the list of text types for Old and Middle English, the two periods relevant from the point of view of my research.²⁸²

²⁸¹ <http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/o/oec/> edited by Antonette di Paolo Healey; Centre for Medieval Studies, University of Toronto. This database is a complete collection of all surviving Old English texts, with the exception of the variants of some manuscripts. As compared to the 400 texts included in the *Helsinki Corpus*, the *Toronto Corpus* has 3037.

²⁸² For further details, see: Kytö, Merja, Matti Rissanen and Minna Palander-Collin, eds. *Early English in the Computer Age: Explorations through the Helsinki Corpus*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1993. Kytö, Merja. *Manual to the Diachronic Part of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts: Coding Conventions and Lists of Source Texts*. Helsinki: Department of English, University of Helsinki, 1996. <http://khnt.hit.uib.no/icame/manuals/HC/INDEX.HTM>

Table 3. – Text types of the *Helsinki Corpus* in Old and Middle English

Text Type	Old English	Middle English	Text Type	Old English	Middle English
Bible	+	+	Philosophy	+	+
Biography: Life of Saint	+	+	Preface	+	+
Document	+	+	Private Letter	–	+
Drama: Mystery Play	–	+	Proceeding: Deposition	–	+
Fiction	+	+	Religious Treatise	+	+
Geography	+	–	Romance	–	+
Handbook: Astronomy	+	+	Rule	+	+
Handbook: Medicine	+	+	Sermon	–	+
Handbook: Other	–	+	Science: Astronomy	+	–
History	+	+	Science: Medicine	–	+
Homily	+	+	Travelogue	+	+
Law	+	+	X ²⁸³	+	+
Official Letter	–	+			

Thanks to the balanced nature of the database, even though the number of instances is modest compared to the much larger *Toronto Corpus*, the results can give an excellent insight into the gradual semantic development of words and provide us with very good approximations. The *Helsinki Corpus* has already proved to be helpful in investigating long-term changes in the language; therefore, even the pilot study, which was first carried out – using solely this database – illuminates the shift of the two meanings of the two words very well.

However, for the reason of this relatively modest number of *gemynd/minde*, *mod/mood* examples, the compilation of a larger, yet still representative, corpus was required for both Old and Middle English. This was carried out based on other available electronic corpora: the above-mentioned *Dictionary of Old English Database* and, for

²⁸³ The category X can only be found in the Old English part and in ME1 and ME2. The manual of the *Helsinki Corpus* uses this abbreviation for “undefined” text types.

Middle English, the *Chadwyck-Healey Individual Literature Collections*²⁸⁴ and *The Middle English Compendium*.²⁸⁵

3.1.1. The Old English Part

The guiding principles to the compilation of the extended corpus were manifold. On the one hand, for the Old English part, all the poetry was taken from the *DOE* database, thus raising the number of words of the *Helsinki Corpus* by roughly one hundred thousand: from 78,040 to 177,833. As for the prose part, all Old English prose was taken from the Helsinki collection, but this time in their entirety, since in many cases, the *Helsinki Corpus* contains only fragments of a text. Further sources were added from the Toronto prose material, keeping it in mind that as many different text types, periods and dialects should be present as possible, ensuring both diachronic and diatopic coverage for my work. The first problem I encountered here is that unnecessary duplication had to be avoided, taking, for example, different – but mainly identical – manuscript versions of the same sermon, psalter glosses, etc. As a consequence, the extra texts added from the *DOE* database had to be treated with due consideration. From the *Lindisfarne Gospels* only Luke, from the *Rushworth Gospels* only Matthew, and from the *West Saxon Gospels* only John was included in the material, based on the selection of the *Helsinki Corpus*. Moreover, the amount of homilies would be disproportionately large if all the surviving texts had been taken. Therefore, a selection had to be made, keeping the balance of different homily types. Consequently, the *Blickling* and *Vercelli Homilies* form about half of all the homilies in the corpus, representing the Gallican tradition; and the homilies of Wulfstan and Ælfric constitute the other half, that of the Benedictine tradition. For keeping this balance, all the twelve *Blickling Homilies* were taken in their entirety, just as all of Wulfstan's homilies.²⁸⁶ Of Ælfric's homilies, a selection had to be made, based on the *Helsinki Corpus* choice and those which seemed more promising from the point of view of the two words examined. These are marked by Cameron numbers: B1.2.2, B1.2.8, B1.2.11, B1.2.15, B1.2.27 and

²⁸⁴ <http://lion.chadwyck.co.uk/> and <http://collections.chadwyck.com/>

²⁸⁵ <http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/mec>

²⁸⁶ Although the Wulfstan canon is debatable, I followed: Healey and Venezky. *A Microfiche Concordance to Old English*. Thus, the following homilies (listed by their Cameron numbers) comprise the Wulfstan collection in my extended corpus: B2.1.1, B2.1.2, B2.1.3, B2.1.4, B2.1.5, B2.2.1, B2.2.2, B2.2.3, B2.2.4, B2.2.5, B2.2.6, B2.2.7, B2.2.8, B2.2.9, B2.2.10, B2.3.1, B2.3.2, B2.3.3, B2.3.4, B2.3.5, B2.3.6, B2.4.1, B2.4.2.A, B2.4.2.B, B2.4.2.C, B2.4.3. (Newark, Del.: University of Delaware, 1980).

B1.2.29.²⁸⁷ Of the supplementary collection edited by Pope,²⁸⁸ all the eighteen texts were included from the second volume, thus from *Domenica V Pentecostem* to the addition to *Catholic Homilies 44*: ‘Paulus scripsit ad Thesalonicenses’, with the exception of the two last texts: addition to *De Auguriis (Lives of Saints 17)* and the passages from *De Virginitate*. Concerning the *Vercelli Homilies*, none are represented in the *Helsinki Corpus*, but for the analysis, seven of them were chosen to maintain the balance, two of which – namely numbers 4 and 7 from Förster’s edition, following the *DOE* database material²⁸⁹ – especially due to the fact that they contain the words examined.

Evidently, the categories of the *Toronto Corpus* regarding text types are different from those of the *Helsinki Corpus*. While in Table 3 we could see that there are numerous genres differentiated in the latter one, the *DOE* database uses only the categories defined by the Cameron numbers:²⁹⁰

A	Poetry
B	Prose
C	Interlinear Glosses
D	Glossaries
E	Runic Inscriptions
F	Inscriptions in the Latin Alphabet

The diachronic coverage of the database is also very important. Ideally, a corpus contains texts from all periods of the time-span to be studied, if possible, spreading evenly on the time-line. As shown above, in Table 1, the *Helsinki Corpus* follows the traditional division (OE, ME, EModE), and besides, it further subdivides the three linguistic periods. In case of Old English, the four subperiods comprise one hundred

²⁸⁷ Godden, Malcolm, ed. *Aelfric’s Second Series of ‘Catholic Homilies’: The Text and Manuscript Tradition*. [Dissertation, Cambridge, 1970]. Godden, Malcolm, ed. *Aelfric’s Catholic Homilies. The Second Series*, EETS SS 5. London: Kegan Paul, 1979.

²⁸⁸ Pope, J. C. *Homilies of Aelfric: A Supplementary Collection*, 2 vols., EETS 259, 260. London: Kegan Paul, 1967-8.

²⁸⁹ Förster, Max. *Die Vercelli-Homilien: I-VIII. Homilie*, Bib. ags. Prosa 12. Hamburg, 1932. Reprinted. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964.

²⁹⁰ Cameron, Angus. “A List of Old English Texts.” In *A Plan for the Dictionary of Old English*, edited by Roberta Frank and Angus Cameron, 29-267. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973. Healey, Antonette di Paulo and Richard L. Venezky. *A Microfiche Concordance to Old English*. Newark: University of Delaware, 1980.

years each. Here, however, I must note that concerning early texts, it is often impossible to define the date of composition. Manuscripts are most often several steps removed from their originals, they are copies and copies of copies. In several cases the scribe made a dialect translation and used linguistic forms different from the original. Due to this, the decisive factor in grouping the texts in the *Helsinki Corpus* was always the date of the manuscript. In my extended analysis, I followed this method, but I had to face the problem that the *DOE* does not have this division. So, the dates of the texts which were added to the Helsinki material had to be defined in order to be able to see the process and direction of the gradual semantic change. This was done by consulting the sources used by the compilers of the Toronto material, checking exactly which manuscript version was used and what the scholarly agreement is on the dating of the given manuscript in order to find the subperiod in each and every case.

Table 4. – Text types and word-counts of the Old English corpora

Text Type	Helsinki Corpus	Extended Corpus
Bible	57,020	218,577
Biography: Lives of Saints	23,615	136,766
Document	14,790	15,047
Fiction	6,530	6,544
Geography	1,690	1,891
Handbook: Astronomy	3,350	15,454
Handbook: Medicine	17,410	51,531
History	52,280	193,748
Homily	27,370	113,016
Law	17,140	22,824
Philosophy	13,000	50,590
Preface	3,960	4,860
Religious Treatise	44,120	97,073
Rule	25,280	69,899
Science: Astronomy	9,430	34,909
Travelogue	7,290	7,270
<i>Prose altogether:</i>	324,275	1,039,999
<i>Poetry:</i>	78,040	177,833

As I have already mentioned, by building the extended corpus, the guiding principle was to enlarge the material in a well-balanced way, following the categorisation of the *Helsinki Corpus*. All in all, the total number of words in the new corpus has grown significantly. As we shall soon see, there does not exist an accurate word-count list for the whole Old English material, therefore the numbers given here serve only as close approximations based on the most precise list available. As for poetic texts, the number of words has increased to 177,833 instead of the original 78,040, as I have already indicated. The prose part of the new corpus has tripled, too. It now contains 1,039,999 words as compared to the previous 324,275. This, in a comparative list of text-types looks as in Table 4 on the previous page.

During the pilot study, frequency-counts were carried out to get the most precise data. The *Helsinki Corpus* material has word-count lists for each subperiod, as Table 1 shows. For the sake of the extended corpus, new word-counts were needed, to include all the material added to it. During this, however, I had to realise that there is no precise word-count list existing (and this is why the above numbers can only be called approximations). The starting point was Peter Mielke's *DOE* database word-count list,²⁹¹ which contains all the works included in the *Toronto Corpus*, arranged according to their Cameron Number. This list was later updated by separating the number of foreign words in the given texts from the Old English words. My first problem was that I could not see clearly what the principles were in deciding what to call "foreign word", but this difficulty seemed negligible compared to the other one. There were surprisingly great differences between the numbers given by the two lists, even when adding up the number of "foreign" and "native" words in a text. Taking for example *Genesis A,B* in Krapp's edition²⁹² (Cameron Number: A1.1), we find that the old list gives 17,082 words altogether. The new list (intended to be more accurate than the old one), which was supposed to avoid foreign words, counts 20,242 Old English and 19 other words; this amounts to a large difference which cannot be accepted: the extra 3,179 words in the new list is as much as 18.6% more than the original number. Looking at the other texts of the *DOE* database, I found that on average the difference between the numbers is about ten percent. To decide which data to use, I had to make some simple word-counts myself and found that Mielke's original list could be preferred, as it is much

²⁹¹ Acquired from an email sent by Dr. Peter Mielke <peter@doe.utoronto.ca> to Dr. Matti Kilpiö <mkilpio@cc.helsinki.fi> on 24 Nov 2001.

²⁹² Krapp, George Philip. *The Junius Manuscript*, ASPR 1. New York, 1931.

more accurate (even though it does not separate the foreign words from the Old English ones). In the end, however, seeing the unreliability of the two word-counts, I decided to avoid using either of them for the calculations based on the extended corpus. As a consequence, frequency-counts are provided only for the pilot study data. For the extended corpus, simple percentages should suffice. For any future semantic study, the compilation of a reliable list is desirable, however, within the confines of this thesis, this could not be carried out. The tables provided above with the different text-types should serve as points of orientation for any further analysis once such a list is available. A short comparison of some other examples of Mielke's two word-counts can be found in Table 5 below in order to demonstrate their problematic nature and why they were not used.

Table 5. – A comparison of word-counts

Title	Cameron Number	New List		Old List	Difference	Percentage
		Old English	Foreign Words			
The Phoenix ²⁹³	A 3.4	4,336	26	3,731	631	16.9%
Caedmon's Hymn ²⁹⁴	A 32.1	48	0	42	6	14.3%
Martyrology ²⁹⁵	B 19.1	1,459	2	1,301	115	8.9%
The Rushworth Gospels ²⁹⁶	C 8.2.1	24,987	16,670	36,299	5,358	14.8%

3.1.2. The Middle English Part

The Middle English part of the *Helsinki Corpus* was extended in another way. As so far no full database for Middle English prose is available, except for what could be found in *The Middle English Compendium*, this part of the original material could not be enlarged to a considerable extent. Consequently, the *Helsinki Corpus* texts were taken – which amounts to roughly half a million words, more than 75 percent of its

²⁹³ *The Phoenix*: Krapp, George Philip and Elliot Dobbie, eds. *The Exeter Book*, ASPR 3. New York, 1936.

²⁹⁴ Northumbrian Version: Dobbie, Elliot. *The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems*, ASPR 6. New York, 1942.

²⁹⁵ Cambridge, Corpus Christi College, MS. 41: Herzfeld, George, ed. *An Old English Martyrology*, EETS OS 116. London: Kegan Paul, Trech, Trübner, 1900. [reprinted: 1973]

²⁹⁶ *The Rushworth Gospels* (Mt): Skeat, Walter W., ed. *The Four Gospels in Anglo-Saxon, Northumbrian, and Old Mercian Versions*. Cambridge, 1871-87. [Reprinted: Darmstadt, 1970.]

Middle English material – and all the prose texts found in the *Compendium*. The *Compendium* itself is a collection of three Middle English electronic resources and offers an easily searchable and interconnected database of these, namely the electronic version of the *Middle English Dictionary*, a *Hyperbibliography* of Middle English prose and verse, and *The Corpus of Middle English Prose and Verse*, a large collection of literary material from the period between 1100 and 1500, forming the electronic full-text archive of the *Middle English Dictionary*.²⁹⁷ This latter part of the *Compendium*, more precisely its prose texts, served as the basis for my research. For poetry, the *Chadwyck-Healey Individual Literature Collections* was used – also known as *Literature Online*.²⁹⁸ This is a collection of more than 339,600 poems from the eighth century to the present day, as well as that of monographs, articles and literary dictionaries. At the beginning of my corpus-building, I started out from the old version of the *Chadwyck-Healey Database*, where there were separate collections for medieval poetry, ballads, romances and drama. Since that, an updated version of the corpus has appeared, which does not treat ballads and romances separately. As for reference, considering the current version of this electronic database, the two collections which formed the bases of my enlarged corpus are: *English Drama (1280-1915)* of which Medieval English Drama contains 248 individual plays, and *English Poetry (600-1900)*, of which Medieval English Poetry – not taking Anglo-Saxon Poetry into consideration – contains several hundred works of altogether 58 authors.

As the time divisions of the *Helsinki Corpus* is a useful backbone to the research, I decided to categorize all the works thus collected into the above mentioned subperiods: ME1, ME2, ME3 and ME4, through which it is easier to trace the changes of meaning. Also, since the geographical distribution of the lexemes in the given centuries is an intriguing question, as well, the dialects of the texts had to be defined, too. In case of the material directly taken from the Helsinki collection, all the data needed were at hand, as the compilers of the database had laid emphasis on the precise grouping of texts and on the manifold classification. Besides date and provenance, other remarks have been added to the sources, such as the age, social rank, sex of the author (where applicable), text type, degree of intimacy in the relationship of the author and the audience, the existence of any foreign original, and many more. In the instances, however, where the

²⁹⁷ <http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/mec>

²⁹⁸ <http://collections.chadwyck.com/> and <http://lion.chadwyck.co.uk/>

text was taken from the *Compendium* or the *Chadwyck-Healey Database*, date and provenance had to be defined individually. In each and every case – similarly to what I did to the texts coming from the *Toronto Corpus* – the editions used by the compilers of the corpora were traced in order to find out which manuscript versions had been used in their database. Then, setting out on this track, the available literature was consulted for the definition of the date and provenance. In a few cases, tracing the manuscripts and finding a scholarly consensus regarding the date and provenance was impossible. For the sake of accuracy, later only those sources were included in the corpus where the manuscript could be precisely dated and localized without the shadow of doubt.

Unfortunately, the lack of precise word-counts hinder the research here, as well. I consulted Christina Powell, of the University of Michigan²⁹⁹ for the word-counts of the medieval texts of the *Chadwyck-Healey* corpus, and this way I was informed that there are 4,505,407 words within the texts, including words that might occur within tags. This, however, is not enough for carrying out frequency-counts, because there exist no detailed word-counts for every individual work, which would support research on the level of dialectal distribution and the four subperiods of Middle English. Without such bases for comparison, only percentages can be calculated, but even this has proved to be enough to follow the semantic change from century to century, from dialect to dialect. For the sake of comparison, however, the frequency-counts gained through the pilot study will also be included.

3.2. The “Meaning-Groups” of the Pilot Study

As the first step of the pilot study, the *Oxford English Dictionary* and the Bosworth-Toller *Anglo-Saxon Dictionary* were consulted. Their classifications have been taken into consideration, but their definitions often seemed to be arbitrary, and their taxonomy was detailed to such an extent that it only added to the difficulties of the analysis. Therefore, the corpus data were grouped into two main “meaning-groups” or “basic meanings”.³⁰⁰ In the case of *mod/mood* it was EMOTIONAL MIND³⁰¹ and

²⁹⁹ Coordinator, Humanities Text Initiative and Coordinator, Encoded Text Services.

³⁰⁰ There has been a long discussion about what to call these “basic meanings.” Perhaps the most accepted name is “prototype” now. I do not wish to dwell on these linguistic considerations, since simply the definition of the term “prototype” itself and the summary of the debates surrounding prototype theory would fill volumes. Therefore, I employed my own terms “basic meaning” and “meaning-group” in order to avoid

RATIONAL MIND/SPIRITUAL SELF, whereas the examples for *gemynd/minde* were divided between MEMORY and MIND (this latter in both rational and emotional senses). So, when examining *mod/mood*, the semantic field of mental processes was reconsidered in terms of emotional and rational features, as a shift is expected in Middle English towards today's meaning "mood", which is essentially showing an emotional feature. However, in the latter instance of *gemynd/minde*, the basic meaning of MIND was not further divided into rational and emotional categories, as this distinction is not significant here. Still, before presenting the data, it has to be noted that the distinction is not always clear-cut – especially in the case of *gemynd/minde* – and sometimes trying to figure out to which basic meaning a certain example belongs is comparable to balancing on a tight-rope. Overlaps between the rational and the emotional were expected and found, and at times only a certain general reference to mental faculties was gained. As the main purpose was to highlight how the emotional meaning supersedes all the others, the instances of general reference were listed under the meaning-group of RATIONAL MIND/SPIRITUAL SELF. And also, as this ambiguous heading suggests, it is frequently impossible to decide whether the word refers to the human mind or the soul and inner man.

3.2.1. mod/mood

3.2.1.1. The "basic meaning" EMOTIONAL MIND

Besides the basic meanings, the preliminary charts made for the pilot study included some basic subgroups within them, as well. They were to show the possible shades of meanings and to indicate the possibility of overlaps in many cases. For *mod/mood*, EMOTIONAL MIND comprises "anger", "arrogance", "pride" and "fury" (all of them under one heading), "courage"; "magnificence"; "heart" (the general

going into these linguistic debates, as I believe that these terms are neutral enough to be used freely. Moreover, I believe that what they stand for is clear enough, even under these names. For those still interested in the debates surrounding "prototypes", I can recommend the following works: Rosch, Eleanor. "Structural bases of prototypicality effects," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 2. (1976): 491-502. Lakoff, George. *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987. Geeraerts, Dirk. "Prospects and problems of prototype theory," *Linguistics* 3-2. (1989): 219-231. Taylor, John R. *Linguistic Categorisation: Prototypes in Linguistic Theory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1989] 1995. Geeraerts, Dirk. *Diachronic Prototype Semantics: A Contribution to Historical Lexicology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.

³⁰¹ The "meaning-groups" or "basic meanings" will always be indicated by capital letters in my dissertation.

emotional colouring of a reference to the mental faculty, centre of emotions); and finally “mood” (the emotional state signifying today's meaning).

anger / arrogance / pride / fury

Wæs merefixa *mod* onhrered; þær me wið laðum licsyrce min, heard, hondlocen, helpe gefremede, beadohrægl broden on breostum læg, golde gegyrwed. (*Beowulf*, ll.: 549-553a)³⁰²

Him þær sar gelamp, æfst and oferhygd, and þæs engles *mod* þe þone unræd ongan ærest fremman, wefan and weccan, [...] (*Genesis*, ll.: 28-31a)

courage

Swylce þær [U]nferþ þyle æt fōtum sæt frean Scyldinga; gehwylc hiora his ferhþe treowde, þæt he hæfde *mod* micel, þeah þe he his magum nære arfæst æt ecga gelacum (*Beowulf*, ll.: 1165b-1168a)

magnificence

Mycel *mod* and strang þines mægenðrymmes and þine halignesse holdes modes wise wordum sprecað, weredum secggeað eall þin wundur wide mære (*Metrical Psalms*, Psalm 144: 13-16)

heart

For þæm þingum, min *mod* is gelustfullod, and ic cyðe þa blisse on minre tungan, and on þæm tohopan ic me syððan gereste (*Paris Psalter*; Psalm 15: 9)

mood

To wo3e he gan hure 3erne;
þe kyng ne dorste him werne.
Rymenhild was ful of *mode*;
He wep teres of blode. (*King Horn*, ll.: 1417-1420)

3.2.1.2. The “basic meaning” RATIONAL MIND/SPIRITUAL SELF

On the other hand, RATIONAL MIND/SPIRITUAL SELF denotes subcategories such as “general reference / rational faculty” (the cases where nothing more certain can be said than that the reference is not emotional); “thought” (the cognitive features); “inner man / soul”; and finally a “person”, which appears chiefly in the first third of Alfred's *Boethius*, where the author refers to himself.

general reference / rational faculty

Mid þy we þa wel neah stodaþ þam bearwum 7 þæm godsprecum, þa ðohte ic on minum *mode* hwæþer ic meahte ealne middangeard me on onweald geslean [...] (*Alexander's Letters*, 37.1)

thought

Forþon is min hyge geomor, ða ic me ful gemæcne monnan funde, heardsæligne, hygegeomorne, *mod* miþendne, morþor [{}hycgendne{}] (*Wife's Lament*, ll.: 17b-20)

³⁰² The references are always as accurate as possible. Usually the line numbers are given, if they could not be found, the referencing of the electronic corpora was employed. Sometimes the quotations are fragmentary, this is also due to the electronic corpora.

inner man / soul

Forðæm sint to manienne ða ðe hiera synna onfunden habbað, ðætte hie mid wacore *mode* ongieten æfter hire misdædum mid hu miclum godum willan Dryhten tobræt ðone greadan his mildheortnesse [...] (*Cura Pastoralis*, 52.405.7)

person

Forðæm hit wæs symle giet þin gewuna þæt þu woldest ælcum *mode* deglu ðing tæcan 7 selðcuð (*Alfred's Boethius*, 39.126.30)

Here, one short note is needed. This latter usage of the word has been discussed in various books and articles. Kurt Otten's *König Alfred's Boethius*³⁰³ is one of the most important studies on it, and Anne Payne provides further insight through her *King Alfred & Boethius: An Analysis of the Old English Version of the Consolation of Philosophy*. She claims that by employing the word *mod* to stand for Boethius, Alfred "dramatizes a dialogue between forces a man encounters in himself" and adds that "wisdom is the receiver and interpreter of experience; Mod, the part of the human spirit that confronts experience in the present moment, provides the impetus for the dialogue."³⁰⁴ Considering the possible rendering of *mod* into modern English, she does not find a good solution. She notes that most translators favour the word "mind", but even though it is the best of the solutions, "it fails to suggest the combination of acute rational and emotional consciousness of experience in the present which allows the word to stand as the symbol of man."³⁰⁵ Whitney F. Bolton, arguing with Payne, asserts that this usage of *mod* is not a real departure from the original, as even in the Latin version, it is often Boethius's mind that is in the focus of attention, and Philosophy calls Boethius *mens (...) propria luce relicta* (I.m.2, 2), which she considers as a possible source for the OE usage.³⁰⁶

3.2.2. gemynd/minde**3.2.2.1. The "basic meaning" MEMORY**

Turning to our other word, *gemynd/minde*, the basic meaning MEMORY contains the inferential subcategories of "memory(concept)"; "memory (faculty)"; and

³⁰³ Otten, Kurt. *König Alfred's Boethius*. Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1964.

³⁰⁴ Payne, *King Alfred & Boethius: An Analysis of the Old English Version of the Consolation of Philosophy*, 125.

³⁰⁵ Payne, *King Alfred & Boethius: An Analysis of the Old English Version of the Consolation of Philosophy*, 125, fn. 11.

³⁰⁶ Bolton, "How Boethian is Alfred's Boethius?" 155.

“commemoration” / “memorial” / “memorial day.” Memory has been interpreted as a “concept” in the instances where it denotes an event or thing which is remembered, or the act of remembering itself. The term “faculty”, on the other hand, indicates a reference to the special power of the mind by which a person remembers.

memory (concept)

And heora *gemynd* onweg gewat mid þam mylcan hlisan, and Drihten þurhwunað on ecnesse. (*Paris Psalter*, Psalm 9: 7)

memory (faculty)

Gode no syððan of ðam morðorhufe in *gemynd* cumað, wuldorcyninge, ac hie worpene beoð of ðam heaðuwylme in hellegrund, torngegniðlan. (*Elene*, ll.: 1302-1306a)

Gemynd frequently denotes a certain act or ceremony of remembering an event or a person, too. Here, due to the relatively low number of examples, these two possibilities, that is “commemoration” and “commemoration day”, have not been treated separately. Moreover, the notion “memorial” has also been added to this subgroup, since, in terms of its referent, it is related to the above mentioned. As most occurrences are to be found in the *Old English Martyrology*, let me quote one example from this work, where the reference is clearly to “commemoration day”; and another one from the end of *Beowulf*, where the hero – shortly before his death – orders a barrow to be built as his memorial.

commemoration / memorial / commemoration day

On ðone ðreottegan dæg þæs monðes bið ðæs halgan biscopes *gemynd* sancte Hilaries (*Old English Martyrology*; MART 15³⁰⁷)

Hatað heaðomære hlæw gewyrcean beorhtne æfter bæle æt brimes nosan; se scel to *gemyndum* minum leodum heah hlifian on Hronesnæsse (*Beowulf*, ll.: 2802-2805)

3.2.2.2. The “basic meaning” MIND

The word’s other basic meaning is MIND. Most frequently, it signifies either the general, all-comprising term; in other cases it is mainly rational. Here, however, as already stated, a sharp distinction has not been drawn between the two inherent qualities, the rational and emotional, unlike the other base word *mod/mood*, where the major emphasis is on this feature. There, judging from the frequency of occurrence of the emotional overtone, the semantic shift towards the new – merely emotional – meaning is possible to detect. Talking of *gemynd/minde*, only a handful of examples have been highlighted besides the subcategory “general reference” (denoting general

³⁰⁷ Helsinki Corpus reference.

reference to the mental faculty). These are cases with special reference to either “thought” / “intention” / “will” / “desire” or to “care” / “concern” / “attention” and finally to “opinion.” Here again, these groups have not been further subdivided, since the focus of the research is on the distinction between the basic meanings and the shift towards the generic concept of mind.

general reference

Quod he; ‘Is al my myght and *mynde* agon?
Hath wyn bireved me myn eyen sight?’
(*The Summoner’s Tale*, ll.: 406-407)

thought / intention / will / desire

And yitt he failed of his froward *mynde*,
For by Goodes purviaunce, Oure Lady was into Egipte gon!
(*Digby Plays*; DIGBY 97³⁰⁸)

care / concern / attention

Pow þart drede no grevows peynes in þi deyng, for þu xalt haue thy desyre, þat is to haue mor *mynde* of my Passyon þan on þin owyn peyne. (In *The Book of Margery Kempe*; KEMPE I,51³⁰⁹)

opinion

The whiche wirchynges forsoþe, after þe *mynde* of Avicen in (2=0= Canonum\); ben somtyme made symple [...] (*The Cyrurgie of Guy de Chauliac*; CHAUL 577³¹⁰)

3.3. The “Meaning-Groups” of the Extended Corpus³¹¹

When the extended corpus was compiled, the two “basic meanings” were kept for both lexemes for the sake of an easier analysis; and for *gemynd/minde* a third one, MENTION was added. Within them, however, even more meanings were differentiated. As it has been stated, at times it is rather hard to decide exactly what the lexeme denotes in the given context, thus, due to the fuzzy boundaries of the semantic fields, clusters of possible meanings were given to remain as accurate as possible. These clusters did not affect the final categorisation into the two (or three) “basic meanings”, as there are rather sharp boundaries between these.

³⁰⁸ Helsinki Corpus reference.

³⁰⁹ Helsinki Corpus reference.

³¹⁰ Helsinki Corpus reference.

³¹¹ The synoptical table of the “basic meanings” and sub-meanings can be found in the Appendix.

3.3.1. mod/mood

3.3.1.1. The “basic meaning” EMOTIONAL MIND

There are several instances where *mod/mood* points towards a specific emotion or intensified spiritual state, but these examples are rather observable in Old English sources, and mostly poetic texts. They are the ones that mirror the special archaic usage of the word, the meanings observable in some cognates as well; what Godden named “vernacular tradition.” These are the first meanings that become obsolete in Middle English (almost entirely after the 13th century). Although there are a few cases where they are retained even later, as late as the 15th century, they can mostly be found in the North, in for example the York mystery plays, as that of “*the skynners*”³¹² and “*the cordewaners*”.³¹³ Most of the Middle English examples listed here are from ME2, as for instance the excerpt for the Southern text *How the Psalter of our Lady was Made*, or the East-Midland romance *Amys and Amyloun*. *Sir Ferumbras* is from ME3 and belongs to the Southern dialect.

anger – wrath

Wæs merefixa *mod* onhrered; þær me wið laðum licsyrce min, heard, hondlocen, helpe gefremede, beadohrægl broden on breostum læg golde gegyrwed. (*Beowulf*, ll.: 549-553a)

...Hou þat þe fals steward wold Bring him down wiþ *mode*, Sir Amiloun wiþ wordes bold Swore, "Bi him þat Judas... (*Amys and Amyloun*, ll.: 1054-57)

courage

Fynd ongeaton þæt hie hæfdon gewrixled wita unrim þurh heora miclan *mod* and þurh miht godes and þurh ofermetto ealra swiðost. (*Genesis A,B*, ll.: 334b-338)

...to gon on þe pament? Hou mihtest þou wiþ eny *moode* Holde vp þin hondes to þe rode, þat yit aren... (*How the Psalter of our Lady was Made*: 2. S. Ambrosius)

...he strong & stif with-alle & ne batedede noyt is *mod*; Of herte was he hol & sound & pleynede him...(*Sir Ferumbras*)

pride – arrogance

No þæs fela Daniel to his drihtne gespræc soðra worda þurh snytro cræft, þæt þæs a se rica reccan wolde, middangeardes weard, ac his *mod* astah, heah fram heortan; he þæs hearde ongeald. (*Daniel*, ll.: 593-597)

Nænig eft þæs swiþe þurh snyttucraeft in þeode þrym þisses lifes forð gestigeð, þæt him folca weard þurh his halige giefte hider onsende wise geþohtas ond woruldcraeftas, under anes meaht ealle forlæte, þy læs he for wlence

³¹² The entry into Jerusalem upon the Ass

³¹³ The Agony and the Betrayal

wuldorgeofona ful, mon *mode* swið of gemete hweorfe ond þonne forhycge heanspedigran. (*Gifts of Men*, ll.: 18-26)

...þu, fersse man, þat art so stout, And heih of *mod*, and herte proud--- He wole bowe for noþing To man,... (*Speculum Gy de Warewyke*, ll.: 623-626)

...is þe kynedom of heuene"--- Þis is ayein pruide and *mood*, þat bi-nymeþ a Mon his god so good. "I-blesset beo... (The minor poems of the Vernon MS: XXXII. *Hou a man schal lyue parfyty.*)

Some of these meanings sound negative now. The associations that come into one's mind when hearing the nouns *anger*, *pride*, *arrogance* are so different from the positive overtones of *courage* that it seems a mystery how all these contradictory meanings could exist for one single lexeme. I must emphasise again,³¹⁴ however, that they were not necessarily negative and avoidable attributes for the Anglo-Saxons, what is more, in many cases the word only points towards a meaning like "pride" or "anger" and all that can be clearly stated is that it is a rather indefinable state of emotions that gives the person a (sometimes sudden) self-awareness, an emotional satiety, and a will to act for or against something. As a consequence, in some cases it was impossible to find such a specific meaning as above, nevertheless, it is evident that the lexeme stands for this archaic usage of *mod/mood*, where the reference is to the intense mental state, the upsurge of feelings, the intensive state of self-manifestation. In these cases, the inner consciousness is being described, and similarly to the previous meanings, it is close to a state of feelings, but on much more general terms. It is the conscious and independent vernacular mind, the one already described, which connects emotion and thinking with will and action. It is something that arises (usually) in a person, urging him to act, and fight if necessary. This is the usage that appears in *The Battle of Maldon*, when *ofermod* fills Byrhtnoth, and this is the one observable in the following examples, all marked by "X", which stands for this indefinable intensified self and self-awareness. It is interesting to note here, too, that *Sir Ferumbras* abounds in this usage of the word, though it is quite a late and Southern text.³¹⁵

X

Wlance ðeode ne mihton forhabban helpendra pað, merestreames *mod*, ac he manegum gesceod gyllende gryre. (*Exodus*, ll.: 487b-490a)

..."Vs forto robben & to slo! "Rest þe! let þy *mod* ouer go! "Þou hast namo breþere in wold; "Þy fader... (Mannyng, Robert: *The Story of England - De Humilitate Tonewenne, matris Belyni & Brenni*)

³¹⁴ Chapter 2.3.2.

³¹⁵ This usage is mostly retained in the north in later Middle English texts.

...kyng hym vnderstod, His herte wax angry & ful of *mod*, & was ful heghe y-pyyt:
His armes he askede anon... (*Sir Ferumbras*)

X – courage

Forþon hy nu hyrwað haligra *mod*, ða þe him to heofonum hyge staþeliað, witon
þæt se <eðel> ece bideð ealra þære mengu þe geond middangeard dryhtne þeowiað
ond þæs deoran ham wilniað bi gewyrhtum (*Guthlac A,B*, ll.: 65-70a)

... Wald þai neuer fine. Þou giue vs, lauerd, might and *mode*³¹⁶ To luue ai þat es sa
god, And thinc apon... (*The Matins of the Cross*)

X – will – intention

...he meteþ wiþ þat kyng & rideþ til hym wyþ *mod*, & smot him wiþ is swerd
keruyng a sterne strok.. (*Sir Ferumbras*)

...him þe dart; þe dart was cast with such a *mod* þat þorw ys scheld it schet, Ac ys
haberke was... (*Sir Ferumbras*)

Close to this meaning is the one which I define as “full consciousness”, and which is kept mostly for formulaic expressions with *mægen/main*. In these examples, the context does not clearly define an intensified self and an intensified consciousness (although connected to it); the only certain factor that we can read out from the context is that the lexeme here denotes consciousness (be it mind or soul or however we may approach it) as a whole. Norma J. Engberg writes that *mod* in this usage refers to “mental ability” as opposed to the contrasting meaning of *mægen* “physical ability.”³¹⁷ The reason why it is grouped together with the examples of EMOTIONAL MIND is that it clearly shows tendencies common with and possibly inherited from the Anglo-Saxon vernacular tradition – mostly owing to the fixed expression it survives in – and can be considered similar to the above examples of *mod/mood* where the mind carries in itself emotional as well as rational tendencies together, manifesting usually in an urge to act and expressing similar tendencies as the intensive, independent consciousness. Within Old English, a very similar meaning appears outside this collocation. In my analysis it is mentioned as “character”, though always treated together with “full consciousness.” It is fascinating to observe that this usage of the word survived almost only in the north in either the Northern dialect or in Scots, as 31 out of the 36 instances come from this region. In all other dialects, they disappear in ME3 at the latest, the last East-Midland sources being: *The Romaunce of the Sowdone of Babylone and of*

³¹⁶ “Might and mode” is a formulaic expression.

³¹⁷ Engberg, “*Mod-Mægen Balance in Elene, The Battle of Maldon and The Wanderer*,” 212. The article explores the required balance between *mod* and *mægen*, the possible consequences of an imbalance and the ways of repairing it.

Ferumbras his Sone who Conquered Rome and Ywain and Gawain; and from the West-Midlands: *A Mournyng Song of the loue of God*, a poem from the Vernon MS and one occurrence in Layamon's *Brut*.

full consciousness

God is min gewyta, ic wæs þinum fæder swa gehyrsum swa ic fyrrest myhte & fullice hold on *mode* & on mægene & þe æfre on fullon hyldon hold & on fulre luue, þæs me is god gewyta. (*Charter 1487*, 42. (Whitelock 13))

God gifeð gleaw word godspellendum, syleð him *modes* mægen se þe is mihtig kyning and wites wealdend; oft weorðlic reaf on huse men her gedælað. (*Paris Psalter*, Psalm 67: 37-40)

...by my faye; Scho blewe hir horne, with mayne & *mode*, Vn-to þe castelle scho tuke þe waye. In-to þe haulle... (*The Romance and Prophecies of Thomas of Ersseldoune*, ll.: 186-189)

...þe blis of heuyn, and hates sin with main and *mode*, and seses nocht of werkes gude, and in þaire hert... (Poems of Ms. Tiber. E VII (by William Nassyngton?): (*R. Rolle's Form of living*, in verse))

character

Gif ðu hwylcne cræft cunne, bega þone georne: swa swa sorga & embhogan geycan monnes *mod*, swa geycð se cræft his are. (*Proverbs 1*, 58 (Cox))

Within the group of instances belonging to the category EMOTIONAL MIND are, of course, the cases where the intensive, acting vernacular mind cannot be observed in any particulars, the only noticeable feature is that the reference is to emotions instead of cognition. In these cases, the lexeme was indexed as “emotional faculty – mood.” Basically, this is the direction from which today's meaning also emerged. The instances, however, where the word is already used in today's meaning (“state of feelings or mind”) without any doubt, are signalled by “mood.”

emotional faculty – mood

Pa ðam cininge wearð þurh þa mæran word *mod* geblissod, ferhðgefeonde. (*Elene*, l.: 988)

Datianus þa dreorig wearð on *mode*, and swor ðurh ða sunnan, and ðurh ealle his godas, þæt he mid mislicum wutum hine wolde fordon. (*Ælfric's Letters* (George) – 96)

...Hys bold brothyr, Sir Bedwere, Full mykell mornyd in hys *mode*; For sorow he myyte not nyghe hym nere, But euyr... (*Le Morte Arthur*)

...oure hertys sleth þe losse of hym doth marre oure *mood*. ijus consolator Be bettyr neybore nevyr man stood to euyr... (*The Raising of Lazarus*, ll.: 363-366)

mood

...loue me makeþ so swete-wod þat wonder blisful is my *mood*. Ihesu, do me do þi wille, Nou and euere, loud... (The minor poems of the Vernon MS: [XL. *Two Songs of Love-longing*])

...Flo[rippe] y-saw þe dore vn-do al chaungede hure hew & *mod*: To Rolond sche spak & playned him to þar-of how... (*Sir Ferumbras*)

...wolde wiþ me fyte? He was þo fol heie of *mod*, Is he nou ilete blod. (*The Romance of Otuel*, ll.: 406-408)

Finally, there were several instances found where the meaning is rather hard to define precisely. It is not a reference to the rational mental faculties, but definitely more than a general reference to a general mental faculty or the soul. It is rather “attitude” or “disposition” with a slight emotional overtone. At times there are even some religious connotations and a touch of spirituality in it: in these cases it was grouped as “disposition – general reference – soul”.

attitude - disposition

Ða þam folctogan fracuðlic þuhte þæt he ne meahte *mod* oncyrran, fæmnan foreþonc. (*Juliana*, l.: 225)

...of worldly sight. 8. Jesus. Marie, of mournyng amende thy *moode*, And be-holde my woundes wyde, þus for mannys synnes I..(*The wynedrawers*, ll.: 61-64)

[0132 (62.4)] Ys þin milde *mod* micele betere þonne þis læne lif þe we lifiað on; weleras ðe mine wynnum heriað. (*Paris Psalter*, Psalm 62: 9-12)

...yow ryght grett delyght I pray yow sere with mylde *mood* to dwelle with vs all þis nyght. Christus I must... (*The appearance on the way to Emmaus*, ll.: 154-157)

disposition – general reference – soul

Wæs he Mellitus mid lichoman untrymnesse mid fotadle swiðe gehefigad; ac hwæðre halgum gongum his *modes* he glædlice all eorðlic þing wæs oferhleapende, ond symle mid his *mode* wæs flegende þa heofonlecan to lufienne & to biddenne & to secenne. (*Bede* 2: 7.116.29)

...that launcelot du lake were so falsse and fykelle of *mode* A-nother lemman than the to take? nay, sertes, for Alle... (*Le Morte Arthur*)

Finally, there remains the rather special case, mostly appearing in King Alfred’s Boethius translation. Here the poetic persona of Boethius is called *mod*, so the reference is to a person instead of the mental faculty or soul or any part of these two. In the pilot analysis, this instance was still grouped under the basic meaning: RATIONAL MIND/SPIRITUAL SELF, but in the second study I decided to list it under the heading: EMOTIONAL MIND. The decision was difficult to make, as this is one of the

meanings that proves the fuzziness of boundaries between the categories. Since, however, this usage is not far from “full consciousness” and even “character”, the final decision was in favour of the basic meaning: EMOTIONAL MIND. This difference between the first study and that of the extended corpus does not affect the results too much, as the *Helsinki Corpus* used for the pilot study had only two of such examples.

person

Hu þæt *Mod* cwæð hwi him ne sceolde lician fæger land; & hu se Wisdom ahsode hwæt him belumpe to hira fægernesse. (*Boethius Heading*: l.: 14)

ða cwæð þæt *Mod*: Nat ic nauht oðres. (*Boethius*, 5.13.15)

ða ðis þa gesprečen was, þa gesugode þæt *Mod*, & seo Gesceadwisnes ongon sprečan & þus cwæþ: Eala, *Mod*, eala; an yfel is swiðe to anscunianne. (*Boethius*, 18.41.7)

3.3.1.2. The “basic meaning” RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF

This category, RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF, carries the other semantic core meaning of *mod/mood*. These are the cases where the lexeme stands for the cognitive agency, the soul, or simply as a general reference to the human mind. Since the aim was to separate all the cases with clearly emotional overtones from the ones where this cannot be observed, the categorisation is not primarily based on the emotional vs. cognitive division of the mind, rather on the emotional vs. rational or spiritual one. When analysing the examples, at times it was impossible to determine a closer definition than “this is a general term for the mental faculty,” and consequently, as the focus of the study is to define how the solely emotional new meaning “mood”, “emotional state of mind” developed, it proved enough to separate the emotional from the non-emotional, thus being able to remain as precise as possible without going into wild guesses and often impossible further definitions than “general reference.” When however, some more accurate approximation was possible, it was done so, thus emerged meaning-clusters like “general reference – soul” with religious-spiritual overtones; or “general reference – thought” and “general reference – thought – intention” where there is some association with the cognitive nature of the mind, although not serving as a really clear-cut example for a rational faculty being in question.

general reference

Ne beo ðu on þinum yrre to anwille, forþon þæt yrre oft amyrræð monnes *mod* þæt he ne mæg þæt ryht gecnawan. (*Proverbs 1*, 26 (Cox))

Gemunde þa on *mode* þæt metod wære, heofona heahcyning, hæleða bearnum ana ece gast. (*Daniel*, l.: 624)

...leuyst þi lyf in rest, Fayre of face, fre of *mode*, Is none þi pere be hest ne west; God may... (Middle English Lyrics: *Ever more Thank God of All*.)

...of the good. For god wot wel that al my *mod* And al min herte and al mi thoght And al... (Gower, John: *Confession Amantis*, 5:4766)³¹⁸

general reference – soul

Hæfde him on innan ellen <untweonde>, wæs þæt æðele *mod* asundrad fram synnum, þeah he sares swa feala deopum dolgslegum dreogan sceolde. (*Andreas*, l.: 1241)

...þat is so good Kepe vs chast in þouht and *mood*--- For of þe wil he takeþ hede, Whon he schal... (*How the Psalter of our Lady was Made*, 3. De quadam virgine in Antiochia)

general reference – thought

þa cwæð ic on minum *mode*, þæt ic wolde andettan, and stælan on gean me sylfne, min scylda, and þa Gode <andettan>; and þu me þa forgeafe þæt unriht minra scylda. (*Paris Psalter* (prose), Psalm 31:5)

...when þe kyng herd þis word, [yt] merueled all his *mode*. he rayse vp fro þe burd and in to a... (*A Middle English Metrical Paraphrase of the Old Testament*, hester liber)

general reference – thought – intention

þa ic in *mode* minum hogade þæt ic wolde towerpan <wuldres> leoman, bearn helendes, agan me burga geweld eall to æhte, and ðeos earne heap þe ic hebbe to helle ham geledde. (*Christ and Satan*, ll.: 84-88)

Wæs seo eorla gedriht anes *modes*, fæstum fæðmum freoðowære heold. (*Exodus*, ll.: 305-306)

Here I must note, that where the context involves intention or will, we arrive at the node where emotions and cognition are both at play. When someone intends to do something, thoughts and rational thinking are just as much concerned as the person's feelings. Sometimes the action is preceded by a long thought-process and well-considered pros and cons whether to carry out a certain deed. At other times, the desire and will is only governed by the person's feelings and action is not preceded by thinking, it is indeed only a matter of ad hoc decision made on the basis of the emotions arising. As we have seen, in Anglo-Saxon times the sometimes wilful *mod* urged the person to act and incited him for action, fight or doing whatever the *mod* wanted him to do. This way, when intention and will are concerned, it cannot be decided if the meaning is closer to emotions or cognition and thinking. Due to this ambiguity, and

³¹⁸ “[...] al my *mod* and al min herte and al mi thoght” is a formulaic expression.

since the basic concern was to separate the instances where there is obvious emotional involvement in the meaning of *mod/mood*, these examples of “will – intention” or “intention – disposition”, were rather grouped under the heading RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF, because we cannot be certain to what degree (if at all) emotions are concerned.

will – intention

Hyre þæt deofol oncwæð: Nu ic þæt gehyre þurh þinne hleoþorwide, þæt ic nyde sceal niþa gebæded *mod* meldian, swa þu me beodest, þreaned þolian. (*Juliana*, ll.: 461b-465a)

intention – disposition

...For our trespass alone. 6 The Iewes thanne of wikked *moode* Nayled his bodye on the roode, Wheron he shed his... (Middle English Lyrics: *The sone of god alone Hath made vs free echeone*.)

...Socour com, þat he vnderstode, & turned oyain wiþ hardi *mode* On þe Sarrazins & smite Wiþ swerdes, þat wele bite,... (*Of Arthour & of Merlin*. [Version A])

So far, however, only those cases were mentioned which are either too general or ambiguous. There are, however several occurrences of the word where we come across some evidently rational meanings, where the reference is to the thoughts or, on broader terms, the cognitive agency of people. These examples are either marked with “rational faculty”; or “rational faculty – thought”, where the reference is probably even more precise and the lexeme could refer to thoughts as well as to the rational part of the mental faculties. As predictable, most of the Middle English texts with this meaning of the lexeme are from ME1 and ME2. Out of the 51 cases of these two meaning-clusters, only 9 are from ME3 and 11 from ME4, indicating that the majority of the cases, two thirds, are from before the mid-14th century. Those coming from after this period are mostly from the north, especially the 15th century texts. Out of these 20 latter examples, 9 are from the Northern dialectal region found in texts associated with William of Nassyngton, or for example *The Towneley Plays*³¹⁹ or *The York Plays*. There is one text, the romance *Octovian*, however, which – though being a ME4 source and coming from the East-Midlands, retains the rational element as late as this.

rational faculty

Ðonne ðæt *mod* ðenceð gegripan him to upahefenesse ða eaðmodnesse, ðæt ðæt he utan eowað innan he hit anwent. (*Cura Pastoralis*, 8.55.12)

³¹⁹ Chiefly Northern in its linguistic features, but some East-Midland elements can also be noticed.

Pinceð him on *mode* þæt he his mondryhten clyppe ond cysse, ond on cneo lecce honda ond heafod, swa he hwilum ær in geardagum giefstolas breac. (*The Wanderer*, ll.: 41-44)

...he lese hys speche; For wet he þencheþ in hys *mod* Ne may ous no man teche; Ac stronge He mot... (William of Shoreham: *I. De septem sacramentis. De psalmo, Exercitatus sum et defecit spiritus*, (I. 5) [D]E uncione extrema.)

...werres made, Wher be thei now? Bethenk wel in thi *mod*. The day is goon, the nyght is derk and fade,... (Gower, John: *To King Henry the Fourth in Praise of Peace*)

...dole to tel or say or forto think in mannes *mode* how Crist opon þe gude friday for vs sched his... (Poems of Ms. Tiber. E VII (by William Nassyngton?): (*St. Mary's lamentation to St. Bernard on the passion of Christ*))

rational faculty – thought

He sorgað ymb ða, & bið ðara suiðe gemyndig, & forgiett his selfes, ðonne he suiðor his *mod* gebint to ðam unnyttran weorcum ðonne he ðyrfe. (*Cura Pastoralis*, 4.37.19)

...And when I mette with þat maiden, it mengid my *mode*. Hir sande has scho sente youe, so semely to see....(*The wefferes*, ll.: 253-254)

3.3.2. gemynd/minde

3.3.2.1. The “basic meaning” MENTION

The other lexeme, *gemynd/minde* gained an extra “basic meaning” through the analysis of the extended corpus. While the pilot study served only with examples for MEMORY and MIND, the enlarged database revealed examples of a third basic meaning, that of MENTION, present in both Old and Middle English, mostly through the expression “maken minde of.” This meaning is obviously close to MEMORY, as mentioning something involves remembering it and reminding others of it.

mention

Gregorius him andswarode: nu gyt hwylcehugu wisan wæron to lafe, þa we willaþ sprecan be Bonefacies weorce þæs biscopes, þæs *gemynd* we dydon herbufan. (*Gregory's Dialogues* 1, 9.61.21)

Eac Ualentinianes broðor Benedictes munukes, þæs *gemynd* ic ær bufan dyde, se wæs læwede wer, ac he wæs swyðe eawfæst, se gewunode, þæt he ælce geare ferde of his agenum & becom fæstende to Benedictes mynstre, to þam þæt he onfenge þæs Godes weres bletsunga & gesawe Ualentinianum his geborenan broðor. (*Gregory's Dialogues*, 13.127.30)

Pusillo gregi regnum promittens possidenda uel possessa propter elemosynam uendi lumbosque praecinctos et lucernas ardentis esse debere iubet uigilandum quoque serui boni malique mentione facta praecipiens seruorum scientem uoluntatem domini multis ignorantem uero paucis uapulare confirmat lytlo edo ric geheht to

hæbbendo agnage fore ælmissa to bebscane & sido ymbgyrdeno & lehtfato beornendo were gerisnelic hateð to wæccenne æc ðon ðræles godes & yfles *gemynd* aworden awærð bebead esne wittende willa drihtnes monigom ðone uncyðig unwittende æc huonum gemersia <gefæstnuið>. (*Lindisfarne Gospels, Luke Heading, 53.*)

...Perfore seint Remigious Of Jerom and oþur doctours glorious Makeþ *mynde*, but he concludeþ hit þat Austin passeþ alle in cunnynge...(How the *Psalter of our Lady was Made*, 6. S. Augustin.)

...mon was made þo sexte daye, as holy write ful *mynde* mase, Thurght the wommon, in gode faye, þo mon begylet... (*A Stanzaic Life of Christ, Causa quare femina tardius formatur siue organiyatur in vtero matris quam masculus*)

The most important aspect of this “basic meaning” is that it much ante-dates the *OED* entry for *mind* in this meaning. While the *OED* puts it to the 14th century, its first appearance is in OE3 (between 950-1050), which is a difference of 300 years. Interestingly, the 2nd edition of the *OED* cites *Deo Gracias*, a circa 1325 occurrence, as this meaning’s first attestation, but the 2004 online version of the dictionary gives and even later appearance, a circa 1350 example from a psalter.³²⁰ However, it is certain that this meaning of *gemynd/minde* did not evolve during Middle English, but was already quite frequent in the Old English period.³²¹

It seems quite certain that the expression *gemynd don* is a calque. We can find it in glosses of Latin *mentionem facere*, and having a look at the Latin originals of the Old English texts where they appear, it is either the same expression, or *memoriam facere* that is translated. The above quoted examples from *Gregory’s Dialogues* have these originals:

Petrus. Placit quod dicis.

Gregorius. Adhuc pauca aliqua, quae de Bonifati episcopi opere supersunt, quia eius *memoriam fecimus*, exequamur. (bk 1, ch.9; p. 53)³²²

(PETER. I am very well satisfied with this your answer.

GREGORY. For as much as we have now *made mention* of Bonifacius, let us prosecute a few more of his acts, not yet spoken of.)³²³

³²⁰ <http://www.dictionary.oed.com> The entry is the following: c1350 Psalter (BL Add.) in K. D. Bülbring Earliest Compl. Eng. Prose

Psalter (1891) cx. 4 Our Lord pitiful & merciful made minde of his wondres.

³²¹ For a reference, and as a support for this meaning, see the *Supplement Volume* of the Bosworth-Toller Dictionary, under the heading *gemynd*.

³²² Moricca, Umberto, ed. *Gregorii Magni Dialogi, libri IV*, Fonti per la storia d'Italia, scrittori, 6. Rome: Tipografia del senato, 1924.

Frater quoque Valentiniani eius monachi, cuius superius *memoriam feci*, vir erat laicus, sed religiosus. (bk 2, ch 13; p. 99)

(A brother also of Valentinian the monk, of whom I *made mention* before, was a layman, but devout and religious)³²⁴

3.3.2.2. The “basic meaning” MEMORY

The category MEMORY includes several smaller clusters of meaning, similarly to the analysis of the pilot study. The best-represented of these remain “faculty” and “concept”, just as in the pilot study. These two are referents to the human memory itself, one to the receptacle, where the act of remembering happens (this is referred to by the term “faculty”), one to the event of remembering itself (signalled by the word “concept”). Besides this, “commemoration” and “commemoration – memorial” also belong to this group, as the terms are also in close association with the act of remembering and the workings of the human memory. “Commemoration” very frequently occurs in the phrase “in minde of” and involves an act – or even ceremony – of keeping someone in memory, while in the latter case the context allows for a more specific referent: not only an abstract commemoration but a more concrete memorial, an event or act that keeps something or somebody in memory. Finally, there appears a fifth group of usage, that of “commemoration day” – in the extended corpus treated separately – surviving quite late in Middle English usually as a set expression especially in wills, like “yeris minde” or “minde day.”

memory (faculty)

Hwæt, ge þonne þeah hwæthwega godcundlices on eowerre saule habbað, þæt is andgit & *gemynd*, & se gesceadwislica willa þæt hine þara twega lyste. (*Boethius*, 14.32.1)

Sie þara manna gehwam behliden helle duru, heofones ontyned, ece geopenad engla rice, dream unhwilen, ond hira dæl scired mid Marian, þe on *gemynd* nime þære deorestan dægweorðunga rode under roderum, þa se <ricesta> ealles oferwealdend earne beþeahte. (*Elene*, ll.: 1228b-1235)

...Ye shuld lefe of your paynfulle afflictione, Callinge to your *mynd* his resurrection, Which sal be so glorivse. This know ye,...(*Christ's burial*)

³²³ Translation from: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/gregory_01_dialogues_book1.htm. Online version on the basis of Edmund G. Gardner's 1911 edition.

³²⁴ Translation from: http://www.tertullian.org/fathers/gregory_01_dialogues_book2.htm. Online version on the basis of Edmund G. Gardner's 1911 edition.

fastly for the tyme that I saw him, and so was than my will and my menyng ever for done without end, but as a fole I let it passyn from my *mynd*. A! lo I, wretch. This was a gret synne, grete onkindness, that I for foly, of feling of a litill bodily (Julian of Norwich: *A Revelation of Love*, ll.: 2762-5)

memory (concept)

Pa eode ut in dagunge of þam huse, þe ða untruman menn in reston, & ana gesæt in deagolre stowe & geornlice ongon þencan bi his dædum, ond wæs inbryrde mid *gemynd* his synna & weop, & his onsyn mid tearum þwoh: & of innewardre heortan God wæs biddende, þæt he ða gena sweltan ne sceolde, ær ðon þe he bi ðæm forðgewitenum gemeleasnissum his, þa ðe he in cildhade oððe in cneohthade gefremede, fulfremeþlicor of tide geclæsnade, ge hine seolfne on godum weorcum genihtsumlecor beeode. (*Bede* 5, 19.242.23)

In *gemynde* æcre bið se rehtwisa from gehernisse yfelre ne ondredeð In memoria aeterna erit iustus ab auditu malo non timebit. (*Psalter Glosses* (Vespasian) 111.6)

...that was gentil and kinde, In worschipe of hir Sostres *mynde* Sche made a riche enterement, For sche fond non amendement... (Gower, John: *Confessio Amantis*, 5. 5725-5728)

primunt fetor et horror mulieris mortue. We rede in 'Vitis Patrum' how þer was a bruther þat gretelie was turment with *mynd* of a womman þat he saw som tyme. So on a tyme a noder bruther of his come & tolde hym at sho was dead (*Alphabet of tales*, CXXXII. Carnis temptacionem reprimunt fetor et horror mulieris mortue.)

commemoration

Soþ is þæt ic eow secgge, þæt þis godspell sceal beon sægd & bodad geond ealne middangeard; forðon þis wæs gedon on min *gemynd*. (*Blickling Homilies* 6, Palm Sunday, 59)

...So hyyt þis lond þat he coom fram; For perpetuell *Mynde* of grete Bretayne He called hyt lyte Bretayne, þat Men... (*Arthur*)

commemoration – memorial

Hatað heaðomære hlæw gewyrcean beorhtne æfter bæle æt brimes nosan; se scel to *gemyndum* minum leodum heah hlifian on Hronesnæsse, þæt hit sæliðend syððan hatan Biowulfes biorh, ða ðe brentingas ofer floda genipu feorran drifað. (*Beowulf*, ll.: 2802-2808)

commemoration day

On þone þrytegoðan dæg þæs monðes byð þæs bysceopes *gemynd* sancte Marcialis. (*Martyrology* 2.1 (Herzfeld-Kotzor) (Ju 30, A.1))

Mary Ottery. in Devenshire, xx ýi, to be demened, xx s' þerof yerely in this wise: that euery yere duryng the terme of xx yere, my *mynd*, with Placebo & Dirige & masse of Requiem to be doon oones, yevyng to euery chanon beinge ther-at (*Fifty earliest English wills in the Court of Probate, London : A. D. 1387-1439 : RICHARD BOKELAND, ESQ., OF ALL-HALLOWS THE GREATER, THAMES ST., LONDON, 1436.*)

the prestes of the same Chaunterie, to the worshipe of God, as so longe as th[e]y may endure. Al-so y bequethe to do make & holde my *Mynde* euery 3ere duryng vij 3ere next folwyng after my desese, in the forsaide Chirche of Seint Leonarde

honest (*Fifty earliest English wills in the Court of Probate, London : A. D. 1387-1439 : JOHN CHELMYSWYK, ESQ., SHROPSHIRE, 1418.*)

pat myne Executours parfourme this my testament. Also y woll that myn Executours ordeyne, the day of my dyyng or of my *mynde*, vj torches brenyng; & after all the service ys done, I woll be-quethe I torche ecclesie me[e] parochia (*Fifty earliest English wills in the Court of Probate, London : A. D. 1387-1439 : RICHARD WHYTEMAN, OF LONDON, WAXCHANDLER, 1428.*)

There are two transitional areas, where it was hard to decide whether the referent was to the rational, thinking processes and faculties of the human mind or some manifestation of memory, be it the faculty of remembering itself or the act of recollection. Thinking often involves remembering, and remembering evokes thoughts. Consequently, the two often mingle and become inseparable from each other in several cases. These instances signal the connection between the two basic meanings of the lexeme (MEMORY and MIND), as these are the nodes where the rational mental faculty becomes connected – or even attached – to the idea of recollection as neither exists without the other one. Concerning a pleasant memory, we “bear it in mind”, indicating both remembering (keeping it in our recollecting faculty), and thinking of it. This kind of usage is signalled by “memory (faculty) – thought.” On the other hand, when we “have mind on” the pleasant days of a summer holiday, we both think of it and remember it, so both thoughts and the concept of memory are at work here. This usage is specified as “memory (concept) – thought.”

Differentiating these nuances of meaning is a very difficult task, and the boundaries of the semantic field prove to be fuzzy. Nevertheless, the definitions can be accurate on the level of “basic meanings” as these are clearly distinguishable. In our case, all the instances where we face meaning clusters like “memory (faculty) – thought” and “memory (concept) – thought”, the usages standing right between MIND and MEMORY, for the sake of more accurate results, they were listed under the heading MEMORY, as all the occurrences where there is the aspect of memory possibly involved, since the aim of the study is to trace how the lexeme gradually loses this feature in Middle English.

memory (faculty) – thought

tempis a man with, Is dispar of godis mekille mersye; for quhen the deuill fyndis a man wexit and torment with seknes, he bryngis to his *mynd* þe ded that he Is lyk to cum to, and the synis that he has done, wnconfessyt (*Ratis Raving, and Other Moral and Religious Pieces: (1.) CRAFT OF DEYNG.*)

...and some go behynde, Hys blessed wurdes to haue yn *mynde*; One þrest on hym, eftsones anoþer, þat meke mayster ys... (Mannyng, Robert: *Meditations*)

memory (concept) – thought

"Now þe end of my lyfe, nor my dead, nor none oþer thyng may hevy me ewhuls I hafe slayn hym þat hase slayn me. And, Alexander, I hafe *mynd* of owr god, how he said vnto þi moder at sho sulde bere þe son of vengeange." And with þat he lenyd hym ... (*Alphabet of tales*, DCCLXIX. Vindicans se ante mortem celeriter moritur.)

passhyon of oure Lorde Jesu Cryst; ffor whate mann or womann that hath hys *mende* on oure Lordis passhyon, I have no power ouer theym at no tyme.' And euer after Seynt Edmond the holy mann had ful grete (*The Life of St. Edmund*, 168:Heading³²⁵)

3.3.2.3. The “basic meaning” MIND

The third major category, according to which the *gemynd/minde* examples were divided up, is MIND. During the analysis, several sub-groups were set up, from the most general reference to the human mind (indicated as “general reference”), to the more specific cases. As discussed in the course of the pilot-study definitions, unlike the *mod/mood* examples, here I laid no specific emphasis on the referent being emotional or rational, as it seems irrelevant from the point of view of the present study. Nevertheless, as observable from the surviving examples, *gemynd/minde* stands rather for the cognitive faculty of the human mind than the emotional one. Accordingly, besides the occurrences where “general reference” was the only possible definition, there is a large number of examples where, besides this general reference, some aspect of thinking is involved. In these instances a further attribute, thought, was included, and the meaning defined as “general reference – thought.”

general reference

Flah is geblowen mielum in *gemynde*; modes gecynde greteð ungynde grom efenpynde, bealofus byrneð, bittre toyrneð. (*Riming Poem*, ll.: 47b-50)

...mene. Hey, etc. The lame and blynd, men owt of *mynd*, And the demonyacle, The deaf and dombe, men layd in... (Middle English Lyrics: *A song in the tune of, And I were a mayd, etc.*)

hopp of Parissh, on a tyme was vexid with so grete a seknes in his head, þat it strake in-to his brayn, & tuke away his witt & his *mynde* from hym. So at þe laste he come vnto hym selfe, & axkyd to be howseld; & þai þat wer abowte was (*Alphabet of Tales*, CLXI. Communicanti non est administranda hostia non consecrata.)

³²⁵ Helsinki Corpus reference.

general reference – thought

...frend.' And therwith I Gan for to wondren in my *minde*. 'O god,' thoughte I, 'that madest kinde, Shal I non...(Chaucer, Geoffrey: *The Hous of Fame*, ll.: 582-585)

d when sho hard tell at it was bod xiiij day iorney fro hur place vnto Mylayn, þat at sho mot not do with hur bodye sho thoght to go in hur *mynde*. And ilka day sho sayd a hondreth patyr noster, and þus sho thoght ilk day to make a iorney. And onon (*Alphabet of Tales*, DCXXIX. Petrus monialem absentem sanauit.)

In other cases, the cognitive element is much more overtly present, especially signalled by the presence of verbs like *think* and *know* connected to our lexeme, and the mental faculty could be further specified as being “rational faculty”, or simply standing for either rational faculty or thought (“rational faculty – thought” in the analysis).

rational faculty

þe brydill with hym or noght. And þis done, with grete contricion he went vnto Saynt Barnard agayn, and told hym what þoght come in his *mynde* in þis prayer-saying: and þus he had not þe hors. & fro thens furthe, he had nevr presumpcion in hi (*Alphabet of Tales*, CXIII. Ad-huc de Sancto Barnardo.)

rational faculty – thought

Elene madelade him on ondsware: Hu is þæt geworden on þysse werþeode þæt ge swa monigfeald on *gemynd* witon, alra tacna gehwylc swa Troiana þurh gefeoht fremedon? (*Elene*, ll.: 642-646b)

lude to hafe rewle; bod rather vnto þe adlyngis & vnto the governance. And so his desyre contynued, and efterward he conseyyd in his *mynd* þat childer sulde furste be broght vpp and excercysed in vertues, at þai mot be provid what gouernance þai (*Alphabet of Tales*, DCLVIII. Puer non debet eligi in prelatum vel presulem.)

A little more specific in its reference, although still not having sharp boundaries, is the case when the lexeme denotes something of crucial significance to somebody, a person’s concern, what his thoughts often dwell upon. Similar is the rare case where the word means “opinion”, another manifestation of the rational mind. These occurrences are marked by “thought – concern – opinion” and form a special group of *gemynd/minde* examples with a focus on the rational faculty and thinking processes.

thought – concern – opinion

Hire wæs godes egða mara in *gemyndum*, þonne eall þæt maþþungesteald þe in þæs æþelinges æhtum wunade. (*Juliana*, ll.: 35b-37)

for the bokys þat weer Syr James, God haue hys sowle, I thynke best that they be styll wyth yow tyll þat I speke wyth yow my-selff. My *mynde* is now nott most vppon bokys. /Item, as for xx li. þat ye sey þat yowre plate lythe fore, it is so (*Paston letters and papers: John Paston II – TO MARGARET PASTON 1475*, 02, 22)

so that thorow reklesnese my brothere and seruauentys be in such joparté as ye haue wryten to me, whych shold be half jnpossybell in my *mynd* that thay shold myssvse so moch stuff in iij tymes the space, and that ye haue euydent knowlych by my s

(*Paston letters and papers: John Paston II – TO WALTER WRITTLE: DRAFT OR COPY 1469, 09, 10*)

As it has already been mentioned, the lexeme does not often display clearly emotional tendencies, like our other word, *mod/mood*. In Old English, when it only occasionally denotes MIND, the mental faculty, instead of the narrower field of MEMORY, there is no occurrence where the emotional faculty is being denoted. In Middle English, from ME3 on, there appear some examples of this type, but most of them come from after 1420, thus in ME4 (18 out of the 23 instances).

emotional faculty

So at þe laste sho sett hur down to mete, and sodanlie hur son come in, and als tye as sho saw hym, for ioy sho wex evyn oute of hur *mynde*. And so it was mor suffrable vnto hur, þe sorow of dead, þan was þe mirthe of life. (*Fifty earliest English wills in the Court of Probate, London : A. D. 1387-1439 : ROGER FLORE (OR FLOWER), ESQ., OF LONDON, AND OAKHAM, RUTLANDSHIRE, 1424-5.*)

Much better attested is the area where not only emotions, but emotion and cognition are both at play. As discussed by the grouping of *mod/mood*'s meanings, this set is where desire, will and intention are concerned, since wanting something may involve careful consideration and thinking as well as emotional factors. To this group belong the clusters of meanings marked by “thought – intention” and “will – intention”, the latter one denoting to some extent a more specific and distinguishable reference to wanting, desiring something than the former, though this clear or blurred nature of reference is attributable mostly to the context only.

thought – intention

of my executours vnderwritten and after th'enformacion of my saide seruaunte Thomas Andrew, to whome I haue shewid my entent and *mynde* in the same manye tymes and often, to haue to theym and to the heires of there ij bodies lawfully begot (*Paston letters and papers: William Paston I – WILL 1496, 09, 07*)

istruxion and the grete martire, he toke ther-of grete pitee, and gan to wepe watir with his iyen, and than he requerid his men to haue in *mynde* to do well, and to defende holy cherche and the cristin feith; and the saisnes com faste ridinge with ban (*Merlin : or, the early history of King Arthur, CHAPTER XV. EXPLOITS OF THE REBEL KINGS AGAINST THE SAXONS.*)

will – intention

Forgif þu me, min frea, fierst ond ondgiet ond gepyld ond *gemynd* þinga gehwylces þara þu me, soþfæst cyning, sendan wylle to cunnunge. (*Resignation, ll.: 21-25a*)

...prayer thurght Goddes might, to plesse God he had grete *mynde*, And the tethe of al his pray, when he to... (*A Stanzaic Life of Christ, Secundum remedium contra originale peccatum.*)

...litle. Of wemen werkes wilnet ho none, Most was hir *mynde* hir maidonhede to kepe. Mony cas for to cum ho... (*The "Gest Hystoriale" of the Destruction of Troy, THE SHAPE AND COLOUR OF THE KYNGES OF GRECE.*)

...grette sorowe dobyde ware, And yet inowgh she had; Her *mynde* was not but for to morne. Agayne to hym will... (*Ipomedon*)

The final group of meanings, just like the previous one where intention was concerned, has some degree of emotion in it. But while intending and willing connects emotions and cognition, as both rational thinking and feelings could be present, here the emotional mind is rather connected to a person's inner man. The way someone behaves, a person's character and inherent qualities of mind belong to this category. These are basically instances where "disposition" or "attitude" are being denoted by the lexeme. And similarly to the semantic fields of *mod/mood*, *gemynd/minde* has a few occurrences where spirituality is concerned, and in these cases the mental faculty as a referent might more precisely be considered as a person's inner man or soul (marked by "general reference – soul").

disposition – attitude

understand, at in thir temptaciouns the deuill may stren3e na man, na3 hit our-cum hyme, bot gyf It be his fre consent, and be in his ryght *mynde*. And tharfor we suld thank god, at tholys ws nocht to be tempyt Forþer than we ma agane-stand; And we res (*Ratis Raving, and Other Moral and Religious Pieces: (1.) CRAFT OF DEYNG.*)

...nyght and day I pray to god send þe good *mynde*. Ther may no man love bettyr his childe þan Isaac is lovyd of me... (*Abraham and Isaac*, ll.: 55-58)

...to se þat fayr fresch flowre the mayde mylde in *mynde*. ijus pastor Lete us ffolwe with all oure myght With... (*The adoration of the shepherds*, ll.: 80-81)

general reference – soul

...Qui creavit omnia. Prey we to hym with al our *mynde*, That hayt mad al mankynde, He brynge us alle to... (Middle English Lyrics: *O flos de Jesse virgula, Laus tibi sit et gloria.*)

...the child to fynde, And worchepyn hym with al myn *mynde*, with al the onour that I may." Quan they kemyn...(Middle English Lyrics: *The sterre hym schon bothe nytt and day, To lede thre kynges ther our Lord lay.*)

3.4. Mod/mood

3.4.1. The Pilot Study

The pilot study of *mod/mood* started with building a table (Table 6) of the basic meanings of the word. As seen from the subtotals given below, the examples found in the *Helsinki Corpus* are rather scarce for the Middle English period, never exceeding 20. The Old English part, especially OE3 is a little more supported with examples, but the subtotals still remain low. This way, however interesting the results seem to be, they can only be regarded as approximations, and only the later analysis of the extended database will tell us how reliable these percentages and frequencies are.

Table 6. – Basic meanings of *mod/mood*

MOD/MOOD		OE2	OE3	OE4	ME1	ME2	ME3	ME4
EMOTIONAL MIND	anger / arrogance/ pride / fury	5	4					
	courage		5	1	1			
	magnificence		1	1				
	heart	8	115	16	7	1	7	3
	mood				1	2		2
Subtotal:		13	125	18	9	3	7	5
RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF	general reference / rational faculty	23	116	11	9	4	7	
	thought	2	4	1				
	inner man / soul	27	35	10	2			
	a person	1	1					
Subtotal:		53	156	22	11	4	7	-
TOTAL		66	281	40	20	7	14	5

To get the figures of the table more clear-cut, further analysis was needed (Table 7). Mere numbers are not enough, even if the *Helsinki Corpus* is an exceptionally well-balanced database. More objective results can be acquired if the ratio of the basic meanings is given in percentage, and later the frequencies are calculated related to the entire corpus. Adding up the instances of our word with the two different basic

meanings, and calculating their ratio and frequency, we expect to acquire results that might strengthen the hypothesis of a marked shift in the word's semantic field.

Table 7. – The simplified results and frequency-counts/10,000 words of Table 6 in the pilot study.

Period	<i>Emotional Mind</i>			<i>Rational Mind / Spiritual Self</i>		
	number/total	percentage	frequency	number/total	percentage	frequency
OE1	-	-	-	-	-	-
OE2	13/66	20%	1.412	53/66	80%	5.758
OE3	125/281	44%	4.968	156/281	56%	6.200
OE4	18/44	41%	2.671	22/44	59%	3.265
ME1	9/20	45%	0.796	11/20	55%	0.973
ME2	3/7	43%	0.308	4/7	57%	0.410
ME3	7/14	50%	0.380	7/14	50%	0.380
ME4	5/5	100%	0.234	0/5	0%	0.000

As we can notice, the difference is not great between the two categories. There is a balance of 41-45% as compared to 55-59% from OE3 to ME2, that is, for approximately five hundred years from the mid-10th to the beginning of the 15th century. Before 950 (in OE2), the majority of the examples of the *Helsinki Corpus* seems to denote the rational mental faculties, whereas in the third subperiod of Middle English, that is from the end of the 1300s to the early 1400s, the emotional and the rational reference are in balance, and by the end of the century, *mood* only appears in its modern, exclusively emotional role. It would be thoughtless to say, however, that the shift was so radical that by 1500 the word had lost its earlier usage completely. The number of examples is low; basing any far-reaching conclusion on merely five occurrences, as is the case in ME4, is rash. Still, as this pilot research was carried out with the help of a representative database of English texts, we can already expect that our deduction approximates the data we could receive on the basis of larger corpora. The *Helsinki Corpus* seems to point towards a gradual shift from the rational towards the emotional field, showing that *mod* took up the meaning “mood”, still in use today, sometime during the Middle English period, and strengthened it definitely by ME4. It would be a fallacy to state that such low numbers in the corpus reflect unquestionably

and accurately what there is in a language. Nevertheless, it can affirm our presuppositions and serve as a starting point to further studies.


3.4.2. The Study of the Extended Corpus

The results of the compilation of the extended corpus were much awaited, to see whether its data reinforce the finds of the pilot study. The database was much larger than taking merely the *Helsinki Corpus* material, with a total of 2273 instances examined (Table 8). Out of these, 2/3 of the material (1492 occurrences) is from the Old English period, and 1/3 of the material (781 occurrences) from Middle English. Due to the larger number of examples, the data gained by the analysis of the extended corpus are more telling. While in the pilot study we received well-balanced percentages from OE3 to ME3, constantly remaining between 40-50% for EMOTIONAL MIND and 60-50% for RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF, in the second analysis, the semantic shift from RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF towards EMOTIONAL MIND is much better observable, as the decreasing and increasing percentages show the process very clearly.³²⁶

Table 8. – Meanings of *mod/mood* in the different periods

Periods	Σ	EMOTIONAL MIND		RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF	
OE2	592	137	23.14%	455	76.86%
OE3	692	287	41.47%	405	58.53%
OE4	208	47	22.60%	161	77.40%
ME1	34	20	58.82%	14	41.18%
ME2	271	221	81.55%	50	18.45%
ME3	267	227	85.02%	40	14.98%
ME4	209	189	90.43%	20	9.57%

³²⁶ Had we added the meaning “person” under the basic meaning RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF, as in the pilot study, the number of instances and the percentages would have changed in the following way: OE2 > 175 (29.56%) : 413 (70.44%), OE3 > 289 (41.76%) : 403 (58.24%). There would not be a very significant changes in the diagram, only OE2 would show a 6.42% difference, and it would not affect the most important periods from the research’s point of view: from OE4 to ME4.

Diagram 1. – Meanings of *mod/mood* in the different periods

For the sake of better understanding, the table has been “translated” into a diagram, which shows the percentages represented in columns as the two basic meanings are related to one-another in the different periods (Diagram 1). We can see a gradual growth of the darker orange colour (EMOTIONAL MIND) indicating the increase of this meaning of the word. The lighter orange colour shows the decrease of the occurrence where *mood* stands for RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF. By ME4, we can see that in only 1 out of 10 cases does the lexeme carry its original function, while 200 years earlier it was still 4 out of 10. The other interesting fact that we can note is the break in the process in OE3. There is a sudden upheaval of the darker orange column, signalling that there was a significant increase in the number of cases where *mod* was emotional. The reason why this sudden growth is surprising is that by OE4 the percentage jumps back by almost 20%, and starts its increase anew. What might be the reason for this?

OE3 is a subperiod that flourishes in mind-words. Only for *mod*, there are 692 occurrences, adding up to 30% of the entire *mod/mood* database. On the one hand, this is due to the increased occurrence of the word in philosophical writings, as the manuscripts of most of the Alfredian translations and also, for example, Ælfric’s homilies can be dated to this time. As we have already seen, however, for Alfred, the *mod* was most often the translation of *animus*, not too often emotional, and was very frequently equated with the life-surviving spirit; and for Ælfric, it was also defined as an

intellectual agency.³²⁷ The reason why the emotional meaning of *mod* still increases is due to another fact. OE3 is the period to which the manuscripts containing Old English poetic works can be connected. These poems carry in themselves a relatively different linguistic tradition, preserve old usages of some words, and reach back to deep layers of the language, since orality allows for more archaic forms and meanings. As I have already pointed out, *mod* in the poetic (or “vernacular”) tradition was much more emotional than in the classical tradition, or as compared to our own concept about the modern mind. Its wilfulness, independent nature, the fact that it has to be controlled, as it so often appears in poetic works, shows that in Old English poetry it was not used predominantly as an intellectual agency. Most of the occurrences where the lexeme denotes “pride”, “arrogance”, “courage”, “anger”, or any of these clearly emotional overtones, come from poetry, which supports the existence of a separate vernacular tradition besides the Latinate classical concept about the mind – a vernacular tradition that possibly goes back to ancient roots, where the mind was regarded not chiefly as an intellectual but as an emotional, active agency. This is further supported by the cognates of *mod*, which very often point towards a similar tradition. Gothic *môþs*, *môd*, for example, means “anger” or “emotion”, Old Norse *móðr* stands for “anger” and “grief”; and even Old Saxon *môd* and OHG *muot* – both denoting “mind” – has the secondary meaning “courage.” Interestingly, this archaic emotional tendency of the word is the one that returns in the lexeme’s new meaning in Middle English, and the classical concept of the mind lives on in *minde*, a word which was not at all loaded with such emotional qualities, the most rational of even the Old English mind-words; one appropriate for the new concept of the mind.

Another fact worth mentioning is that while the pilot study did not find any instances of the rational *mood* in ME4, the study of the enlarged corpus did so. On the basis of the evidence in the electronic *Middle English Compendium* and *The Linguistic Atlas of England*, we can see later – though sporadic – usage of *mood* in its non-emotional meaning. Such a source is for example William of Nassyngton’s *Spiritus Guydonis*,³²⁸ or *The Gospel of Nicodemus*, both from the northern regions of England.

...so (on erthly) gude (þat) reches es more in þaire *mode* þan Crist god sun
þat boght þam dere. and my-self... (*Spiritus Guydonis*)

³²⁷ Chapter 2.3.1.

³²⁸ It is usually attributed to him.

...in ayre was hynged on hyght, þat meruayld all my *mode*; I loked & saw bifor my syght Ihesus þat dyed... (*The Gospel of Nicodemus*)

Surprisingly, however, besides the expectable Northern occurrences of traditional usage in Middle English, there are some sporadic East-Midland examples too, preserving the rational meaning of the word. *Octovian*, for instance, presents the following example, where one thinks in the *mood* – a definitely intellectual, rational activity.

...wyste what he was; The emperour thocht euyr yn hys mode The chylde was comyn of gentyll blode, He thocht ryght...(*Octovian*, ll.: 1125-1128)


Thus, after the study of the extended corpus, we can confirm that the results gained support the finds of the pilot study in case of *mod/mood*; they make them more accurate and serve with important examples reaching a little beyond the confines of the *Helsinki Corpus*. The significance of these examples lies in the fact that they post-date the *Oxford English Dictionary*, which puts the latest appearance of this word to 1390 in Gower's *Confessio Amantis*: "If thou wolt take into thi *mod* Reson, thou myht be reson deeme That [etc.]" and to circa 1400 in the *Destruction of Troy*: "For to mele with þat maidyn & hir *mode* here." The extended database this way broadens the time period with several decades.

With the extended database, another fascinating study has been carried out: the dialectal distribution of the lexeme in its different meanings in Middle English. The question to be answered by this is whether any difference can be observed in the dialectal representation of *mood* in its meaning RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF and to what extent the North retains its function of preserving linguistically archaic forms in this case, from period to period (Table 9).

Table 9. – *Mood* as RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF in the different ME dialects

Periods	Σ	KENT		SOUTH-ERN		EAST-MIDLAND		WEST-MIDLAND		NORTH-ERN		SCOTS		IRELAND	
		Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
ME1	14	2	14.29%	10	71.43%	0	0.00%	2	14.29%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME2	50	0	0.00%	9	18.00%	10	20.00%	8	16.00%	23	46.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME3	40	0	0.00%	1	2.50%	15	37.50%	18	45.00%	6	15.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME4	20	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	6	30.00%	0	0.00%	14	70.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%

Diagram 2. – Dialectal distributions of *mood* as RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF in the different ME dialects



The table and the belonging diagrams (Table 9 and Diagram 2) indicate this shift towards the north, although perhaps not in such definite steps as we would imagine. It is true that in ME4, 70% of the examples come from the Northern dialect, but before this, there were more occurrences in the north in ME2 than in ME3. What the charts also demonstrate is the sudden drop in the southern regions, indicating how the obsolescent *mood* in its original meaning lives on rather in the northern regions. The only exception is the East-Midlands, where the percentages grow until ME3, and only then fall back to 30%. We must not forget, however, that these percentages are relative as well, since the numbers of the surviving examples significantly drop by ME4, meaning that merely 6 instances are enough to create a 30% result for the East-Midlands in this period.

3.5. Gemynd/minde

3.5.1. The Pilot Study

The next part of the analysis concentrates on the other lexeme participating in the semantic change: *gemynd/minde*. In the pilot study, altogether 199 examples were studied, 74 of which come from the Old English period, and 125 from Middle English. Similarly to the other lexeme, most of the Anglo-Saxon occurrences can be dated to the time between 950 and 1050, afterwards there is a great decrease in the number of surviving examples, until in ME3 (1350-1420) they start to reappear again. The division of the word's semantic field into two basic meanings MEMORY and MIND, brought the following results (Table 10 and 11).

Table 10. – The basic meanings of *gemynd/minde* in the pilot study

<i>GEMYND/MINDE</i>		OE2	OE3	OE4	ME1	ME2	ME3	ME4
MEMORY	memory (concept)	4	17	6	1	8	12	19
	memory (faculty)	3	15	5		1	13	19
	commemoration / memorial / commemoration day	2	16				1	1
Subtotal:		9	48	11	1	9	26	39
MIND	general reference		3				21	24
	thought / intention / will / desire		1				1	1
	care / concern / attention		2					2
	opinion							1
Subtotal:		-	6	-	-	-	22	28
TOTAL		9	54	11	1	9	48	67

Table 11. – The results in percentages

Period	MEMORY		MIND	
	number/total	percentage	number/total	percentage
OE1	-	-	-	-
OE2	9/9	100.00%	0/9	0.00%
OE3	48/54	88.89%	6/54	11.11%
OE4	11/11	100.00%	0/11	0.00%
ME1	1/1	100.00%	0/1	0.00%
ME2	9/9	100.00%	0/9	0.00%
ME3	26/48	54.17%	22/48	45.83%
ME4	39/67	58.20%	28/67	41.80%

Before a thorough comparison of the two tables, a trap has to be eliminated, stepping into which would distort all the acquired results, and leave us beset by doubts. Seemingly, the Middle English period plays a joke on us. Deducing from today's usage, we may expect a decrease in the frequency of *minde* with the basic meaning of MEMORY, and in turn a relative increase in the occurrence of the word signifying MIND. This latter expectation is fulfilled, as we have seen, but the other side of the table does not clearly represent this. Surprisingly, if we look at the pilot study, adding up all the instances of the word referring to “memory”, we find a steady growth in frequency in the ME period, suggesting that instead of going gradually out of use, the word strengthens its original field of reference and increases in frequency of use together with the general reference to the mental faculty acquired anew. Table 12 shows the data thus gained, with the frequency-counts per 10,000 running words. Comparing the Middle English subperiods, we find that the number of tokens/10,000 words considerably increases from the 12th to the late 15th century from 0.088 to 1.824 for MEMORY, providing respectively higher numbers than the results gained for MIND, which is merely 1.309 in ME4.

Table 12. – Frequency-counts for *gemynd/minde*

Period	MEMORY frequency / 10,000 words	MIND frequency / 10,000 words
OE2	0.978	-
OE3	1.908	-
OE4	1.633	0.238
ME1	0.088	-
ME2	0.923	-
ME3	1.411	1.194
ME4	1.824	1.309

In order to gain much more telling and reliable data, we have to consider what causes the sudden increase in frequency. The only feasible solution for re-examining the results is looking at the context of all occurrences in the *Helsinki Corpus*. By this method, we can deduce that, interestingly, in the Middle English period, especially in its later subperiods, when the word *minde* appears meaning MEMORY, it occurs mostly in collocations – collocations, which in their petrified expressions can reflect a usage prior to the examined period. Some of the most important ME expressions preserving the notion of “memory” are: *beren in minde*, *bringen unto/into minde*, *bringen oute of minde*, *callen unto minde*, *comen to minde*, *drauen into minde*, *haven minde of*, *kepen in minde*, *time oute of minde*, *holden in/on minde*, *passen oute of minde*, *from/of/oute of minde*, *fallen in/into/oute of minde* and *ben out of minde*. These collocations tend to fix and fossilise an earlier usage, and some of them still retain the word's original meanings to our day; let us think of the ModE equivalents of these expressions, where the reference of *mind* is to the mental faculty of remembering or to memory as a concept.

As a consequence, since the primary aim of this study is to examine how the *base words* change their meanings, in order to gain more precise data for the usage of *minde* in Middle English, it is worthwhile to take only those instances into consideration where the word denotes MEMORY outside such collocations, standing on its own. Therefore, all these fossilised expressions were disregarded in the following calculations. Table 13 and Diagram 3 contain the number of cases where *gemynd/minde* denoting MEMORY is to be found in such collocations. For the sake of easy comparison, fixed Old English collocations that had become obsolete by the Middle English period were treated


separately, since I was interested in eliminating those expressions that determine Middle English collocational restrictions. In such Old English examples, *gemynd* stands mostly together with the following verbs: *afæstnian to*, *niman*, *begietan*, *lætan*. These instances have not been grouped under a separate heading, they are treated together with the Old English occurrences where the word stands outside collocations.

Table 13. – The number of collocations for *gemynd/minde* as MEMORY³²⁹


Period	Total	Collocation	Number of instances	Percentage
OE2	9	in collocation stands alone	3 6	33% 67%
OE3	48	in collocation stands alone	9 39	19% 81%
OE4	11	in collocation stands alone	4 7	36% 64%
ME2	9	in collocation stands alone	2 7	22% 78%
ME3	26	in collocation stands alone	20 6	77% 23%
ME4	39	in collocation stands alone	33 6	85% 15%

Diagram 3. – The ratio of fossilised expressions.

The yellow colour indicates fixed collocations, green stands for examples outside collocations



³²⁹ As there is merely one example for ME1 in the *Helsinki Corpus*, this period was not taken into consideration in this and the following table.



Here special attention is to be paid to the change occurring between ME2 and ME3. Even though the number of examples is not always as high as it would be ideal from the point of view of quantification, the tendency is detectable that roughly three times as many occurrences appear outside fixed expressions from OE2 to ME2, as those in collocations. From ME3, however, we seem to get the mirror image of this pattern, with more than 75% of the instances in collocations.

The following table (Table 14) shows the results of the frequency-counts, having thus eliminated the trap of fossilised expressions. The numbers gained are much more telling and satisfactory. As contrasted with the seemingly steady increase for MEMORY in the Middle English period, we acquire a contrastive pattern of decreasing frequency. While the number of tokens is 0.718/10,000 words in ME2, it is only 0.281 in ME4. Moreover, if this result is compared to the frequency-count for the basic meaning MIND – which is 1.309 tokens/10,000 words – it is clearly detectable that a gradual shift started some time during the Middle English period towards the generalisation and broadening of the semantic field of *gemynd/minde*.

Table 14. – Frequency-counts for *gemynd/minde* without collocations


<i>Period</i>	MEMORY (without collocations) frequency / 10,000 words	MIND Frequency / 10,000 words
OE2	0.654	-
OE3	2.241	-
OE4	1.039	0.238
ME1	-	-
ME2	0.718	-
ME3	0.326	1.194
ME4	0.281	1.309

For the sake of easier comparison, Table 15 and Diagram 4 show the two different frequency-counts carried out, and the contradictory figures gained before and after treating the collocations separately.

Table 15. – Comparison of frequency-counts for *gemynd/minde* in Middle English with the “basic meaning” MEMORY, with and without taking collocational restrictions into consideration

<i>Period</i>	MEMORY (with collocations) frequency / 10,000 words	MEMORY (without collocations) frequency / 10,000 words
ME1	0.088	-
ME2	0.923	0.718
ME3	1.411	0.326
ME4	1.824	0.281

Diagram 4. – Comparison of frequency-counts when *gemynd/minde* is MEMORY




3.5.2. The Study of the Extended Corpus

The second research, based on the extended database compiled from the *Helsinki Corpus*, the *Dictionary of Old English Database*, the *Middle English Compendium* and the *Chadwyck – Healey Collections*, shows very similar results. The total number of examples in the extended database is 210 in Old English and – much more – 1394 in Middle English, thus altogether 1604 occurrences have been analysed; eight times as many as in the pilot study. Out of the 210 Old English examples, more than 50% can be dated to OE3, that is, between 950 and 1050. This is not surprising, as most of the Anglo-Saxon corpus, especially the manuscripts containing poetry can be dated to this time. As for Middle English, more than 60% of the occurrences is from ME4 (1420-1500). The representation of ME1 is quite insignificant, with only 5 examples, but the scarcity of evidence is rather obvious, given the relatively smaller number of surviving English manuscripts from this period.

Table 16. – The meanings of *gemynd/minde* in the different periods

Periods	Σ	MIND		MEMORY (with collocations)		MENTION	
OE2	58	1	1.72%	57	98.28%	0	0.00%
OE3	110	10	9.09%	95	86.36%	5	4.55%
OE4	42	1	2.38%	28	66.67%	13	30.95%
ME1	5	4	80.00%	1	20.00%	0	0.00%
ME2	61	21	34.43%	36	59.02%	4	6.56%
ME3	475	178	37.47%	268	56.42%	29	6.11%
ME4	853	440	51.58%	349	40.91%	64	7.50%

Diagram 5. – The meanings of *gemynd/minde* in the different periods

Due to the much larger corpus, the new category: MENTION had to be introduced. This semantic field is relatively well balanced in its representation all through the 7 linguistic subperiods, mostly (with the exception of OE3) staying under 10%. In chapter 3.3.2.1. I already emphasised that the most important aspect of this sense of *minde* is that it ante-dates the *OED* entry with about 300 years.

The two other categories of meaning, MIND and MEMORY, since these are the semantic fields that were affected by the change. If we have a look at the results of MIND, we can clearly see that there is a dividing line between Old and Middle English.³³⁰ While before the mid-12th century, there are only a few instances when *gemynd* means MIND, the numbers multiply in the following centuries. Compared to the 12 examples in Old English, Middle English amounts to 640. We must keep it in mind, however, that paying attention only to the numbers can be misleading. Even though, during the corpus building, it was kept in mind to compile a balanced collection, taking as many possible text-types, dialects and other variants as possible, with a relatively equal representation in the different periods, the number of words in the given time-slots cannot be entirely equal. This shows well if we compare the results of OE3 and ME1. In OE3, there are 10 instances of *gemynd* meaning MIND, while in ME1 only 4. As, however, the total number of examples in these periods is very different (110 for OE3 while only 5 for ME1), this ratio gets an entirely new

³³⁰ In the pilot study, the change is visible only from ME3 on, due to the fewer occurrences of the word.

significance. The mathematical impossibility of 4 being more than 10 occurs here, as calculating the results in percentages, which is much more reliable than mere numbers, indicates that the four ME1 instances total exactly 80% of the examples, whereas the 10 instances of OE3 is only 9%. As a consequence, calculating the results this way proves again far more accurate; and looking at the finds, we can say that the percentages clearly indicate how the word started to broaden its semantic field towards denoting the mental faculty. The only place where the tendency seems to break a little is quite well predictable. Evidently it is the period between 1050 and 1250, where the surviving number of examples is so small that it cannot serve as precise data.

Comparing the finds to those of the pilot study, we can say that the results are very similar, even though the total number of examples in the first analysis was less. The problematic subperiod is the same, ME1 with its lack of examples (only 1 in the *Helsinki Corpus*). Otherwise, the percentages in both studies indicate how the meaning MIND started to gain ground in growing ratio, reaching 45.83% in the pilot study and 37.47% on the basis of the extended corpus by the mid-14th century.

As I have already indicated, a trap is hidden by the *minde* collocations. Seemingly there is no great change in the frequency of the appearance of *minde* denoting MEMORY in the Middle English period. Even though it does not increase in number, as in case of the pilot study, the percentages remain quite similar in ME2 and ME3, staying well above 50%, and falling only to 40.91% in ME4. Thus, in the analysis of the extended version of the corpus, a similar problem had to be faced. As in this case frequency-counts could not be carried out, we must rely on the percentages given, and we can say that even this shows that the occurrence of *minde* meaning MEMORY remains relatively stable during Middle English; moreover, it exhibits itself in almost every century as appearing in much higher percentage than the meaning MIND.


This second research, therefore, mirrors very similar results to that of the pilot study. Subtracting the collocations from the occurrences of *gemynd/minde* with the meaning MEMORY, the percentages change. We can observe that while in Old English the word mostly denotes MEMORY, all through the Middle English period *minde* mostly stands for MIND as opposed to the previous results, and the differences are significant. As Table 17 and Diagram 6 show, in ME2 more than 63% implies the mental faculty, as opposed to the previous 34.43%; in ME3 it is 77.06% instead of 37.47%; and finally in ME4 it rises to more than 80% instead of 51.58%. Therefore, the

results have completely changed with this method, and disregarding collocations, they are much more accurate. In the cases where *gemynd/minde* signify MEMORY, there is a steady and much more conspicuous decline. While 54.84% of *gemynd* stood for recollection in the 11th century, it decreased to 7.69% by the 15th. Without omitting the collocations, it was 66.67% to 40.91%!

Table 17. – The meanings of *gemynd/minde* in the different periods (without collocations)

Periods	Σ	MIND		MEMORY (without collocations)		MENTION	
OE2	50	1	2.00%	49	98.00%	0	0.00%
OE3	89	10	11.24%	74	83.15%	5	5.62%
OE4	31	1	3.23%	17	54.84%	13	41.94%
ME1	4	4	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME2	33	21	63.64%	8	24.24%	4	12.12%
ME3	231	178	77.06%	24	10.39%	29	12.55%
ME4	546	440	80.59%	42	7.69%	64	11.72%

Diagram 6. – The meanings of *gemynd/minde* in the different periods (without collocations)




There is another interesting feature that we can see when we look at the table comparing how many times the lexeme appears in collocations and how many times

outside collocations in the different periods. Table 18 and Diagram 7 show that as we proceed in time, *gemynd/minde* appears more and more often in collocations when it stands for MEMORY, reaching around 90% by ME4, from the less than 15% in OE2, signalling that in 9 out of 10 cases it is only by the fossilised expression that the word preserves the old usage, while in OE2 it was almost the other way round. The only time where the growth seems uneven is ME1, but it is due to the fact that there is only one single occurrence.

Table 18. – *gemynd/minde* as MEMORY in the different periods with and without collocations

Periods	Σ	MEMORY (collocations)		MEMORY (no collocations)	
OE2	57	8	14.04%	49	85.96%
OE3	95	21	22.11%	74	77.89%
OE4	28	11	39.29%	17	60.71%
ME1	1	1	100.00%	0	0.00%
ME2	36	28	77.78%	8	22.22%
ME3	268	244	91.04%	24	8.96%
ME4	349	307	87.97%	42	12.03%

Diagram 7. – *gemynd/minde* as MEMORY in the different periods with and without collocations



In case of *minde*, a dialectal analysis has also been carried out, similarly to our other mind-word, to see if there are any recognisable patterns in the territorial distribution of the lexeme in its different usages. Having a look at the Middle English dialectal distribution of *minde*, several trends can be observed in the history of the word (Table 19). Out of the 654 instances where the lexeme stands for MEMORY, 10 come from Kent, 37 from the Southern dialect, 322 from the East-Midlands, 122 from the West-Midlands, 127 from the Northern dialect, 33 from Scots and 3 from Ireland. These finds only reflect the fact that a large number of the manuscripts come from the East-Midlands. If, however, we look at the distribution in percentages, the results are more interesting, as it becomes evident that in the 15th century, when the standardisation of the English language begins, and London English with the East-Midland dialect starts gaining more and more prestige, the high number of East-Midland examples only amount to a total of 33.81%, while the Northern and Scots representatives are together 35.53%.

Table 19. – *Minde* as MEMORY with collocations in the different Middle English dialects

<i>Period</i>	Σ	KENT		SOUTH-ERN		EAST-MIDLAND		WEST-MIDLAND		NORTH-ERN		SCOTS		IRELAND	
ME1	1	0	0.00%	1	100.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME2	36	0	0.00%	7	19.44%	12	33.33%	8	22.22%	9	25.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME3	268	0	0.00%	17	6.34%	192	71.64%	31	11.57%	27	10.07%	0	0.00%	1	0.37%
ME4	349	10	2.87%	12	3.44%	118	33.81%	83	23.78%	91	26.07%	33	9.46%	2	0.57%

Already this seems to indicate a movement from the south to the north, but as stated earlier, we can get more precise data if the collocations are not considered and only those examples are dealt with where the lexeme denotes MEMORY in its base form, outside the binding confines of collocational restrictions. Building a chart on this basis gives comparatively different results. Table 20 displays the percentages acquired without these fossilised expressions.


Table 20. – *Minde* as MEMORY without collocations in the different Middle English dialects

<i>Period</i>	Σ	KENT	SOUTH-ERN	EAST-MIDLAND	WEST-MIDLAND	NORTH-ERN	SCOTS	IRELAND
ME1	0	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%
ME2	8	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	6 75.00%	2 25.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%
ME3	24	0 0.00%	1 4.17%	18 75.00%	3 12.50%	2 8.33%	0 0.00%	0 0.00%
ME4	42	0 0.00%	1 2.38%	14 33.33%	6 14.29%	16 38.10%	5 11.90%	0 0.00%

The chart has several advantages compared to the previous one. First of all, it more clearly demonstrates the decrease of the lexeme's basic-meaning as MEMORY in the south. There are no Kentish texts at all that exhibit such examples. In the Southern dialect, their number decreases drastically, too: from 37 to merely 2 examples, with a falling percentage. While in ME1 the single occurrence of *minde* with the meaning MEMORY comes from the Southern dialect, and there are 7 more instances in ME2 (adding up to almost 20% of the period's examples); studying only the lexemes outside collocation, we find no examples in ME1 and ME2 in this dialect at all. There are considerable changes in the East-Midland and West-Midland dialects, too. The number of examples is significantly reduced, here as well. In the East-Midlands, the 322 cases of the entire Middle English period become only 38, and the 122 examples of the West-Midlands become merely 11. All in all, it seems, however, that with the disappearance of several Southern examples that mean MEMORY only in collocations – and also that of similar Northern cases – from the mid-13th until the beginning of the 15th century, the Midlands – and especially East-Midlands – dominate the sphere. Obviously, calculating the frequency of these occurrences would be of much help in seeing the most clearly how heavy this dominance is, but due to the lack of word-counts for the Middle English corpus, this should remain an object of further research. One of the most discernible differences, and probably the most fascinating one, is the change in the percentages of Northern and Scots examples. In ME4, between 1420 and 1500, these two regions are the only areas where the percentage grows in ME4 when collocations are neglected, in all other areas it decreases radically. The two dialects together make up exactly 50% of the cases, out of which Northern alone is 38.10%, thus becoming the most significant

dialect from this perspective. This comes as no surprise, of course. The Northern³³¹ and Scots dialects tend to preserve some archaic forms which cannot be observed any longer in other areas. The diagram below (Diagram 8) shows how these examples gained ground in the Northern territories.

Diagram 8. – *Minde* as MEMORY without collocations in the different dialects



But what happened to the other major semantic field of *minde*, where the lexeme denoted its modern meaning MIND? As we have already seen in Table 16 and 17, the numbers steadily grow towards ME4, together with the increase in the number of the word's occurrences; but along with this, the percentages as compared to *minde*'s other semantic fields also show an upward slope, rising to 80.59% with 440 occurrences in the 15th century. If we consider the dialectal distribution of the lexeme in this meaning, we can realise that in ME4 most of these 440 examples come from dialects other than Northern and Scots, adding up to 61.36%, while *minde* denoting MEMORY without


³³¹ Despite being innovative in Old English, and leading in many changes even later.

collocations can be found 50% in the north. All in all, it becomes evident that the numbers of *minde* as MIND are getting higher in the whole of Britain. Meanwhile, in ME4 the relative percentages as compared to those of *minde* meaning MEMORY are somewhat higher only in Kent, the East-Midlands and the West-Midlands, while in the north it is the opposite. This find supports the thesis again that the old meaning was retained longer in the Northern and Scots dialects. For the sake of easier comparison, besides the table, charts have been drawn to illustrate what happened to the word.

Table 21. – *Minde* as MIND in the different dialects

<i>Period</i>	Σ	KENT		SOUTH-ERN		EAST-MIDLAND		WEST-MIDLAND		NORTH-ERN		SCOTS		IRELAND	
ME1	4	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	3	75,00%	1	25,00%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%
ME2	21	0	0,00%	3	14,29%	4	19,05%	5	23,81%	9	42,86%	0	0,00%	0	0,00%
ME3	178	0	0,00%	13	7,30%	110	61,80%	35	19,66%	19	10,67%	1	0,56%	0	0,00%
ME4	440	9	2,05%	8	1,82%	173	39,32%	80	18,18%	139	31,59%	31	7,05%	0	0,00%

Diagram 9. – *Minde* as MIND in the different dialects



3.6. *Memorie* and *Remembraunce*

Thus having analysed the data of the *Helsinki Corpus* and placing the semantic shift in time, the obvious question of *what* could have triggered the change remains. Judging from the results, we can assert that there are significant turning points in the history of these words, which emerge in the 14th century. This age was a linguistically busy one, shortly before the process of standardisation began in the English language. The linguistic consequences of the Norman Conquest are already quite visible, with a huge percentage of French loanwords in the vocabulary. A considerable dialectal variety has developed, making the language very diversified. Both the inflectional system and the conjugation of the verbs have significantly simplified, and this way, several common Germanic characteristics of English have disappeared or remain in a vestigial form. It seems that the lexemes studied here got into the mainstream of this linguistic turmoil, too. Sometime in the 1300s, *minde* started losing its “basic meaning” MEMORY and called its troops to retreat from the semantic battlefield. This may have several reasons that shall be dealt with later,³³² we must note here, however that this semantic shift did not only concern these two words of Germanic origin. Apparently, external influence contributed largely to the process, too, in the form of two new words arriving from the other side of the Channel that penetrated the language step by step. They are *memorie* and *remembraunce*, the French loans, which were gradually gaining ground at the time when *minde* was losing it. During the corpus analysis, these two words had to be examined, as well.

3.6.1. The Pilot Study

The number of *memorie* and *remembraunce* examples was quite low in the *Helsinki Corpus*: only 23 occurrences for one and 14 for the other word. Even this low number, however, indicates the way the two lexemes entered into the English vocabulary after ME2 and started to dominate the semantic field. Tables 22 and 23 show their numbers in the given subperiods of Middle English.

³³² Chapter 4.

Table 22. – The appearance of *memorie* in Middle English in the pilot study

Period	<i>concept</i>	<i>faculty</i>	<i>commemoration</i>	<i>Total</i>
ME1	-	-	-	-
ME2	1	-	1	2
ME3	1	1	1	3
ME4	13	2	3	18

Table 23. – The appearance of *remembraunce* in Middle English in the pilot study

Period	<i>only with the meaning: 'memory as concept'</i>
ME1	-
ME2	-
ME3	2
ME4	12

The following diagram (Diagram 10) visualises the appearance of *memorie* and *remembraunce* in the English vocabulary, as found in the pilot study. Both of these loanwords have the relatively same scope of meaning as *minde* in its original usage (MEMORY). The lexeme *memory* first appeared in ME2 and in the course of approximately 200 years it conquered the semantic field. According to the pilot study, within a short period after the arrival of *memorie*, the other newcomer, its ally: *remembraunce*, also gained ground in the language. Its arrival can be dated to the third subperiod of Middle English, that is, between 1350-1420 (at least in the pilot study, as the extended corpus ante-dates this result). It is apparent that these French “cousins” further weakened the obsolescent *minde* (MEMORY), and joining forces, their “campaign” of depriving the original Germanic word of its function proved to be successful. They gradually gained more and more ground, and while in ME2 only 22% of the semantic field was in their – or more accurately in *memorie*’s – hands, in ME3 it grew to 45% and in ME4 to a massive 84% (see Diagram 11), pushing *minde* up towards the north until it grew so much out of use that today this lexeme preserves its original referent only in some fossilised expressions, as pointed out above.

Diagram 10. – The three words: *minde*, *memorie* and *remembraunce* meaning MEMORY in Middle English in the pilot study






Diagram 11. – The ratio of *minde*, *memorie* and *remembraunce* in the Middle English subperiods.





3.6.2. The Study of the Extended Corpus

The extended corpus gave a significantly higher number of examples for the analysis, therefore, the results must be more reliable. There are 317 occurrences of *memorie*, and 573 occurrences of *remembraunce*. The other important difference in comparison with the pilot study is that *remembrance*, although only with 2 examples, appears in ME3 texts as well, showing that it entered the English vocabulary before 1350, and therefore was not much preceded by the other loanword: *memorie*.

...noble contenance In bataile of *remembraunce*; Wawain him conteind þan so,... (*Of Arthour & of Merlin*. [Version A], and also in the Auchinleck MS)

Table 24. – The comparison of the appearance of *minde* (in the basic meaning MEMORY), *memorie* and *remembraunce* in Middle English

Periods	<i>minde</i> (without collocations)	<i>memorie</i>	<i>remembraunce</i>
ME2	8	3	2
ME3	24	36	103
ME4	42	278	468

The diagrams below picture these changes and intend to make the numbers appearing in the table more easily comprehensible. When the percentages are shown in Diagram 13, we can observe how *minde* starts losing ground as compared to the loanwords. While it is still 62% in ME2 (the second half of the 13th – first half of the 14th century), it becomes 5% by ME4, in the late 15th century. It means that while *memorie* and *remembrance* were used for denoting the recollecting faculty or the act of

remembering in 38% in ME2, this percentage increased to 95% in ME4, only about 150 years later.

Diagram 12. – The ratio of the three lexemes in Middle English





Diagram 13. – The percentages of the three lexemes in Middle English



3.7. The “Basic Meaning” MIND

Perhaps the most fascinating analysis is finding out which word denoted the mental faculty in greater ratio in the given periods and in the individual dialects. We have seen that in the course of Middle English *mod/mood* gradually lost its meaning MIND, while on the other hand, *gemynd/minde* slowly took its place and became the basic lexeme referring to the mental faculties. After the quantification of the results, several comparative tables have been made. Before the analysis of the entire corpus, let me first begin with a recollection of the pilot study, and provide the results of it, as well. In Table 25, indicating the changes within Old and Middle English, we can see that the numbers gained in the pilot study show rather exclusive results. In the Old English period, it is only OE3 where we meet examples of *gemynd* meaning MIND, but merely 6 out of 162, totalling to 3.70%. In the other subperiods of Old English, it is only *mod* denoting the mental faculty out of the two words. In ME1, ME2 and ME4 we face either *mood* or *minde* occupying the entire field. This exclusive nature of the words is somewhat misleading, though, generated by the low number of examples that could be found in the *Helsinki Corpus*. As the table shows, there were only 75 cases recorded for Middle English. Still, even the *Helsinki Corpus* can provide us with good approximations, showing the semantic shift. Already from this chart it becomes well visible that ME3, i.e. the end of the 14th and the beginning of the 15th century, is the transitional period where both words are in use for the same concept.

Table 25. – The lexemes denoting MIND in Middle English in the pilot study


Period	<i>gemynd/minde</i>		<i>mod/mood</i>		Total
OE2	-	-	53	100.00%	53
OE3	6	3.70%	156	96.30%	162
OE4	-	-	22	100.00%	22
ME1	-	-	11	100.00%	11
ME2	-	-	7	100.00%	7
ME3	22	75.86%	7	24.14%	29
ME4	28	100.00%	-	-	28

After the examples of the *Dictionary of Old English Database* the *Chadwyck-Healey Database* and *The Middle English Compendium* were added, the analysis of the

entire enlarged corpus could begin with a hope of getting even more precise data (Table 26). This way, only for the Middle English period, there were 767 examples where either *mood* or *minde* stood for the mental faculty. As for Old English, the sum is even greater, totalling to 1033. The results of this general overview are most telling. In Old English, there seems to be an almost exclusive dominance of *mod*. From the total of 1033 instances where the text refers to the mental faculty, only 12 use *gemynd*, in all the other cases it is *mod*. Out of these 12 examples, 10 can be found in OE3 (950-1050), but this does not even amount to more than a sum of 2.41%, meaning that it was only about every 41st instance where *gemynd* was used in this meaning. Furthermore, if we take the complete cornucopia of Old English mind-words into consideration, we can conclude that this is a very insignificant sum; enough, however, to signal the tendency within the word itself to broaden its semantic field towards its new meaning. In Middle English we cannot see the exclusivity that can be observed by examining only the *Helsinki Corpus*. Still, we can say that the percentages gained through the enlarged corpus are similarly very high for *mood* in ME1 and ME2 (above 70%), and after the huge change taking place in ME3, it rises to 95.65% for *minde* in ME4. The transitional period thus remains the end of the 14th century, this time instead of the 75.86% : 24.14% in favour of *minde*, with a 81.65% : 18.35% ratio.

Table 26. – The basic meaning MIND in the different periods

Periods	Σ	GEMYND/MINDE		MOD/MOOD	
OE2	456	1	0.22%	455	99.78%
OE3	415	10	2.41%	405	97.59%
OE4	162	1	0.62%	161	99.38%
ME1	18	4	22.22%	14	77.78%
ME2	71	21	29.58%	50	70.42%
ME3	218	178	81.65%	40	18.35%
ME4	460	440	95.65%	20	4.35%

Diagram 14. – The meaning MIND in the different periods

It is also intriguing to take a look at the way the sum of words is divided into our subperiods. Interestingly, the sum is very high in OE2 (456) and OE3 (415), then declines in OE4 (162), gets even lower in ME1 (18), and remains low in ME2 (71), until it starts increasing in ME3 (218) to arrive at a very high number again in ME4 (460). Certainly, the time between the mid-11th and the late 13th centuries was a historically turbulent era, which – due to the Norman dominance – did not flourish in English language manuscripts as much as the times preceding and following it. However, even disregarding this fact, we can say that the interest in the mind and the use of the mental vocabulary was more characteristic to the centuries before and after this period. If we have a look at the individual works coming down to us from OE2, it comes as no surprise that we face an abundance of *mod*, because this was the time when the manuscripts containing the Old English translation of Bede's *Historia Ecclesiastica* and the – similarly Alfredian – Boethius and *Cura Pastoralis* translations were born; works with an increased interest in the mind. Similarly, OE3 includes very significant other manuscripts with a heightened philosophical interest, as the Old English translation of Gregory's *Dialogues*, or the *Blickling*, *Vercelli* and Ælfric's *homilies*. Later, in ME4 the growing interest in philosophical issues is signalled by the appearance of the mystics.

These writings are the source of a large number of *minde* expressions, together with other moralising literature so characteristic of this period, the manuscripts of which can be dated back to the later 15th century. Such are morality and mystery plays.

The next step in the analysis is acquiring a dialectal division besides the chronological one. For this, all the sources used were defined by their dialectal belonging, and thus categorised into the linguistic subperiods one-by-one. It is fascinating to see that in all of the dialects,³³³ there is inverse proportionality between the two words. While in ME1 and ME2, that is between the mid 12th and mid 14th centuries it is the word *mood* which stands for the human mental faculty, from the second half of the 14th century *minde* takes its place in all dialects. The process is excellently visible looking at the comparative charts. In each and every dialectal area there is a shift between ME2 and ME3, *mood* winning in an average of 69.96% against *minde*'s average 30.04% in ME2. In the next subperiod, however, it is *minde* winning to an average of 84.58% against *mood* represented by now only with an average of 15.42%. By the second half of the 15th century – in every dialect – all or almost all cases show that the mental faculty is denoted by the new word. It is only the Northern dialect where merely 9 out of 10 instances use the new word, while *mood* preserves its original meaning in a bit more than 9% of the cases.

Table 27. – *Mood* as RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF
in the different Middle English dialects

Periods	Σ	KENT		SOUTH-ERN		EAST-MIDLAND		WEST-MIDLAND		NORTH-ERN		SCOTS		IRELAND	
ME1	14	2	14.29%	10	71.43%	0	0.00%	2	14.29%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME2	50	0	0.00%	9	18.00%	10	20.00%	8	16.00%	23	46.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME3	40	0	0.00%	1	2.50%	15	37.50%	18	45.00%	6	15.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME4	20	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	6	30.00%	0	0.00%	14	70.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%

³³³ Except for East-Midland in ME1, where there are only 3 occurrences of the meaning MIND, and all of which belong to the lexeme *minde* with no example of *mood* in such meaning. Due to the relatively low number of examples (18 altogether), however, ME1 cannot be regarded as a well-represented period.

Table 28. – *Minde* as MIND in the different Middle English dialects


Periods	Σ	KENT		SOUTH-ERN		EAST-MIDLAND		WEST-MIDLAND		NORTH-ERN		SCOTS		IRELAND	
		Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage	Count	Percentage
ME1	4	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	3	75.00%	1	25.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME2	21	0	0.00%	3	14.29%	4	19.05%	5	23.81%	9	42.86%	0	0.00%	0	0.00%
ME3	178	0	0.00%	13	7.30%	110	61.80%	35	19.66%	19	10.67%	1	0.56%	0	0.00%
ME4	440	9	2.05%	8	1.82%	173	39.32%	80	18.18%	139	31.59%	31	7.05%	0	0.00%


Table 29. – A comparison of the basic meaning MIND in the different dialects

Periods	KENT		SOUTHERN		EAST-MIDLAND		WEST-MIDLAND		NORTHERN		SCOTS		IRELAND	
	MOOD	MINDE	MOOD	MINDE	MOOD	MINDE	MOOD	MINDE	MOOD	MINDE	MOOD	MINDE	MOOD	MINDE
ME1	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%	100.00%	66.67%	33.33%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
ME2	0.00%	0.00%	75.00%	25.00%	71.43%	28.57%	61.54%	38.46%	71.88%	28.13%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%	0.00%
ME3	0.00%	0.00%	7.14%	92.86%	12.00%	88.00%	33.96%	66.04%	24.00%	76.00%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%
ME4	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	100.00%	3.35%	96.65%	0.00%	100.00%	9.15%	90.85%	0.00%	100.00%	0.00%	0.00%

Looking at a heap of numbers in a table is not as telling as their translation into charts, therefore, besides the above tables of the individual dialectal areas showing how the representation of the meaning MIND changed from period to period, two other series of comparative charts have been prepared, which – with their plasticity – make it easier to follow the semantic change. The first one, Diagram 15, uses a different approach than Diagram 14; here the main focus is on the individual subperiods of Middle English, reflecting how *minde* gradually takes the role of *mood*, and broadens its meaning towards the mental faculty in greater and greater percentages as time goes by. An examination of the growing dominance of light blue lines visualises how the Middle English mental vocabulary changed during the centuries, and how *mood* gave grounds almost entirely to the new mind-word.

Diagram 15. – The changing dominance of the lexemes from ME1 to ME4





The following charts (Diagram 16 and 17) are three-dimensional representations of the same process. Here the focus is on the two lexemes, the diagrams have been designed on this basis, dividing the corpus up into the group of *mood* and that of *minde*. Afterwards the usual colour-coding was used for the separate dialects, and the four periods are shown simultaneously. The height of each column indicates the percentage of the lexeme meaning MIND as compared to the other lexeme. The higher the column is, the greater the percentage is. The way the columns shift downwards, and fact that the *mood* columns gradually decrease while the *minde* columns increase their height, visualise the semantic process that took place. Diagram 18 shows each dialect separately.

Diagram 16. – The division of *mood* as MIND in the different ME dialects




Diagram 17. – The division of *minde* as MIND in the different ME dialects





Diagram 18. – The ratio of *minde* and *mood* meaning MIND in the different dialectal regions³³⁴



³³⁴ The original map of Middle English dialects was taken from: Baugh and Cable, *A History of the English Language*, 186.

4. The Possible Reasons of the Semantic Change

The previous chapter proved several things. The two separate analyses, the pilot study and that of the extended corpus, brought very similar results, cross-checking one another. By providing the parallel results, the data gained proves to be reliable. According to the studies, there were gradual and well observable changes in the meanings that *mod/mood* and *gemynd/minde* covered. As we have seen, the lexeme *mod/mood* started becoming overwhelmingly emotional in the 13th century (ME3), but we must not forget about the Old English vernacular tradition, either, where the mental faculty – as it appears mostly in poetic texts – carried such emotional overtones, too. Parallel with this, the word's other basic meaning, RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF, was retained in the north, but even there it was mostly *minde* that stood for the mental faculty from ME3 (second half of the 14th century) on. A similar process happened to *gemynd/minde* as to the other word. At the same time as *mod/mood* started to lose its old meaning, *gemynd/minde* started to lose its basic meaning MEMORY, too, and denoted in higher and higher frequency MIND. The old meaning was predominantly retained in the Northern dialect.

The main question this chapter will try to answer is why this semantic change happened and how it reflects the processes taking place in the society and the way of thinking about the mind. This chapter, therefore, will rely on both the corpus research and the preceding discussions and will bring linguistic and socio-cultural considerations together in order to contribute to a fuller understanding of the Old and Middle English mind(s), both the words and the concept(s).

4.1. Linguistic Considerations

Definitely, one of the keys to answering the question why it is exactly *gemynd* which, developing into *minde*, survived to Modern English denoting the mental faculty, is exploring its functions in the Old English period and a comparison with that of other mind-words. As we will see later,³³⁵ *gemynd* and *mod* were the lexemes most often used in prose texts denoting this concept. This partly explains why these two words survived

³³⁵ Chapter 4.2.

and why the others were more likely to fade out of use, but does not reveal why *mod* lost its primacy in the mental lexicon, giving ground to *gemynd* to occupy its place. Even though the chief semantic field that *gemynd* covered in Old English was memory and remembrance, it must have had the potentials to broaden its meaning to a more general reference to the mind. As we have seen, there are about a dozen occurrences already in Old English texts, where the lexeme stands for the mental faculty. Antonina Harbus does not stop here, though. She claims that “the word probably originally connoted ‘mind’ but seems to have been mostly used with the sense of ‘memory’ or in locative constructions expressing ‘in the mind.’”³³⁶ Certainly, the word carried some inherent tendencies to develop later towards the much broader basic-meaning MIND. The few Old English examples where the most obvious interpretation is a generalised reference to the mental faculty proves this. Also, memory has always been regarded part of people’s mind, so memory and mind are often associated with one another. However, I cannot find enough support to say that the original meaning of *gemynd* was “mind”; the one that this lexeme later regained. Although Harbus is carefully inserting the word “probably” into her explanation, all that supports this statement is that according to the etymological dictionaries, the word’s Sanskrit, Greek and Latin cognates connote “mind”, and some other cognates refer to the thinking process. However, Latin *mens*, *mentis* could have emotional overtones, too; and Greek *μενος* even more so, meaning “desire”, “anger”, “courage” – so not simply a general “mind”, like in the case of the Anglo-Saxon *mod*. Moreover, many cognates rather stand for “memory” or “to remember”, as for instance Icel. *minni*, Danish *minde*, OHG *gimunt*, Latin *meminisse*, Greek *μναομαι*, so I do not find that her argument has a sound enough basis.

When she elaborates her idea of why *gemynd* stayed in use after the Old English period, while the other words used for the mental faculty either became obsolete or shifted their meaning, her opinion calls for another comment. She claims that

[...] it is perhaps significant that it [*gemynd*] is cognate with Latin *mens/mentis* ‘mind’ and a host of related, imported terms because during the early ME period, when Latin-based romance vocabulary was being imported via the conquering Normans, cognate terms had a greater chance of being retained than unfamiliar ones.³³⁷

³³⁶ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 42.

³³⁷ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 44.

This statement seems rather unsupported, even though an article by Xavier Dekeyser and Luc Pauwels is referred to, because it is not obvious that medieval English-speakers were able to relate these two words etymologically in an era before the advent of comparative linguistics, given the often fanciful and impressionistic etymologising current in Antiquity and the Middle Ages. Harbus further adds that, for example, in Iceland, a place without any Norman influence, *hugr* is the lexeme surviving into modern usage, while in England it fell out of use by the 13th century.³³⁸ I believe, however, that the Norman influence cannot have been the reason behind this difference, especially that *hyge* – though also a frequently used mind-word – is not comparable in “popularity” to the usage of *mod*, particularly not in prose texts.

Although Harbus does not seem to be right in her suppositions about why *gemynd* was preserved, there must definitely be some linguistic reason behind it. Looking at the Old English lexicon, we can see that Old English *gemynd* in the basic meaning MEMORY was supported by other words, such as the adjectives *gemyndig*, *gemyne* or the verbs (*ge*)*mynan*,³³⁹ *gemyn(d)gian*. In Middle English, all these supporters became obsolete, except for *mind(e)ful*, and it seems likely that *minde* was therefore left free to expand towards a general reference to the human mind.

While, in Middle English, *minde* lost almost all its corresponding verbs and adjectives; thus its productivity ceased and it was left alone in the linguistic turmoil of the period, in the background, significant cultural changes were taking place in Europe, reaching their apogee in Early Modern English with the Age of Renaissance. Science and scientific writing began to develop by leaps and bounds, new methods and concepts required new words. The language became lavish with neologisms, the influx of which reached its greatest intensity in the 16th and 17th centuries.³⁴⁰ Together with the gradual growth of new scientific terminology, the English lexicon was also thriving on new philosophical terms. Although King Alfred laid the foundations of philosophical writing

³³⁸ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 44.

³³⁹ Michiko Ogura discusses the development of verbs of cognition, too, and examines the Old English word *gemynan*. The author concludes that out of the word-group *wenan*, *bencan*, *gebencan*, *þyncan*, *smeagan*, and *gemunan*, it is *bencan* which survived the semantic conflict, since this was the only “colourless” one of the lexemes. *Wenan*, though being the most common one, was often used with negatives. *Verbs in Medieval English: Differences in Verb Choice in Verse and Prose*, 67; and “OE Verbs of Thinking,” *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 87. (1986), 325-341.

³⁴⁰ See: Koivisto-Alanko, *Abstract Words in Abstract Worlds: Directionality and Prototypical Structure in the Semantic Change in English Nouns of Cognition*, 148. And Nevalainen, “Early Modern English Lexis and Semantics,” f. 336.

in English as early as the 9th century, new trends required more refined vocabulary. The widespread cultural changes of the 13th-14th centuries, like the rising middle class, their increasing share in political life and literature, the establishment of grammar schools teaching a growing number of these people to read and write, meant a significant change in the nature of literary works produced. Reading and hearing about philosophical issues had become the share of the lower layers of society, too. As Janet Coleman notes, “by the later 14th century the use of English verses in sermons became habitual,”³⁴¹ and besides this, there is evidence that already in the 12th century – although this tradition partly started in Anglo-Saxon times – bishops and abbots were preaching in English.³⁴² A great number of homiletic and didactic works started to be produced in this century, which also “indicated a shift towards an increase in private lay devotional reading in the vernacular.”³⁴³ Writing in English was the means of reaching these people and winning them, and on the other hand of nourishing those who wanted to follow the road offered by popular philosophers of the age. By the end of the Middle English period, mystics like Walter Hilton, Julian of Norwich or Margery Kempe³⁴⁴ had become increasingly popular, all satisfying people’s basic instincts to get closer to God, offering a way to identify with Him and to reach a level of contemplative life, when the mystical union of the Deity and the soul is acquired. Religion, and thus also philosophy, had stepped out of the interior of churches, the dialogue with God had become part of the everyday life.

New trends brought forth new vocabulary, and as the target group was no longer the clergy, the use of the vernacular even in religious and philosophical writing became inevitable. The Lollards’ Bible translation meant a touchstone in the process and although translation was a controversial topic of this time, more and more works emphasised that each language had the ability to transmit the meaning of the original. In one of the Wycliffite writings, we can read the following:

For Ierom, þat was a Latyn man of birþe, translátide þe Bible boþe out of Ebru and out of Greek into Latyn, and expounide ful myche þerto. And Austyn and manie mo Latyns expouniden þe Bible for manie parties in Latyn, to Latyn men among whiche þei dwelliden. And Latyn was a comoun

³⁴¹ Coleman, *English Literature in History 1350-1400: Medieval Readers and Writers*, 23.

³⁴² Coleman, *English Literature in History 1350-1400: Medieval Readers and Writers*, 172.

³⁴³ Coleman, *English Literature in History 1350-1400: Medieval Readers and Writers*, 23.

³⁴⁴ A high number examples of *minde* in Middle English are from the mystics.

langage to here puple aboute Rome and bi3ondis and on þis half, as Englishe is comoun langage to oure puple.³⁴⁵

Even though we know that translation was already important in the 9th century, in King Alfred's time, it gained further significance in the 14th. Literacy reached a certain layer of the laity as well, more and more people had the means to read, and therefore the need for translations increased in order to serve the requirements of the growing layer of the new literate laity. As William Nassyngton in the late 14th century wrote:

Some cane franche and na latyn,
That used has court, and dwelled therin.
And some cane of latyn a party
That cane franch but feberly.
And some undirstandye ynglych
That nouter can latyn ne franche.
But lerede and lewed, alde and yonge,
All undirstandys ynglych tonge.³⁴⁶

The basic principle of translations was twofold: generally, a careful balance between *verba* and *sententia* had to be found. Translators had to be both faithful to the original and clear in channelling the message of the work they were conveying. This double task had had a long tradition, which can be traced back to Antiquity and the Patristic Age. Saint Jerome in his Vulgate Bible followed at times the words, at times the sense, or sometimes both of them: “vel verbum e verbo, vel sensum e sensu, vel ex utroque commistum”³⁴⁷; a familiar phrase echoed by many, for example by Alfred himself in his *Preface to Pastoral Care*. Fidelity to both sense and language was a requirement, but achieving this was a strenuous task; and indeed, the vernacular Middle Ages tightropes between the two. It either focuses on “openness” of the text, where literal translation is rejected as meaning becomes captive of the language,³⁴⁸ and therefore, a more “rhetorical”, sense-to-sense interpretation is followed. Or it puts more emphasis on the words themselves and on “grammatical” approach, and develops a norm for translation “whose hermeneutical motive is directed at textual appropriation

³⁴⁵ Quoted in Minnis and Machan, “The Boece as Late-Medieval Translation.” Hudson, *English Wycliffite Writings*, 70.

³⁴⁶ In BM MS Royal 17C viii, fol. 3 (and Add. MS 22283 and Add. MS 22558), quoted in Coleman, *English Literature in History 1350-1400: Medieval Readers and Writers*, 174.

³⁴⁷ PL xxviii, 1138C. See: Minnis, A. J. ed. *Chaucer's Boece and the Medieval Tradition of Boethius*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1993.

³⁴⁸ The Ciceronian model. See also Jerome and Evragnius of Antioch, in, for example: Copeland, *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages*, 49-50.

and at the shaping and persuasive powers of discourse.”³⁴⁹ However it was, after the 13th century, a period of upswing in textual transmissions; with the above mentioned cultural changes of the 14th century; and later, with the growing number of scientific and philosophical works written in the vernacular, the English language was facing a great task. New vocabulary had to be created to specialise the language and adapt it to the demands of introducing these relatively new themes in the vernacular.³⁵⁰ Its linguistic resources had to be utilised and exploited, thus the time was ripe for the appearance of lexical innovations and neologisms.

Although, looking back, the entire process of changing mental and philosophical vocabulary seems to be a relatively clear-cut and quick one, happening in definite and “determined” steps, it encompassed a few of centuries in late Middle English, early Modern English. Päivi Koivisto-Alanko examines the semantic changes of *wit*, and touching upon other words of cognition, she draws our attention to some tendencies in the semantic history of abstract words. She writes that “as the sphere of abstract thinking and experience broadened, one word had to be stretched to cover too wide a range of meanings and as a result it became ambiguous.”³⁵¹ In her example, she shows how *wit* gained more and more meanings within its basic-meaning COGNITION in the Early Modern English period (see also *OED* entry for *wit*), and the same process is true for *minde*. As the framework of abstract thinking broadened, *minde* expanded its meaning in order to encompass a wider range of concepts. In ME3, it already comprised such abstract ideas as thought, intention, will, desire, care, concern, attention, and even opinion. The ability to stretch its meaning towards other mental faculties than remembering was inherent in the word, as already in OE3 we can find sporadic instances where the referent of *gemynd* cannot be “memory” or “commemoration”, but clearly points into the direction of general intellectual powers. This inclination for broadening was further facilitated by the above mentioned loss of supporting adjectives and verbs.

³⁴⁹ Copeland, *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages*, 55.

³⁵⁰ On the tradition of academic transitions in the Middle Ages see also: Ellis, Roger and others, eds. *The Medieval Translator: The Theory and Practice of Translation in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1989. For how involved people were in the problems of meaning and translation later, in the 16th century, see: Salmon, Vivian. “Views on Meaning in 16th- Century England.” In *Language and Society in Early Modern England: Selected Essays 1981-1994*, edited by Konrad Koerner, 55-75. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1996.

³⁵¹ Koivisto-Alanko, *Abstract Words in Abstract Worlds: Directionality and Prototypical Structure in the Semantic Change in English Nouns of Cognition*, 147.

When an old word becomes excessively ambiguous in its meaning, the time is ripe for the appearance of new words in the lexicon, especially because polysemy is not easily tolerated by the linguistic system. This is specifically so in case of philosophical and scientific writing, where precise, unmistakable, sharply-defined vocabulary is required. There were two ways of broadening the English lexicon, both of which contributed largely to the late Middle English semantic turmoil. One of these methods was the reinterpretation of an earlier word, the expansion or reduction of its field of reference; the other one was borrowing the specialised terminology, often from Latin via French.

In general, the new “cognitive” lexemes entered scientific writings first and formed a *suprastandard* layer of the vocabulary. Päivi Koivisto-Alanko defines this expression as referring to the “part of the language that belongs to the uppermost register and cannot be considered either colloquial or standard.”³⁵² Her examples are *intelligence*, *intellect* and *science* entering into the language for a specific purpose, for philosophical writings, and first exclusively used for such scholarly texts. In the beginning, these words did not interfere with the original, native words *knowledge* and *understanding*, as they were chiefly used for these specific, suprastandard purposes. When, however, philosophical translations and writings were in general, targeted more at everyday people, these words entered the standard language and the new vocabulary of cognition acquired a standard status.

Even though Koivisto-Alanko is right when saying that the wide range of “cognitive” language made its *début* at the beginning of early Modern English, the major changes concerning *mod/mood* and *gemynd/minde* came about earlier, most probably because these words are not that specialised in their usage as many of their near-synonyms examined by Koivisto-Alanko. With the broadening of the semantic field of *minde*, it seems that there was a simultaneous push-chain and drag-chain process that took place in terms of the two words. A clear rearrangement of the semantic fields can be noticed already in the heart of the Middle English period, and new vocabulary was drawn in from French. The adoption of loans tends to initiate a process, pressing old words out of use and replacing them. In our case, the newcomers were *memorie* and *remembraunce* taking over, thus instigating a chain process in the

³⁵² Koivisto-Alanko, *Abstract Words in Abstract Worlds: Directionality and Prototypical Structure in the Semantic Change in English Nouns of Cognition*, 167.

language.³⁵³ These words, however, seem to have a relatively different history compared to *intelligence*, *intellect*, *science* and some other words connected to the mind. They were not used in suprastandard for a long time, but as demonstrated by the evidence of electronic corpora, they gained power very quickly and appeared in steadily rising frequency from ME2 on, not chiefly in scholarly works, but for instance in the poems of the Vernon MS, romances, and the works of Chaucer, Gower, Lydgate and Langland and even the Scottish Gavin Douglas, and thus found its way relatively easily to standard English.

In the 14th century, when these two new lexemes, *memorie* and *remembraunce* appeared “on board”, there were two words with the basic meaning (RATIONAL) MIND, and the linguistic “battle” started. Harbus suggests that the scene was even more complex. She claims that when the Latin term *memoria* was imported via Norman French and entered its new environment “*memoria* connotes both the mnemonic faculty of the mind and also the more encompassing concept ‘consciousness/mind’, whereas in Latin, both classical and medieval, the word *memoria* connotes only ‘memory.’”³⁵⁴ Thus, she claims that in the beginning, there were three words fighting for the referent “mind”, two of which seem to be almost entirely parallel in their semantic fields, as both *memorie* and *minde* can stand for the mnemonic faculty as well as consciousness and mind. She builds this idea upon the evidence of the *Anglo-Norman Dicionary*,³⁵⁵ which – though giving the senses “memory” and “remembrance” – also mentions the expressions *de bone memoire* or *de seine memorie* as meaning “of sound mind.” Although, in her footnote, she specifies that *memor* can connote “mind” only in an Anglo-Norman context, she seems to build an entire theory upon this weakly attested idea and states the following:

It appears that the native notion of the essentially mnemonic power of the mind influenced the usage of this imported term, though here was a chance to isolate the connotation ‘memory’ to this new word. Clearly, it was not desirable or necessary to distinguish mind and memory lexically, even in post-Conquest England, and when specificity was required, context

³⁵³ cf. Koivisto-Alanko, *Abstract Words in Abstract Worlds: Directionality and Prototypical Structure in the Semantic Change in English Nouns of Cognition* and Samuels, *Linguistic Evolution with Special Reference to English*.

³⁵⁴ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 55.

³⁵⁵ Edited by W. Rothwell, London, 1992.

determined whether it was the mind or its recollective powers which was connoted by one of the English terms.³⁵⁶

It is true that the Old English *gemynd* carried the potential to broaden towards a meaning denoting the mental faculty. There are a few early examples where the word is best translated as “mind.” However, stating that “it was not desirable or necessary to distinguish mind and memory lexically” is a rough-and-ready, superficial way of approaching the question. It is as if we said that simply because *sely* used to denote “happy”, “blessed”, “holy”, “innocent”, “feeble” and “crazy” once, and moreover, it carried virtually all these meanings at the turn of the fifteenth and sixteenth centuries,³⁵⁷ it was “not desirable or necessary to distinguish” happiness, innocence, holiness, feebleness or even craziness. Or, taking the idea even further, should we say from this point of view that it was not “desirable or necessary” to distinguish a buxom woman from an obedient one a couple of centuries ago, just like a godparent from “groundless rumour”³⁵⁸ at, let us say, the beginning of the 19th century? Evidently, a word does not pick up an entirely new meaning out of the blue, and meanings develop from one another. However, it does definitely not mean that there was no need for distinguishing these meanings. If it had been so, the words wouldn’t have developed. What is more, the Old English *gemynd* seems to denote the mnemonic faculty in the primary sense, the recollection of something, or that which is remembered, therefore it should not be forcefully and entirely “merged” into “mind.” Further, as there used to be many other mind-words, several of which had chiefly emotional properties, it must definitely not be stated that the native notion of the mind was an “essentially mnemonic” one.

I would also like to add that talking about the later development of the word is also over-simplified when we read that “the Old English *gemynd* was able to regain its broader sense, ‘mind’, and after being developed into the Middle English term *mind*, continued to connote ‘memory’ as well as ‘mind’ until the fifteenth century.”³⁵⁹ I must remark here that taking collocations into consideration, *mind* retains its double meaning even today in the expressions: *to keep sth in mind*, *to call sth to mind*, *to pass out of*

³⁵⁶ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 55.

³⁵⁷ According to the *OED* entry for *seely*, it can stand for “happy” as late as: 1483 - Cath. Angl. 56/1 “Cele, vbi happy,” and already means “foolish” in: a1529 Skelton Col. Cloute 1246 “Nor of theyr noddy polles, Nor of theyr sely soules.” All the other meanings are frequent all through the 13th – 17th centuries.

³⁵⁸ *OED* definition for *gossip*.

³⁵⁹ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 55.

mind, to put sb in mind of sth, etc., where the original reference to the recollective powers is still in use. What is more, in contemporary Scots, it still means “a memory” or “recollection” even outside the strict confines of collocations.³⁶⁰

To cut a long story short, I would like to maintain to the idea that when *memorie* (and *remembraunce*) appeared in the semantic battlefield, there were not three but two words: *minde* and *mood* with the basic meaning: RATIONAL MIND, in fight with each other. As *mod/mood* had its inherent tendency of denoting the mind’s emotional qualities, simultaneously with the expansion of *gemynd/minde*’s meaning, this word underwent a process of semantic specialisation. The outcome of the fight was as expected in such instances: as mentioned above, it is usually either an old near-synonym taking over its place, or a recent loan. *Mod/mood* was thus defeated by *gemynd/minde*, taking over its functions of denoting mental processes in general and leaving it with its purely emotional referent. On the contrary, *gemynd/minde* had been pushed out of its original function by Early Modern English by the two French newcomers, *memorie* and *remembraunce*. To sum up, the troops of the lexemes gradually rearranged their forces in the semantic battlefield, and after the turbulent 14th-15th centuries, *mod* – in its original meaning – withdrew to the north until it surrendered altogether, and yielded ground to *gemynd*, a word that in return for its newly acquired territory had to renounce that of “memory.”

4.2. Literary Considerations

Besides the obvious linguistic factors, there are several other influences that must have facilitated the semantic change. The first point that we should find an answer to is why exactly *mod* and *gemynd* were the two lexemes that survived out of the abundance of mind-words. Antonina Harbus³⁶¹ devotes some attention to the question, and she primarily looks for the answer in the wide usage of the two Old English words *mod* and *gemynd*, and argues that both lexemes were far more frequent even in Old English, than other mind-words. Therefore, their frequent appearance in prose texts assured their survival and continued use in the Middle English period, whereas other words of the

³⁶⁰ See, for example: Robinson, Mairi, ed. *The Concise Scots Dictionary*. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1985.

³⁶¹ *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*

Old English mental lexicon, which were used less, and mostly in poetry, became gradually obsolete. Her argumentation is clear and acceptable in this aspect. Certainly, out of the arsenal of Old English mind-vocabulary the ones which are more frequently used, especially outside poetical context, are more likely to survive.

As I have already discussed, there was great importance attributed to mental states, emotions and the spirituality behind man's actions in Anglo-Saxon England; and this must be one of the causes that justify the existence of so many mind-synonyms and near-synonyms in the vocabulary. But there is one more reason: a 'prosaic' one. And here the word 'prosaic' must appear in inverted commas, as the reason in question is in connection with poetry, indeed. I must refer back to the arguments elaborated in chapter 2.4. concerning the Old English poetic diction: as I have discussed there, the alliterative line and the tradition of employing 'repetitions with variation' required the existence of whole word-groups for the most frequently used phrases. A host of compounds and a bunch of synonyms and near-synonyms stood in service of the Anglo-Saxon *scop*. In 'time of need', depending on the metrical conditions, there was a wide range of mind-words to call upon, to select from. With the new trends in literature, the appearance of the rhyme and the disappearance of the alliterative line – even if it was a temporary feature and it reappeared in the 14th century –, many of the poetical compounds, and even some of the simplexes were less and less frequently employed, and consequently, it is no wonder that they went gradually out of use.

Harbus, when considering the changes that occurred in the mental vocabulary, briefly mentions the decline of the alliterative tradition,³⁶² but is not consistent in the treatment of Old English mind-words, as we have seen. She argues that they – both simplexes and compounds – were not used interchangeably simply for the sake of alliteration, but – though sharing their semantic "ranges" at times – they were in many instances consciously chosen by the medieval poet. In claiming so, she disagrees with Godden, who asserts that the near-synonyms were "used more or less interchangeably,"³⁶³ but criticises Phillips³⁶⁴ by saying that his "attempt to distinguish shades of meaning extrapolates tendencies as firm rules."³⁶⁵ Harbus argues that the

³⁶² Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 45.

³⁶³ Godden, "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind," 289.

³⁶⁴ *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*.

³⁶⁵ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 34.

lexemes denoting “mind” in Old English cannot have been interchangeable, but she never denies it, either, that sometimes mind-words were used for the sake of alliteration.

All in all, to some extent I tend to agree with Harbus, who claims that many of the mind-words cannot have been used interchangeably but were rather near-synonyms in the wide lexical arsenal of Old English, sharing their semantic “ranges” in some context; but I do not find her reasoning and the quotations she provides convincing enough. I would further like to emphasise that the fact that most of the mind-words became obsolete in Middle English is partly owing to the changing fashion in poetic diction, the disappearance of the alliterative line and the frequent employment of repetitions in formulaic poetry, as there was no great need any more for the huge number of lexemes denoting “mind.” Harbus, however does not attribute further significance to this and writes that

[...] rather than falling out of use as a result of the decline in the alliterative tradition, the reduced mental vocabulary after the Old English period might reflect a change away from the idiomatic sourcing of emotions and overt references to the mind, as emotions and mental experiences like dreams and visions are not explicitly mind-based in those Middle English texts which continue to show some interest in the psychological literary viewpoint.³⁶⁶

If this is so, she might be right in her reasoning why Old English compounds, as for instance *breastcearu*, *breostgeðanc*, *breosthyge* or *ferhþcofa*, where the location of the mind is defined, have become obsolete. But this does not answer the question why other compounds and simplex nouns are lost, too.

4.3. The Rationalisation of the Mind

Perhaps the most important cultural factor surrounding the change from *mod* to *minde* is the change in the concept of the human mind. While nowadays the distinction is often drawn between the cognitive and the emotional, and people tend to identify themselves rather with their cognitive, intellectual selves, laying less emphasis on and attributing smaller importance to “raw feelings”, earlier the identification was less biased and consciousness itself and the human mind’s workings were much more associated with the unity of sensations, emotions, thoughts and actions. From this,

³⁶⁶ Harbus, *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, 45.

Onians draws the conclusion that “this lack of differentiation appears to mean that men lived more for the moment or at least shaped their language from the standpoint of the moment and its satisfaction.”³⁶⁷ The closer association of thoughts and feelings is reflected in the views on the supposed locus of the mind as well.

Together with this change of conventions and the disappearance of warrior society, new ideas about the mind came to light. With the development of medicine, it was discovered that the brain had important functions, its primacy was acknowledged, and together with this, the mind shifted its location to this place. Before this time, the conscious mind had had its locus in the chest, not surprisingly, as emotions had physiological signs that could be felt around this part of the body.³⁶⁸ The mind, therefore had not been regarded as much an abstract entity as it is now. Consciousness and all its factors had well-observable “appearances”: emotions caused quicker heart-beating, etc; thinking manifested in words coming with breath, all originating in the chest. And all this had been strongly connected to action. The vernacular mind, *mod*, was an intensive and observable abstraction, and in this quality, it shared the development that Onians observes examining Greek and Latin words for the mind. When, however, with the development of science, scientific thinking and philosophy, the brain started gaining primacy, the mind gradually lost its location in the chest. Parallel to this, there was a separation of the rational and the emotional. As Onians writes:

[...] it is interesting to note that the head, in which normally no physical change is felt accompanying changes of consciousness [...] was in the original belief the seat of an entity not concerned in consciousness, consciousness then being emotional [...]. Its calmness now becomes the seat of the dispassionate intelligence, which has been distinguished and separated from the emotional and appetitive elements.³⁶⁹

So it seems that once the brain became the locus of the mind, a place that could not be much felt in an emotional impact, there was a division of passions from the intellect, and also, an increasing attention was given to rational thinking, and its primacy over emotions. This might be the reason why the Old English authors who were familiar with this learned world-view had a slightly different concept of the mind than their contemporaries who were still living according to the heroic ethos. However,

³⁶⁷ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 21.

³⁶⁸ For a fuller discussion, see chapter 2.3.3. and 2.3.4.

³⁶⁹ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 119, fn. 3.

as the warrior society was disappearing and Christian ethics, the knowledge of medicine and philosophy spread, the road was open to this learned image of the mind, the one which was more intellectual, located in the head, and not nearly as passionate as the old concept.

During the Middle English period, a tendency for the separation of the rational from the emotional is visible and is taking definite steps towards our modern understanding of the mind, which is rather cognitive than emotional. As time passed, the vernacular approach of the Anglo-Saxon *mod* began to fade away, and it seems that perhaps due to the renewed interest in the mind and its locus, and its definite placement in the brain, the mind started to become more dissociated from emotions and more associated with cognition and rationality. The mind (and the brain) was rather a receptacle of thoughts and reason than feelings, as evidenced by texts of the period.

Due to the fact that the mental faculty began to imply an entity which was primarily rational, perhaps a word less loaded with emotional qualities was befitting the new image of the mind than *mod* was. *Gemynd* was a perfect choice (if we can talk about choices in a linguistic – cultural medium). Other words, like *myne* or *hyge*, were not only attested almost exclusively in poetry, but had emotional overtones just as *mod* did. *Gemynd* was one of the most rational of all the Old English mind-synonyms, and this quality could also contribute to its jump-start towards being the chief word denoting the mental faculty.

4.3.1. The Changes in the Functions of Memory

Besides *gemynd* being the most rational of the mind-words, there are other extra-linguistic elements which might have contributed to the fact that a word meaning “memory” was preserved out of the cornucopia of Old English mind-words. Interestingly, just before the linguistic change took place, there was an increased interest in memory as part of the mental faculty. Mary Carruthers mentions that

[...] while there are virtually no medieval treatises “De memoria” much before the twelfth century, there are a number of writings on prayer, meditation, the study of Scripture, which employ some basic features of practical memory-work that we find also in antiquity, without evidencing

much (if any) interest in the concept of memory and recollection, philosophically conceived.³⁷⁰

After this period, however, more and more attention was dedicated to memory, the concept that *gemynd* used to denote and the meaning that *minde* partly retains in Middle English, particularly in the north. This may partly be attributed to becoming acquainted with Aristotelian philosophy³⁷¹ and also with his commentators like Avicenna. The human mind started gaining increased attention and the time was ripe for a renewed philosophical interest which reached its apogee around the 14th century and after, when philosophical writing in the vernacular became widespread due to the rise of the middle class and other cultural changes that I have elaborated in earlier.

Memory becomes one of the chief functions of the – by now – rather rational mind, and as such, *gemynd* / *minde* is again closer to the new image than *mod* was. It is further supported by the fact that memory and remembering was not simply meant as recollection of past events and imprints in our mind, but a much broader faculty and mental category. First it was closer to emotional powers, yet still remaining the most rational of all the mind-words; later it became connected to the intellect and thinking. Consequently, it went through a similar process as the concept of the mind.

What many readers of classical and medieval texts observe is that emotions and intellect were not as dissociated for the people of antiquity and of the early Middle Ages as they are for us. Mere cold-blooded thinking considered independently of emotions is characteristic rather of later centuries, beforehand, hot-headed actions, emotions were in closer connection with cognition than they are for us nowadays. Onians examines the ancient Greek concepts for knowing, remembering and forgetting – ideas rather independent from emotional powers – and reveals that none of these concepts were considered as a merely cognitive element in the workings of the human mind. As for οἶδα, “to know”, he expresses that to this verb

[...] which later was reserved for the expression of cognition, intellectual awareness, we are compelled to give a richer meaning, a relation to feeling, emotion, and even to conation. A condition or rather attitude of the whole mind is implied.³⁷²

³⁷⁰ Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 48.

³⁷¹ He described memory in his *De Anima* quite extensively.

³⁷² Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 15-16.

Remembering and forgetting had similar associations. Nowadays the two concepts are rather connected with cognitive factors and forgetting or remembering indicate their loss or recovery. For the Greeks, however, as Onians argues, “the meaning is not merely that the emotion or activity is perceived or lost as an object of thought, but that it is recovered in itself, felt and perhaps visibly expressed, or [...] that the consciousness thereof, the emotion and the tendency to action, cease altogether.”³⁷³

I feel that even though *gemynd* seems to be the most rational one among the mind-lexemes, the Anglo-Saxon “vernacular” concept of memory must have had similar functions to what Onians observes about knowing, remembering and forgetting in Greek texts. Remembering the past was of chief significance in a heroic society, recounting the deeds of the ancestors, genealogy, singing tales of the golden past, promises made and remembered are recurrent elements in Old English poetry. It introduces us a society to which the past was of great importance, and who were aware how much past actions influenced the present. Remembering was as much part of this warrior society as boasting, and recalling past events before a battle or in the hall was almost like “word-magic” on the present and the future, a similar function that boasting might have had. Recollecting memories of past battles and heroic ancestors – as it so often appears in Anglo-Saxon poetry – must have filled the audience with *mod*, and encouraged them to action.

With the disappearance of heroic society, the “vernacular” concept of memory started to fade away, and memory started getting another function. Mary Carruthers dedicated great attention to the importance and interrelatedness of memory and thinking in the Middle Ages. In her two books, *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture* and *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400 - 1200*, she studies the differences between the medieval conception of memory and remembering and our modern understanding of it. As we think of it today, memory is much more detached from the intellect than it was in the Middle Ages. Memory for us is, as Carruthers defines, “a kind of photographic film, exposed (we imply) by an amateur and developed by a duffer, and so marred by scratches and ‘inaccurate’ light-values.”³⁷⁴ In the medieval times, however, memory was of much higher regard, it was admired and thought of as a sign of supreme intellect, “it was

³⁷³ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 19.

³⁷⁴ Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 1.

memory that made knowledge into useful experience.”³⁷⁵ One of the main focuses of her works is to show that the way we think about memory now can be blamed for a false preconception we have about the Middle Ages, namely that originality and creative thinking was not an issue. Prodigious memory was always admired, good memory was one of the bases of a great character. Memory and its training played a crucial role in that time, it is always recognised, and as a consequence, it seems that authorities were much more valued than original discovery. Memory, however, was not thought of as a mere recollection, an automatic “reproduction” of something past. Carruthers calls our attention to the fact that when writing about memory in the Antiquity and the Middle Ages, one thing that was always admired in connection with it was if a person was able to recite a text backwards as well, or being able “to skip around in it in a systematic way, without being lost or confused.”³⁷⁶ This fact indeed indicates that memory was not a mere imitation, but much more connected to knowledge and the intellect. Knowledge itself inevitably uses memory, as it recalls and combines images brought up from it. When we memorise, we store up bits of knowledge.

As Carruthers emphasises in her other book, the monastic practice of meditation, for example, based on recollecting texts previously read, is very far from how we interpret memory nowadays. Memory then stood closer to what we call cognition today or “the construction of thinking,”³⁷⁷ than to the ability to reconstruct something. The stress placed upon the significance of memory and a reliance on the authorities thus did not contradict originality, rather it was this memory which had to be used inventively in constructing novel ideas, new matters. Authority and memory did not mean ready-made knowledge, rather fertile grounds for fruitful new thoughts.

With our modern frame of mind, we would think that the vice of *memoria* was forgetting. For the medieval thinker, however, it was *curiositas*, a mnemotechnical vice, disorder in thoughts, the mind inclining to laziness and wandering, ideas coming and going without order, a failure to pay attention.³⁷⁸ Effective meditation was based on an ordering of thoughts, an emptying of the mind of useless, earthly matters and remembering, focusing on what is divine. Only through the cloud of forgetting can we

³⁷⁵ Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 1.

³⁷⁶ Carruthers, *The Book of Memory*, 18. For example, Augustine writing about a friend, Simplicius in *De natura et origine animae*.

³⁷⁷ Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 2.

³⁷⁸ See: Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, from page 82 onwards.

get closer to God, by putting aside all our other thoughts. We can “remember” God only after “forgetting.” This way, effective “remembering” God is a focused attention, a mind with ordered and concentrated thoughts. Consequently, learned medieval memory (not the same as the vernacular one) once again proves to be different from the modern concept, being much closer to thinking than to a mere recollection of mental images.

Before closing the discussion on memory and its significance, one more thing has to be noted. That memory was an abstraction somewhat different from our modern concept is also realised in the fact that very often it was not used in a sense of recollecting the past, but rather as “remembering the future.” This is reflected in examples as for example in *Andreas*, where *gemynd* was translated rather as “thought – concern.”

Wes a domes georn; læt ðe on gemyndum hu þæt manegum wearð fira
gefrege geond feala landa, þæt me bysmredon bennum fæstne weras
wansælige. (*Andreas*, ll.: 959-963a)

Carruthers elaborates on this question, too.³⁷⁹ One can remember Heaven or Hell, remember the Last Judgement, or even Death as the expression “memento mori” reminds us, even though these are not based on direct experience or things that happened in the past. Remembering the future is closer to imagination, creating a mental vision from matters of the memory directed to the future.³⁸⁰ Such phrases were frequently employed later by mystics, for example, as contemplation often required the visualisation of matters of the faith in order to live them through, to experience revelation, a mystical experience, getting closer to God. This mental visualisation was aided by murals and decorated stained glass windows, and this visualisation is definitely a use of memory “but for thinking, for inventing, for making a composition in the present that is directed towards our future.”³⁸¹

Even though, this tradition of what the memory is, involved mostly associations with thinking and cognition, we should not bypass another feature of it which makes it different from today’s concept, but which retains some similarities with the vernacular concept of the more unified mind. Carruthers also claims that an expression like

³⁷⁹ *The Craft of Thought*

³⁸⁰ For further treatment of these two faculties, especially in Chaucer’s works, see: Burnley, *Chaucer’s Language and the Philosophers’ Tradition*.

³⁸¹ Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 69.

“‘Remember Jerusalem’, like the American equivalent, ‘Remember the Alamo’, is a call not to preserve but to act – in the present, for the future.”³⁸² She adds that “the matters memory presents are used to persuade and motivate, to create emotion and stir the will.”³⁸³ This aspect of memory is very often neglected nowadays, though very common in the Middle Ages, as she notes. Moreover, I would add, even though there began a separation of cognition and emotions in later medieval thinking, in this special usage, the old idea of a unified mind was retained much longer, and it stands as another support for the idea that remembering, thinking, emotions, will and act used to be much more inseparable than they are today.

All in all, originally there seemed to be a closer connection between the faculties of thinking and feeling, cognition and emotion, and even recollection. The mind was for a long time in many cultures perceived rather as a unity, a whole, in which emotions influenced the way of thinking, thinking brought forth emotions, and these two finally culminated in action. There was a “primal unity of mind in which perception or cognition is associated with or immediately followed by an emotion and a tendency to action varying in degree and kind according to the nature of the object [...]”³⁸⁴ With the appearance of new trends in thinking, this unity started to fall apart, though some aspects of it were retained sporadically in the later Middle Ages, too. *Gemynd*, though still the most rational of all the mind-words, might have been a witness of this unified concept of consciousness where remembering, thinking and emotions were all connected to action. However, as time passed, heroic society was gone, new learned trends appeared in the concept of remembering, and the mind started to attain chiefly rational – intellectual functions, memory was almost entirely stripped of its vernacular functions, and became a faculty associated chiefly with thinking.

As a consequence, the fact that *minde* roots in an Old English word signifying “memory” deserves greater attention. Memory had an understanding much broader than today and connected to a general mental faculty with much tighter bonds than it is today. The concept of remembering comprised not mere recollection, but creative thinking and cognition as well. Therefore, besides the linguistic reasons, the word was not far from the new image of the human mind, the much more rational, thinking

³⁸² Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 67.

³⁸³ Carruthers, *The Craft of Thought*, 67.

³⁸⁴ Onians, *The Origins of European Thought*, 16.

agency, and could therefore expand its meaning very easily towards the general reference to the mental faculty. And it did especially so, since memory was regarded as one of its chief parts.

4.3.2. The Moderation of Passions

The question still remains, however, what happened to *mod* during this period. Even though it used to be the most frequently employed word denoting the mental faculty, it gave rise to a new meaning in Middle English, “a frame of mind or state of feelings” as the *Oxford English Dictionary* defines. Just as our other word, *gemynd*, carried the potentials to broaden its meaning towards “mind” from the earliest surviving sources on, so did *mod*. As evidenced by the cognates and many Old English texts, *mod* carried in itself meanings like “anger” or “courage.” It was at times an uncontrollable overflow of passion, a fierce upsurge of the emotional mind, which urged the warrior to a heroic fight. The word very often referred to the mind as an emotional faculty and therefore the road was open to the narrowing of its meaning once *gemynd* started to broaden its own.

As we saw it earlier,³⁸⁵ there is a seeming contradiction in the semantic field of the Old English *mod*. It was a word that could denote virtues and vices as well, be it “courage” or “pride”, “magnificence” or “wrath.” However,, as I have discussed, the contradiction exists only on the surface level, since the conventions of a heroic society set different behaviour patterns than those influenced by Christian teaching about the deadly sins. The overflow of passion in the form of anger or pride was regarded essential and part of the established social norms. When the “vernacular” overflowing mind, the inner fire of human consciousness manifested in such a way, it was not considered negative, thus Old English “anger” could easily share the same lexeme as “courage” or “magnificence.” Anger, just like boasting (a manifestation of pride) was respected and even required for a long time, and there was not much discussion about the deadly sins in the Old English period.

The situation started to change gradually around the 12th century. Paul Hyams, discussing this era, notes that there was “a major secular civilizing process to juxtapose

³⁸⁵ Chapter 2.3.2.

and integrate with the Twelfth-Century Renaissance of the clerical schools.”³⁸⁶ This was the time when an increasing number of works (especially penitentials) began to appear about the virtues and vices – and therefore the seven deadly sins – and together with the spread of courtly literature and the morals promoted by them, a new secular ethic started to take shape. Hyams notes that through this process, the Mirror of Princes literature was also remodelled after the mid 13th century and appeared almost as a new genre reflecting “the milieu of the friars,” their “efforts to bring moral reform to the laity” and emphasising “the king’s special duty to provide an example to his people.”³⁸⁷

Some, like Barbara Rosenwein, deny that it should be called a civilising process. Certainly, there occurred major changes in this period, but she does not explain this as a “taming-process” of the warrior by being taught self-restraint and control of overflowing emotions. She calls it a historical change that “takes us from one set of conventions and restraints to another rather than through a process of civilizing.”³⁸⁸ Certainly, the word “civilising” has so many connotations that it is better to avoid it in this case. Anger and pride had their place in the heroic society, since they belonged to the set of social conventions, even rules, and “well-understood and justifiable causes.”³⁸⁹ Sometimes they came as an overflow of *mod*, an uncontrollable upsurge of inner fire. But similarly, “its ‘irrationality’ had a rational function within a feuding culture,”³⁹⁰ and expressing anger, just as pride, were in close connection with status and even honour, it had an important role in political competition and disputes, like pride did.

Consequently, in no way can we call the appearance of these two feelings all time negative in Anglo-Saxon England. Therefore, sharing a common lexeme with “courage” and “magnificence” is not as contradictory as it might seem at first sight. Even pride and anger could be positive displays of a noble character of a good and loyal warrior or a powerful lord. *Mod*, thus, did not only denote the mental faculty, but several of the ways it took an outward shape and manifested itself, be it boasting behaviour or a brave act. *Mod* was the mind; but in its traditional or (as Godden calls it) vernacular understanding, the consciousness, the fire from within, which did not draw a sharp distinction between cognition, emotion and the will leading to action. It carried all these

³⁸⁶ Hyams, “What did Henry III of England Think in Bed and in French about Kingship and Anger?” 106.

³⁸⁷ Hyams, “What did Henry III of England Think in Bed and in French about Kingship and Anger?” 111.

³⁸⁸ Rosenwein, “Controlling Paradigms,” 241.

³⁸⁹ Rosenwein, “Controlling Paradigms,” 241.

³⁹⁰ Rosenwein, “Controlling Paradigms,” 241.

notions in itself, and was a free-ranging and less-controlled agency than what it became later. Pride, anger, courage all got on well together within its confines without any contradiction, and formed an organic part of it, as the *mod* of an Anglo-Saxon could once surface in one, another time in another of these abstractions.

The major change in the evaluation of pride and anger occurred with the downfall of warrior society. In the active society of the Anglo-Saxons, passions were not hidden as much as later teaching on self-control and moderation required. The reasons of this change have been defined in various ways, but all that is certain is that in the 13th century moralising texts started to appear in growing number and – *partly* due to the renewed efforts of the mendicants to convert laymen – greater emphasis was put on the vices, and a new ideal was formed together with new conventions of expected behaviour patterns. The passions of anger and pride had to be kept under control, otherwise, as Susan James writes:

[...] they induce blindness of understanding, perversion of the will, alteration of the humours, and by these means maladies and disquietness. In early-modern writing, our constitutional inability to govern our emotions is often attributed to the Fall; as punishment for Adam's sin, God removed from us the capacity to control, moderate, and direct them, creating the inward chaos that is the lot of all but a very few exceptional people.³⁹¹

Passions were regarded an important part of human nature, but especially from the late Middle Ages they were also recognised as destructive forces which can harm people if they are not controlled. They were no longer required behaviour patterns as they were in the warrior-society, but rather to be avoided in the new socio-cultural milieu. It is fascinating to see that it happened just around this time, in the middle of the 13th century, that *mod/mood* started to lose its “basic meaning” MIND and – together with getting rid of the specific meanings “pride”, “arrogance”, “courage” etc, it broadened its semantic field towards denoting “state of mind” in general. Therefore, just at the time when more and more contradiction could have been noticed between the lexeme's different meanings, these contradictions disappeared altogether, and parallel to this, the new word *gemynd/minde* started to stabilise its place in the semantic field “mind.”

³⁹¹ James, *Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*, 13. With a reference to Wright, *Passions of the Mind*, 125.

5. Epilogue

The extralinguistic factors thus become connected to language-internal processes, and socio-cultural changes become internalised in terms of semantic developments, as well. Due to the philosophical movements of the age, new words concerning mental processes penetrated into the English lexicon, and old ones shifted their meaning. Thus, by the interaction of language-external and language-internal processes, the problem of the conspicuous shift in the basic meanings of the two lexemes has been explored. Obviously, such a semantic change is much more complex and further scrutiny is inevitable; thus the questions of *how* and *why* have only partly been answered. Language, as stated in the beginning, is not an autonomous entity, since it is constantly under the influence of the intricately intertwined system of intra- and extra-linguistic factors. From this point of view, the study of an abstraction, such as the seat of human cognitive, intellectual and emotional powers, has proved to be particularly fruitful. As philosophical thinking and the interest in the mental and spiritual faculties came into the limelight in the late Middle English period with heightened intensity and novel ideals, the mind received remarkable attention, and with the introduction and development of new ideas and concepts, the two words, *mod/mood* and *gemynd/minde*, were free to alter their meanings step by step. The *terra incognita* of this linguistic battle has thus become *terra cognita*; or at least a partially explored territory, which is already familiar enough to find the way out of the linguistic labyrinth.

As a final word, I would like to restate what is in the introduction. The changes described here are generalised views of generalised processes, stereotyped understandings of the concept of the mind in different periods of medieval England. Even though these stereotypes do work, we must not forget about the individual. Various approaches to the Old and Middle English mind have been presented, as well as several possible reasons that stood behind the semantic shift from *mod* to *minde*. However, we must keep in mind that every person's understanding of this abstract entity must have been shaped by his or her individual experience and world view. Tendencies can be discovered by different linguistic and literary methods, we can study changes on the grassroot-level or in a global perspective. Each and every method will bring us closer to a fuller understanding. However, we must not forget that what has been depicted here from the distance of five hundred years and even a millennium is a

unity shaped by a variety of individuals, however paradoxical it may sound. Just as the mountain-range: although the skyline is a unified whole, in reality it is made up of hills and dales, forests and meadows, and an infinite variety of stones and pebbles.

Eadem spectamus astra, commune caelum est, idem nos mundus involvit.
Quid interest, qua quisque prudentia verum requirat? Uno itinere non potest
perveniri ad tam grande secretum. (Symmachus)

– *There are several roads to all great secrets. This has been mine....*

Bibliography

- Alexander, Michael J. *Old English Literature*. New York: Schocken Books, 1983.
- Ashdown, Margaret. "The Attitude of the Anglo-Saxons to their Scandinavian Invaders," *Saga Book of the Viking Society* 10. (1928): 75-100.
- Averroes. *Colliget, Die medizinischen Kompendien*. Venice, 1562. Reprinted. Frankfurt am Main: Minerva, 1962.
- Avicenna. *Liber Canonis*. Venice, 1507. Reprinted. Hildesheim: Olms, 1998.
- Barney, Stephen. *Word-Hord: An Introduction to Old English Vocabulary*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 1985.
- Barton, Richard E. "'Zealous Anger' and the Renegotiation of Aristocratic Relationships in Eleventh- and Twelfth-Century France." In *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbara H. Rosenwein, 153-170. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Baugh, Albert C. and Thomas Cable. *A History of the English Language*. London: Routledge, 1993.
- Benviste, Emile: *Indo-European Language and Society*, translated by Elizabeth Palmer. London: Faber and Faber, (1969) 1973.
- Björk, Robert E. and John D. Niles, eds. *A Beowulf Handbook*. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997.
- Bloch, Marc. *Feudal Society*, translated by L. A. Manyon. Chicago: Chicago Press, 1961.
- Bolton, Whitney F. "How Boethian is Alfred's Boethius?" In *Studies in Earlier Old English Prose*, edited by Paul E. Szarmach, 153-168. Albany: State University of New York, 1986.
- Burney, J. D. *Chaucer's Language and the Philosophers' Tradition*. Bury St. Edmunds: D. S. Brewer – Rowman & Littlefield, 1979.
- Cameron, Angus. "A List of Old English Texts." In *A Plan for the Dictionary of Old English*, edited by Roberta Frank and Angus Cameron, 29-267. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.
- Carruthers, Mary. *The Book of Memory: A Study of Memory in Medieval Culture*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

- Carruthers, Mary. *The Craft of Thought: Meditation, Rhetoric, and the Making of Images, 400-1200*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1998.
- Clifford, Rose F. "European neurology from its beginnings until the 15th century: An overview." *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 2. (1993): 21-44.
- Clifford, Rose F. "The neurology of Ancient Greece – an overview." *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 3. (1994): 237-260.
- Coleman, Janet. *English Literature in History 1350-1400: Medieval Readers and Writers*. London: Hutchinson, 1981.
- Copeland, Rita. *Rhetoric, Hermeneutics, and Translation in the Middle Ages: Academic Traditions and Vernacular Texts*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1991.
- Damico, Helen and John Leyerle, eds. *Heroic Poetry in the Anglo-Saxon Period: Studies in Honour of Jess B. Bessinger, Jr.* Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1993.
- DaSent, Sir George W. ed. *Njál's Saga*. London, 1861. Online Medieval and Classical Library, <http://sunsite3.berkeley.edu/OMACL/Njal/>
- Diamond, Robert E. *Old English Grammar and Reader*. Detroit: Wayne State University Press, 1970.
- Diaz, Javier, ed. *A Changing World of Words: Diachronic Approaches to English Lexicology and Semantics*. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002
- Diekstra, F. N. M. "The Seafarer 58-66a: The Flight of the Exiled Soul to Its Fatherland." *Neophilologus* 55. (1971): 433-446.
- Dobbie, Elliot. *The Anglo-Saxon Minor Poems*, ASPR 6. New York: Columbia University Press, 1942.
- Dubs, Kathleen E, ed. *What does it Mean? Pázmány Papers in English and American Studies*. Volume 3. Piliscsaba: Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 1993-1994.
- Ellis, Roger and others, eds. *The Medieval Translator: The Theory and Practice of Translation in the Middle Ages*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1989.
- Engberg, Norma J. "Mod-Maegen Balance in Elene, The Battle of Maldon and The Wanderer" *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 85. (1984): 212-226.
- Erickson, Robert A. *The Language of the Heart, 1600-1750*. Philadelphia: University of Pennsylvania Press, 1997.

- Fabiszak, Małgorzata. "A Semantic Analysis of Emotion Terms in Old English." *Studia Anglica Posnaniensia* 34. (1999): 133-146.
- Fisher, D. J. V. "The Church in England Between the Death of Bede and the Danish Invasions." *Transactions of the Royal Historical Society*, ser. 5, vol. 2. (1951): 1-19.
- Fisher, D. J. V. *The Anglo-Saxon Age c. 400-1042*, vol. 3. London: Longman, 1973.
- Förster, Max. *Die Vercelli-Homilien: I.-VIII. Homilie*, Bib. ags. Prosa 12. Hamburg, 1932. Reprinted. Darmstadt: Wissenschaftliche Buchgesellschaft, 1964.
- Fox, Cyril and Bruce Dickins, eds. *The Early Cultures of North-West Europe*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950.
- Frank, Roberta and Angus Cameron, eds. *A Plan for the Dictionary of Old English*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1973.
- Frank, Roberta. "Poetic Words in Late Old English Prose." In *From Anglo-Saxon to Early Middle English: Studies Presented to E. G. Stanley*, edited by Malcolm Godden, Douglas Gray, and Terry Hoad, 87-107. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Gallacher, Patrick J. ed. *The Cloud of Unknowing*. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1997. In TEAMS Middle English Texts, <http://www.lib.rochester.edu/camelot/teams/clunintr.htm>
- Gamkrelidze, Thomas V and Vjačeslav V. Ivanov. *Indo-European and the Indo-Europeans*, 2 vols. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995.
- Gardner, Edmund G., ed. *Gregory the Great: Dialogues*. 1911. Online version: <http://www.tertullian.org>, *The Tertullian Project*, edited by Roger Pearse.
- Geeraerts, Dirk and Stefan Grondelaers. "Looking Back at Anger: Cultural Traditions and Metaphorical Patterns." In *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, edited by John. R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury, 152-179. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995.
- Geeraerts, Dirk. "Prospects and problems of prototype theory," *Linguistics* 3-2. (1989): 219-231.
- Geeraerts, Dirk. *Diachronic Prototype Semantics: A Contribution to Historical Lexicology*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1997.
- Geertz, Clifford. "The Growth of Culture and the Evolution of Mind." In *The Interpretation of Cultures*, edited by Clifford Geertz, 3-32. New York: Basic Books, 1973.

- Gevaert, Caroline. "The Evolution of the Lexical and Conceptual Field of Anger in Old and Middle English." In *A Changing World of Words: Diachronic Approaches to English Lexicology and Semantics*, edited by Javier Diaz. Amsterdam: Rodopi, 2002.
- Gevaert, Caroline. "The ANGER IS HEAT Question: Detecting Cultural Influence on the Conceptualisation of Anger Through Diachronic Corpus Analysis." In *Perspectives on Variation, Sociolinguistic, Historical, Comparative*. SLE-Proceedings, 195-208. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 2005.
- Godden, Malcolm R. "Anglo-Saxons on the Mind." In *Learning and Literature in Anglo-Saxon England*, edited by Michael Lapidge and Helmut Gneuss, 271-298. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985. And in *Old English Literature*, edited by Roy M. Liuzza, 284-314. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.
- Godden, Malcolm, Douglas Gray, and Terry Hoad, eds. *From Anglo-Saxon to Early Middle English: Studies Presented to E. G. Stanley*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.
- Godden, Malcolm, ed. *Aelfric's Catholic Homilies. The Second Series*, EETS SS 5. London: Kegan Paul, 1979.
- Godden, Malcolm, ed. *Aelfric's Second Series of 'Catholic Homilies': The Text and Manuscript Tradition*. [Dissertation, Cambridge, 1970]
- Godfrey, John. *The Church in Anglo-Saxon England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.
- Grimm, Jacob. *Teutonic Mythology*, 4 vols. London: George Bell and Sons, 1900.
- Grímnismál. Snorra-Edda*. The collection of the University of Iceland, <http://www.hi.is/~eybjorn/>
- Grönbech, Vilhelm. *The Culture of the Teutons*, 3 vols. London: Oxford University Press, 1931.
- Harbus, Antonina. "The Medieval Concept of the Self in Anglo-Saxon England," *Self and Identity* 1. (2002): 77-97.
- Harbus, Antonina. *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*. Amsterdam, New York: Rodopi, 2002.
- Harvey, E. Ruth. *The Inward Wits: Psychological Theory in the Middle Ages and the Renaissance*. London: The Wartburg Institute, 1975.

- Hávarðar Saga Ísafirðings*. University of Iceland Collection,
<http://www.hi.is/~terry/ntfylvlgjur.htm>
- Healey, Antonette di Paulo and Richard L. Venezky. *A Microfiche Concordance to Old English*. Newark: University of Delaware, 1980.
- Healey, Antonette di Paulo and Richard L. Venezky. *A Microfiche Concordance to Old English*. Newark: University of Delaware, 1980.
- Herzfeld, George, ed. *An Old English Martyrology*, EETS OS 116. London: Kegan Paul, Trech, Trübner, 1900. [reprinted: 1973]
- Hill, John M. "Social Milieu." In *A Beowulf Handbook*, edited by Robert E. Björk and John D. Niles, 255-269. Exeter: University of Exeter Press, 1997.
- Hiltunen, Risto and others, eds. *English Far and Wide: A Festschrift for Inna Koskenniemi*. Turku: University of Turku, 1993.
- Hogg, Richard M., ed. *Cambridge History of the English Language*, 6 volumes. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Hudson, Anne, ed. *Selections from English Wycliffite Writings*. Toronto: University of Toronto Press, 1997.
- Hyams, Paul. "What did Henry III of England Think in Bed and in French about Kingship and Anger?" In *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbara H. Rosenwein, 92-124. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Isidore of Seville. *Etymologiae*. In *Etymologiarum sive Originum Libri 20*, 2 vols., edited by Lindsay W. M. Oxford: Clarendon, 1911.
- James, Susan. *Passion and Action: The Emotions in Seventeenth-Century Philosophy*. Oxford: Clarendon, 1997.
- James, William. *Principles of Psychology*. Cambridge: Harvard University Press, [1890] 1981.
- Jón Helgason, ed. *Eddadigte*, 3 vols. Copenhagen: Munksgaard, 1955.
- Karenberg, Axel and Irmgard Hort. "Medieval Descriptions and Doctrines of Stroke: Preliminary Analysis of Select Sources. Part I: The Struggle for Terms and Theories – Late Antiquity and Early Middle Ages (300-800)," *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 7, no. 3. (1998): 162-173.
- Karenberg, Axel and Irmgard Hort. "Medieval Descriptions and Doctrines of Stroke: Preliminary Analysis of Select Sources. Part II: Between Galenism and

- Aristotelism – Islamic Theories of Apoplexy (800-1200),” *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 7, no. 3. (1998): 174-185.
- Karenberg, Axel and Irmgard Hort. “Medieval Descriptions and Doctrines of Stroke: Preliminary Analysis of Select Sources. Part III: Multiplying Speculations – The High and Late Middle Ages (1000-1450),” *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 7, no. 3. (1998): 186-200.
- Kastovsky, Dieter. “Semantics and Vocabulary.” In *Cambridge History of the English Language: The Beginnings to 1066*, vol. 1, edited by Richard M. Hogg, 290-348. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1992.
- Kellogg, Robert L. “The Context for Epic in Later Anglo-Saxon England.” In *Heroic Poetry in the Anglo-Saxon Period: Studies in Honour of Jess B. Bessinger, Jr.*, edited by Helen Damico and John Leyerle, 139-156. Kalamazoo: Medieval Institute Publications, 1993.
- Kershaw, Nora. *Anglo-Saxon and Norse Poems*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1922.
- Kiricsi, Ágnes. “From *Mod* to *Minde* – Report from a Semantic Battlefield.” In *What does it Mean*, edited by Kathleen E. Dubs, 217-239. Piliscsaba: Pázmány Péter Catholic University, 2003-2004.
- Kiricsi, Ágnes. Review of *The Life of the Mind in Old English Poetry*, by Antonina Harbus. *Neophilologische Mitteilungen* 105. (2005): 504-507.
- Koerner, Konrad, ed. *Language and Society in Early Modern England: Selected Essays 1981-1994*. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1996.
- Koivisto-Alanko, Päivi. *Abstract Words in Abstract Worlds: Directionality and Prototypical Structure in the Semantic Change in English Nouns of Cognition*. Mémoires de la Société Néophilologique de Helsinki 58. Helsinki: Société Néophilologique, 2000.
- Kövecses, Zoltán. “Anger: Its Language, Conceptualisation, and Physiology in the Light of Cross-Cultural Evidence.” In *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*, edited by John R. Taylor and Robert E. MacLaury, 182-196. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995.
- Krapp, George Philip and Elliot Dobbie, eds. *The Exeter Book*, ASPR 3. New York: Columbia University Press, 1936.
- Krapp, George Philip, ed. *The Junius Manuscript*, ASPR 1. New York: Columbia University Press, 1931.

- Krapp, George Philip, ed. *The Paris Psalter and the Metres of Boethius*, ASPR 5. New York: Columbia University Press, 1932.
- Kurath, Hans. *The semantic sources of the words for the emotions in Sanskrit, Greek, Latin, and the Germanic languages*. PhD dissertation, University of Chicago. Menasha: The Collegiate Press, 1921.
- Kytö, Merja, Matti Rissanen and Minna Palander-Collin, eds. *Early English in the Computer Age: Explorations through the Helsinki Corpus*. Berlin: Mouton de Gruyter, 1993.
- Kytö, Merja. *Manual to the Diachronic Part of the Helsinki Corpus of English Texts: Coding Conventions and Lists of Source Texts*. Helsinki: Department of English, University of Helsinki, 1996.
<http://khnt.hit.uib.no/icame/manuals/HC/INDEX.HTM>
- Lakoff, George. *Women, Fire and Dangerous Things: What Categories Reveal about the Mind*. Chicago: University of Chicago Press, 1987.
- Lapidge, Michael, Helmut Gneuss. *Learning and Literature in Anglo-Saxon England*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1985.
- Lass, Roger, ed. *The Cambridge History of the English Language: Early Modern English 1476—1776*, vol. 3. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Lebowitz, Josiah. *Norse Gods and Goddesses*.
<http://www.pebbleversion.com/html/NorseGods.htm>
- Liuzza, Roy M, ed. *Old English Literature*. New Haven and London: Yale University Press, 2002.
- Mackie, William S, ed. *The Exeter Book*, EETS OS 194. London: Kegan Paul, 1934.
[reprinted: repr. 1973]
- Magnús Finnbogason, ed. *Njáls Saga*. Reykjavík: Bókaútgáfa Menningarsjóðs og Þjóðvinafélagsins, 1944.
- McIntosh, Angus, M. L. Samuels and Michael Benskin, eds. *A Linguistic Atlas of Late Medieval England*, 4 vols. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1986.
- Minnis, A. J. and Tim William Machan. "The Boece as Late-Medieval Translation." In *Chaucer's Boece and the Medieval Tradition of Boethius*, edited by A. J. Minnis, 167-188. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1993.
- Minnis, A. J. ed. *Chaucer's Boece and the Medieval Tradition of Boethius*. Cambridge: D. S. Brewer, 1993.

- Moricca, Umberto, ed. *Gregorii Magni Dialogi, libri IV*, Fonti per la storia d'Italia, scrittori, 6. Rome: Tipografia del senato, 1924.
- Nevalainen, Terttu. "Early Modern English Lexis and Semantics." In *The Cambridge History of the English Language: Early Modern English 1476—1776*, vol. 3, edited by Roger Lass, 332-458. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1999.
- Norrøn mytologi frå A til Æ*. http://lind.no/nor/index.asp?vis=s_i_olav_tryggvason#62
- Ogura, Michiko. "OE Verbs of Thinking," *Neuphilologische Mitteilungen* 87. (1986), 325-341.
- Ogura, Michiko. *Verbs in Medieval English: Differences in Verb Choice in Verse and Prose*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1996.
- Olry, Régis. "Medieval Neuroanatomy: the Text of Mondino dei Luzzi and the Plates of Guido da Vigevano," *Journal of the History of the Neurosciences* 6, no. 2. (1997): 113-123.
- Onians, R. B. *The Origins of European Thought about the Body, the Mind, the Soul, the World, Time and Fate*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1951.
- Otten, Kurt. *König Alfred's Boethius*. Tübingen: M. Niemeyer, 1964.
- Owen, W. J. B. "Wanderer, Lines 50-57," *M. L. N.* 65, (1950): 161-165.
- Parry, Milman. *The Making of Homeric Verse: The Collected Papers of Milman Parry*. Edited by Adam Parry. Oxford: Clarendon Press, 1971.
- Payne, F. Anne. *King Alfred & Boethius: An Analysis of the Old English Version of the Consolation of Philosophy*. Madison, Milwaukee and London: The University of Wisconsin Press, 1968.
- Peyroux, Catherine. "Gertrude's *furor*: Reading Anger in an Early Medieval Saint's Life." In *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbara H. Rosenwein, 36-58. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Phillips, Michael J. *Heart, Mind, and Soul in Old English: A Semantic Study*, unpublished PhD dissertation. University of Illinois, 1985.
- Pope, J. C. *Homilies of Aelfric: A Supplementary Collection*, 2 vols., EETS 259, 260. London: Kegan Paul, 1967-8.
- Rissanen, Matti. "The Loss of Wit 'Know': Evidence from the Helsinki Corpus." In *English Far and Wide: A Festschrift for Inna Koskenniemi*, edited by R. Hiltunen and others, 195-206. Turku: University of Turku, 1993.

- Rosch, Eleanor. "Structural bases of prototypicality effects," *Journal of Experimental Psychology: Human Perception and Performance* 2. (1976): 491-502.
- Rosenwein, Barbara H. "Controlling Paradigms." In *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbara H. Rosenwein, 233-247. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Rosenwein, Barbara H. ed. *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Salmon, Vivian. "The Wanderer and The Seafarer, and the Old English Conception of the Soul," *The Modern Language Review* 55. (1960): 1-10.
- Salmon, Vivian. "Views on Meaning in 16th- Century England." In *Language and Society in Early Modern England: Selected Essays 1981-1994*, edited by Konrad Koerner, 55-75. Amsterdam, Philadelphia: John Benjamins Publishing, 1996.
- Samuels, Michael L. *Linguistic Evolution with Special Reference to English*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1972.
- Sawyer, Peter H. *The Age of the Vikings*. London: Edward Arnold, 1962.
- Sedgefield, Walter J. ed. *King Alfred's Old English Version of Boethius 'De Consolatione Philosophiae'*. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1899)
- Skeat, Walter W. ed. *Ælfric's Lives of Saints*, EETS OS 76, 82, 94, 114. London: Kegan Paul, 1881-1900.
- Skeat, Walter W., ed. *The Four Gospels in Anglo-Saxon, Northumbrian, and Old Mercian Versions*. Cambridge, 1871-87. [Reprinted: Darmstadt, 1970.]
- Smithers, G. V. "The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer (continued)," *Medium Aevum* 28. (1959): 1-22.
- Smithers, G. V. "The Meaning of The Seafarer and The Wanderer," *Medium Aevum* 26. (1957): 137-153.
- Snorri Sturluson. *Heimskringla: A History of the Norse Kings*, translated by Samuel Laing. London: Norroena Society, 1907. In Online Medieval and Classical Library, <http://sunsite.berkeley.edu/OMACL/Heimskringla/>
- Strite, Vic. *Old English Semantic Field Studies*. New York: Lang, 1989.
- Sweetser, Eve E. *Cambridge Studies in Linguistics 54, From Etymology to Pragmatics: Metaphorical and Cultural Aspects of Semantic Structure*. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1990.

- Symmachus. *Relatio 3*, in Bibliotheca Augustana, http://www.fh-augsburg.de/~harsch/Chronologia/Lspost04/Symmachus/sym_re03.html
- Symmachus. *Relation 3*, <http://www.acs.ucalgary.ca/~vandersp/Courses/texts/sym-amb/symrel3.html>
- Szarmach, Paul E. ed. *Studies in Earlier Old English Prose*. Albany: State University of New York, 1986.
- Tacitus. *Germania. P. Cornelii Taciti Opera*. The Latin Library, <http://www.thelatinlibrary.com/tac.html>
- Tacitus. *Germania*. UNRV History, <http://www.unrv.com/tacitus/tacitus-germania-2.php>
- Taylor, John R. and Robert E. MacLaury eds. *Language and the Cognitive Construal of the World*. Berlin, New York: Mouton de Gruyter, 1995.
- Taylor, John R. *Linguistic Categorisation: Prototypes in Linguistic Theory*. Oxford: Clarendon Press, [1989] 1995.
- The Fitzwilliam Museum*, http://www.fitzmuseum.cam.ac.uk/gallery/normans/gallery/coin_8.htm
- The History of Epileptology*, in Deutsches Epilepsiemuseum Kork, http://www.epilepsiemuseum.de/alt/body_historen.html
- The Wanderer Project*, <http://research.uvsc.edu/mcdonald/wanderweb/>
- Thorpe, Benjamin ed. *The Homilies of the Anglo-Saxon Church*. London: Richard and John E. Taylor, 1843-6. Reprinted: New York: Johnson Reprint Corp., 1971.
- Tolkien, J. R. R. *Finn and Hengest: The Fragment and the Episode*, edited by Alan Bliss. London, 1982.
- Walshe, Thomas M. "Neurological Concepts in Archaic Greece: What did Homer Know?" *Journal of the History of Neurosciences* 6. no. 1. (1997): 72-81.
- White, Stephen D. "The Politics of Anger." In *Anger's Past: The Social Uses of an Emotion in the Middle Ages*, edited by Barbara H. Rosenwein, 127-152. Ithaca and London: Cornell University Press, 1998.
- Whitelock, Dorothy. "The Interpretation of *The Seafarer*." In *The Early Cultures of North-West Europe*, edited by Cyril Fox and Bruce Dickins, 261-272. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1950.

Wierzbicka, Anna. *Semantics, Culture, and Cognition: Universal Human Concepts in Culture-Specific Configurations*. New York, Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1992.

Wright, Thomas. *The Passions of the Mind in General*, edited by W. Webster Newbold. New York: Garland, 1986.

Dictionaries

A Concise Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, edited by John R. Clark Hall. Cambridge: Cambridge University Press, 1962.

An Anglo-Saxon Dictionary, edited by Joseph Bosworth Joseph and T. Northcote Toller. Oxford: Clarendon, 1898. *Supplement Volume*. 1921.

An Icelandic-English Dictionary, edited by Richard Cleasby and Gudbrand Vigfusson. Oxford: Clarendon, [1874] 1957.

Anglo-Norman Dictionary, edited by W. Rothwell and others. London, 1992.

A Thesaurus of Old English, 2 vols, edited by Jane Roberts and Christian Kay, with Lynne Grundy. London: Kings College, 1995.

Oxford English Dictionary on CD-ROM (Second Edition) Version 1.13. Oxford: Oxford University Press, 1994.

Oxford English Dictionary Online. <http://www.dictionary.oed.com>, 2004.

The Concise Scots Dictionary, edited by Mairi Robinson. Aberdeen: Aberdeen University Press, 1985.

The Middle English Dictionary, edited by Hans Kurath. Michigan: Michigan University Press, 1954.

Electronic Corpora

Chadwyck-Healey Literatures Collections. <http://collections.chadwyck.com/>

Dictionary of Old English Database, edited by Antonette di Paolo Healey. <http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/o/oec/>

Literature Online. <http://lion.chadwyck.co.uk/>

Middle English Compendium. <http://ets.umdl.umich.edu/m/mec>

The Helsinki Corpus of English Texts. Helsinki: Department of English, University of Helsinki, 1991.

Appendix

<i>mod/mood</i>		<i>gemynd/minde</i>		
EMOTIONAL MIND	RATIONAL MIND / SPIRITUAL SELF	MENTION	MEMORY	MIND
anger – wrath courage pride – arrogance X X – courage X – will – intention full consciousness character emotional faculty – mood mood attitude - disposition disposition – general reference – soul person	general reference general reference – soul general reference – thought general reference – thought – intention will – intention intention – disposition rational faculty rational faculty – thought	mention	memory (faculty) memory (concept) commemoration commemoration – memorial commemoration day memory (faculty) – thought memory (concept) – thought	general reference general reference – thought rational faculty rational faculty – thought thought – concern - opinion emotional faculty thought – intention will – intention disposition - attitude general reference – soul